



PROCEEDING Jakarta Geopolitical Forum VI/2022

Jakarta, 24-25 August 2022

Geo Maritime: Chasing the Future of Global Stability

LEMBAGA KETAHANAN NASIONAL RI
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(JGF) VI/ 2022**

“GEO-MARITIME: CHASING THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL STABILITY”

JAKARTA, 24 – 25 AUGUST 2022

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Geo-Maritime: Chasing the Future of Global Stability



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PROCEEDING

THE JAKARTA GEOPOLITICAL FORUM (JGF) VI/ 2022 "GEO-MARITIME: CHASING THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL STABILITY"

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FOREWORD
THE GOVERNOR OF THE NATIONAL RESILIENCE INSTITUTE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
“GEO-MARITIME: CHASING THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL STABILITY”



Jakarta Geopolitical Forum is an international event annually organized by Lemhannas RI, specified to focus on geopolitical matters. As we learn from history, Lemhannas RI for the first time was established as a school of geopolitics. It is relevant for now the forum to serve as a platform for dialogue and for exchanging of ideas for building peaceful and secured global geopolitics. I believe this forum will provide an effective opportunity to contribute

to the review of global geopolitical dynamics.

Let me briefly overview the current geopolitical condition which remains uncertain as we are seeing at a global level, that many modern trends in traditional conflicts abruptly have an outbreak. It shocks the world, and our hearts and thoughts go out to the millions of people suffering from the horrendous humanitarian tragedy on the ground. The geopolitical tension is also adding new challenges and uncertainties to a world that is already walking a fine line between growth and inflation. In the near term, a recession seems likely in several regions, depending on the eventual path of geopolitical policy and strategy. The margin of error is thin, and a policy-induced hard-landing may pose a considerable threat to risk.

Power competition nowadays has a rapid escalation in the maritime sphere by way of potential modality for the rule is taking place. The extension of power influence would impact the geopolitical landscape when the world suffers from complexities through some interplayed unprecedented events. There is no rule engaged so far, in maritime accessible for power that would be our global challenges. Power projection is underway, even before Covid-19 pandemic, to gain benefits grows into common strategy in the competition. Chasing the balance of power through power projection has compelled the world to face its most intractable challenge. This has tested our world in deeper churn. At this term, power politics would be an object that binds diversified struggle of influence among nations.

Geopolitical dynamics in maritime space is currently overexposed by military rivalry underpinning redistribution of power. The rise of great powers' hegemony

in the competition for military balance through military rivalry has determined the military control over maritime space. Therefore, controlling the water ways through the use of maritime power more broadly involves military capabilities at sea would be our focus in the context of protecting maritime-based resources and maritime-based traffic for supply chain and connectivity. The maritime task in geopolitical gameplay considers power instruments with their use in the strategy, associated with military policy based on foreign policy. Nonetheless, maritime order would be our task to commit to building clarified norms and values at sea to circumvent the strategy to pre-empt.

Maritime geopolitics in such circumstances has forced the military to counteract to trigger what would be devastating implications to the peripheral states. Some hot spots cannot be evaded to maritime issues which are currently raising in dispute such as in the South China Sea, East Asia, and Indo Pacific. It represents threats and challenges that interstates should correspond affirmatively. The state of the nation is a site of nationalism energies which are now indissolubly linked with only the military force to exert itself as a state against others'. The regional political development and power configuration in the region are the excesses of the remaining cold war structure that so far at the elevated level has emerged the pressure for global stability.

Maritime power, from standpoint of defense and security, lends the country's geopolitics indisputable. However, it is developed in the construction and modernization of capabilities that will increase political tensions. Taking note of maritime power capacity through military modernization, particularly in technology, always followed by the economic conditions, it becomes crucial for states in the region to adapt the capacity refers to a power system that encompasses all of the sea's power elements and transfers whole efficiency to national power.

Cooperation is critical now to establish the maritime order to avoid threats from the sea. As the post-modern geopolitics referred to so called geo.V. Dealing with the global supply chain for commodity supplies, and connectivity. Effects from the geopolitical fallout are also likely to linger for a while. Depending on their reliance and proximity to commodity supplies, new winners and losers are expected to emerge. We are aware of the importance of geopolitical risks in accurately gauging economic prospects. But although geopolitics may be in vogue, their relationship has been interdependent. At this point, maritime defense underlies its importance to protect the marine commercial fleet and navy as the backbone of the economy. In the twenty-first century, the maritime technological industry is vital to the development of a country's maritime power and capability. The navy is primarily a defensive force at this stage.

Furthermore, it is not just a force that guards the coasts, but it is also a force that assures the safety of marine transportation routes. In this term, states must develop new concepts, maritime policies, and tactics within the framework of soft power, as well as economic and technology, commercial, and logistics factors, in order to secure the pathway of maritime-based supply chain and maritime connectivity.

In light of all those challenges ahead, the Jakarta Geopolitical Forum is very timely to organize as global dynamics in maritime geopolitics to emulate the tensions of power competition tends to goes on while power gain for resources scarcity tends to escalate. At the same time, advancing technology for gaining power in the context of hegemony would lead to wide disparities among nations.

Considering its reliance on energy and other commodities, the protection of supply chain and connectivity may remain high concern, even when the power competition would likely never end that may dampen growth for prolonged periods of time. More broadly, we expect the war, combined with the ongoing effects of the pandemic, to add increased uncertainty to the global landscape and complexity to global trade and geopolitical dynamics.

We expect a success going the Jakarta Geopolitical Forum forward to mean more adequate substantial outcomes come to our mind for policy making. Policymakers, I believe, all over the world, are still looking for ways to contain the spread of geopolitical fallout. Yet, we think current events will eventually serve as a catalyst to accelerate the transition towards the global stability. It calls for a new approach with actions to transform threats into opportunities, by rethinking how we understand, value and norms of maritime geopolitics as a precious resource, catalysing change and building partnerships to achieve the global stability.



PREFACE
DEPUTY FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES OF
THE NATIONAL RESILIENCE INSTITUTE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA



Alhamdulillahirrabbi'lalamin, thanks to Allah SWT for His grace and guidance so that **"The Jakarta Geopolitical Forum VI/2022"** forum can be carried out properly and smoothly. This seminar was **themed "Geo-Maritime: Pursuing the Future of Global Stability"** which was held on August 24-25, 2022 to explore the implementation of critical thinking and the development of fresh ideas and strategic, it is an annual agenda of the Deputy for Strategic Studies of Lemhannas RI based on its main tasks and function.

The theme raised in this forum is very relevant if we look at the current developments in the global, regional and national strategic environment. Global geopolitics currently leads to the mastery of maritime power followed by hard power competition to fight over natural resources and regional hegemony by the superpowers.

The development of maritime power, both economic and security, has an impact and potential for regional and global geopolitical instability. The question that needs attention is how to navigate maritime geopolitics as a prerequisite modality to build global stability in a safe and prosperous world?

The objectives to be achieved in holding this forum are to understand the strategy of asymmetric geopolitical competition in the uncertainty of the direction of global security towards the right balance, then understand the open geo-economic architecture in ensuring the sustainability of resources under a peaceful political constellation, as well as the contribution of geo-maritime technology to a safe global architectural balance.

The forum presented the results of research, reviews, and sharing sessions conducted by world geopolitical experts from various countries. The results of the forum are then documented in this proceeding. This forum was successful with the help of many parties. Therefore, we would like to thank the many parties who have helped to organize this seminar.



We realize that there are still many shortcomings in the preparation of the proceeding, so suggestions and constructive criticism are very much needed. Hopefully this proceeding is useful for readers and those in need.

Wassalamualaikum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh.

Jakarta, 24 August 2022
Deputy of Strategic Studies,

Prof. Dr. Ir. Reni Mayerni, M.P.
Middle Principal Advisor (IV/d)

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

THE CHAIRMAN OF JGF VI/2022



The Jakarta Geopolitical Forum (JGF) is a sharing session for world geopolitical experts in studying regional situations in the world. This forum was initiated by the Indonesian National Resilience Institute (Lemhannas RI) since 2016. This forum aims to provide a place for practitioners, professionals and academics to exchange views and thoughts on the future of geopolitics and world order. Geopolitics, which is defined as a living space, is a central issue for all countries in the world.

On August 24-25, 2022, the JGF was held for the 6th time with the theme **“Geo-Maritime: Chasing the Future of Global Stability”**. Currently, the world is looking for a balance in the midst of geopolitical competition due to the competition for hegemony from developed countries and also the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war. One of the objectives of holding the JGF in 2022 is to understand the strategy of geopolitical competition between countries, especially in the maritime aspect, understand the geo-economic architecture for the sustainability of global productivity, and how advances in geo-maritime technology are utilized for world security and prosperity.

In addition, the implementation of the 2022 JGF is intended to build awareness and mutual understanding among global actors on how to create peaceful and balanced global stability. Some of the critical questions that will be discussed include, how to navigate maritime geopolitics as a prerequisite modality to build global stability in a safe and prosperous world?

This proceeding book contains a number of articles from world geopolitical experts as well as practitioners, professionals and academics from the country. Therefore, on this occasion, please allow us say thanks to:

1. The Governor of the Lemhannas RI, Dr. Andi Widjajanto as the initiator and motivator in the JGF committee.
2. Mr/Mrs. Resource persons both from abroad and Indonesia who have shared their knowledge and experiences in the JGF VI/2022.
3. The participants of the JGF VI/2022 who have contributed and played an active role during the event.

4. Partners and the JGF 2022 committee and all parties that I cannot mention one by one who have given their time, energy, and thoughts for the success of this forum.

Hopefully this proceeding is useful for all of us, especially practitioners, professionals and academics to predict the future development of geopolitics and world order and it is hoped that this forum will remain strategic for speakers and participants to discuss geopolitical issues at the world level.

Jakarta, 24 August 2022
Chairman
The Jakarta Geopolitical Forum VI/2022

Rido Hermawan, M.Sc.
TNI Major General

ABOUT JAKARTA GEOPOLITICAL FORUM VI/2022

“GEO-MARITIME: CHASING THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL STABILITY”

Jakarta, 24-25 August 2022

I. Background

The recasting of global order in the era of strategic reality has implications far beyond the power-shift by the rise of China and the fall of the United States (US)' supremacy. While at a time particularly when some of the pressing problems like pandemic, climate change and economic downturn in the post-pandemic, required coordinated solutions. Maritime geopolitical concept has been used thus far for struggling for power, but low at the same time at the service for humanity. At the other moment, a maritime-configured power since the turn of the 21st century has taken a root of insecurities when China's revisionist positions takes on the established maritime order. Notwithstanding the US' response is unclear how each regional stakeholders will manage to address the emerging issues of maritime power politics and political security in contested spaces.

In the midst of current economic recovery in the post-COVID 19, there is a decisive shift away from globalisation and towards an economic nationalism. The US and China strategic competition which has deemed to be a new cold war would bring the world in anxiety. Single power with supremacy as a global hegemon attributed to the US not equal to the Chinese' multipolar foreign policy oriented. When the US officially labelled China a strategic competitor, at the same the US does not seem to have changed that rhetoric regarding China. As such, geopolitical risks, especially the confrontational relationship with the US, may also push China's medium-term perspective lower, the more the two economies bifurcate their path from the still important economic relations, whether we look at trade or investment. Conflict of norms by China and the US' political manoeuvre at the renewed tension has dropped off some economic concerns that constitutes global hegemonic power clash. Cluster of struggles dubbed as countries around the world to do consolidating newly institutionalized democratic regimes with resources scarcity under which global norms of economy deadlocked. Marine resources become elements of which maritime blue economy is pursued profoundly for generating growth which are critical determinants for a long-lasting food supply and energy stability.

Beyond economic and trade, the US stepped up the measures for China's containment, but they were not fully unexpected, especially as concerns the technology side. In fact, the US had already increased the scrutiny through stricter export controls, especially after China announced the adoption of Made in China 2025. This long-term plan made it increasingly clear that China would be aggressively pursuing rapid technological upgrade and ambitious objectives in terms of substituting key imports with domestic components. Against that backdrop, the transfer of technology has become increasingly restricted by tightening exports control on high-end technology products. In turn, China has recently introduced export licenses for key technologies, such as artificial intelligence. Maritime techno-war would possibly happen when the two superpowers surged.

As power competition remains on maritime related issues, the future of geo-maritime is so relevant. Global system powered by hegemonic interest in the era of transitional norms of trade and economy has been advancing technology to struggle for power, challenged by the rise of counter-hegemonic states. The question is "how to navigate maritime geopolitics as a prerequisite modality to build a global stability in a secured and prosperous world?"

Determining the right prescription for how the US should respond to strategic competition with China depends on having the right diagnosis of the problem. Unfortunately, much of the prevailing analysis and commentary on the subject has so far gotten the diagnosis with misunderstanding or misrepresenting the nature of the challenge poses ahead. Therefore, The Jakarta Geopolitical Forum VI/2022 raised the theme: "**Geo-Maritime: Chasing the Future of Global Stability**".

II. Questions

1. What would the uncertain asymmetric geopolitical competitive strategy assure of global security in proper balance?
2. How to construct an open maritime geo-economics architecture with sustainable and proportioned access of resources for growth and sustaining resource under peaceful political power?
3. How would the advancing maritime technology coincidentally contribute to secured and balanced global architecture under such fragmented situation?

III. Purpose of Theme

1. Understanding the contemporary geo-maritime context that emerge power to upcoming geopolitical issues.
2. Exploring the maritime-based geopolitics and its global impact.

IV. Objectives of the Theme

Structuring a design of relations among geopolitical actors in achieving a balancing that comes to the global stability.

V. Resume of Speaker Presentation:

1. Collin Koh Swee Lean, Ph.D.

Maritime Defense and Security in Southeast Asia Following COVID-19 and Ukraine War: A Preliminary Assessment

Six months into the war in Ukraine, some interesting lessons can be gleaned from the conduct of the campaign – especially for interested bystanders in Southeast Asia as far as the future of maritime defense and security is concerned. First, the war showed that notwithstanding the prior focus on non-traditional security and gray zone challenges, conventional interstate armed conflict remains a real prospect now and in the future. Second, the war also demonstrated that with sufficient political resolve, fighting morale and external military assistance, the smaller and weaker party can still possess the opportunity to stymie the campaign plan of the bigger and stronger adversary, even if yet to completely defeat the latter in the battlefield. Finally, the war also showed the devastating economic impact of a protracted conflict, not just to the belligerents but also, the world at large.

2. Admiral (Ret) Prof. Dr. Marsetio

Indonesia's Maritime Defense Amidst Regional Geopolitical Dynamics: A Review Of The US-China Hegemony Struggle

As the largest economy in Southeast Asia, Indonesia's role is an important one, especially since in 2023 Indonesia will become the Chair of ASEAN. It is expected that together ASEAN countries and their partners can realize a stable and peaceful Indo Pacific region. Economically, both the US and China are equally important, given the size of China's Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure projects in Indonesia. The US is ASEAN's fourth largest trading partner and source of investment. Thus, the stability of the Indo-Pacific Region is needed for ASEAN countries to continue to advance, becoming a locomotive for developing cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.

In overcoming problems in the Indo-Pacific as a continuation of the US and China competition, Indonesia's stance is united in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, namely encouraging stability, peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with the vision of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific adopted by the ASEAN Heads of State at the ASEAN Summit in Bangkok 2019. The ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific is an affirmation of ASEAN's position in maintaining peace, security, and stability and prosperity carried out through the principles of Centrality, Inclusivity, and Complementary which are indispensable amid the dynamics of geopolitical and geostrategic shifts in the Indo Pacific region.

3. Mr. Sam Roggeveen

China's Maritime Ambitions in Southeast Asia: an Australian Perspective

China will inevitably become the leading power in Southeast Asia, largely because of its own economic and military growth but also because American resolve to maintain its place as leader of the Asian security order will decline. This essay discusses both trends, and then makes an argument for how the consequences of this shift can be managed by Southeast Asian states. Nothing can stop China becoming the leading power in Southeast Asia, but the core objective for regional states should be to prevent it becoming the dominant power. In the military realm, this can be done by focusing on two priorities: (1) frustrate or delay Chinese ambitions for foreign bases; and (2) build up air and maritime denial capabilities. These priorities can be achieved without substantially higher defence spending, without moving Southeast Asian states into closer alignment with the US and its allies, and without provoking arms racing or distrust.

4. Dr. Andi Widjajanto

Maritime Defense & Security In Geo V Era

First keyword is Military Reform, The second keyword is Defense Modernization, The third keyword is defense transformation, The fourth keyword is Indonesia Defense Power. That's the key word that was conveyed by the president on October 5, 2021. This is our homework, how the military reforms that we have carried out since 1998 may then continue towards defense transformation, so that we can form long-term plans towards achieving the powerful regional force of Indonesia's defense, which I believe must go beyond planning 2050 if not maybe until 2070.

5. Timothy R. Heath, Ph.D.

Maritime Political Economy: China, The United States, and Asia

The intensifying competition between China and the United States opens opportunities for countries to develop their economies. China can provide funding for infrastructure development and the United States can help countries better manage their maritime resources. However, the competition also raises risks. China's expectations of concessions on issues like fishing or sovereignty and U.S. hopes of closer cooperation can add political pressure on decision makers in Southeast Asia. Countries can manage such pressure by more clearly articulating their own vision for the region's development and by building strategies of compartmentalized cooperation.

6. Philips Vermonte, Ph.D.

Foundations of a Maritime Power: Sustainability and Security of Marine Resource Production and Trade - A View from Indonesia

The Plan of Action on Indonesia's Maritime Policy of 2021-2025 entails Indonesia's targets and priorities in increasing its leadership roles and in ensuring a condition of peace and security in the maritime setting.³⁰ However, some of the targets set fails to clearly portrays how they will correlate on the overall effort on ensuring regional inclusivity and open regional maritime architecture. On increasing Indonesia's leadership in maritime cooperation in bilateral, regional, and multilateral settings, the government targets mere aspects like "being able to be a member" of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), "participating in forums" like the Indian Ocean Rim Association, the ASEAN Maritime Forum, or "being able to host or attend an event" on the framework of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) or the State Parties on the Law of the Sea.

7. Alan Dupont, Ph.D.

The Gathering Storm: Maintaining Prosperity and Security in Asia's Maritime Commons

East Asia's economic growth and development over the past forty years has been impressive by any measure. It might be a stretch to call this a golden period of development and prosperity because the region has not been without its tribulations, disputes and geopolitical tensions. But there has not been a major armed conflict since 1979. Compared with the bloody wars and conflicts of the previous century, historians will undoubtedly characterise the early part of this century as an unusually benign era. The problem is that storm clouds are gathering, posing the

question of whether Asia's long peace is coming to an end. If a more turbulent future awaits us, how can we preserve the gains of the past to ensure that when prosperity returns it doesn't have to be built on the ashes of the present?

8. Alexander Korolev, Ph.D.

China-Phillipines and Sustainable Development in South China Sea: Cooperation Or Confrontation?

Philippines and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Cooperation on Oil and Gas Development, demonstrating their willingness to explore joint development as a pathway to collaboration, notwithstanding their territorial disputes. Recent commentaries on joint development are mostly framed on legal challenges, South China Sea (SCS) rows, geopolitics, and state-centric security issues. However, there have been no extensive discussions on the potential contributions from non-state stakeholders that can make joint development agreements environmentally sound, sustainable, and less political. These stakeholders are the oil companies, fishermen and coastal communities. In this regard, this NTS Insight explores potential roles of these stakeholders in promoting joint initiatives to share and develop resources in the SCS. It argues that the engagement and participation of non-state stakeholders in resource sharing and joint management must be pursued to address key non-traditional security challenges in the SCS. It also examines mechanisms to integrate marine environmental protection and sustainable fishing management into joint development agreements.

9. Mr. Ryan Hass

Building a Regional Architecture and a Framework of Cooperation in Asia Towards Global Stability

The international system is facing acute stresses at the same time as great power competition is intensifying. These two dynamics are mutually reinforcing. Russia's invasion of Ukraine is straining food and energy security worldwide. Deepening U.S.-China enmity is eliminating options for both major powers to coordinate responses to pandemics and climate change.

At the same time, maritime Asia is becoming the fulcrum of great power competition. As grand strategist Bruce Jones has written, "The Western Pacific is becoming to today what East Germany was to the Cold War; the front line of tensions between the world's leading military powers. Its

deep waters have replaced the European heartland as the fault line of geopolitical tensions.”

There are no signs that major power competition in maritime Asia will abate any time soon. Regional actors must improve their ability to manage incidents and lower risk of conflict.

There are steps available to reduce risk. These include forging greater commonality of interpretation around relevant international law, broadening codes of conduct for operational behaviors, expanding practical cooperation in the maritime domain, and organizing existing regional dialogues thoughtfully to spur practical progress on maritime security.

10. Prof. Dr. Ir. Dadan Umar Daihani, D.E.A.

Geopolitics Landscape in an Artificial World: Advancing Maritime Technology in Geo-Strategic Perspective

The development of sophistication in information and communication technology will have a significant impact on the dynamics of the future geopolitical landscape. Traditionally, geopolitics describes the relationship between regions based on their geographical conditions. Relations between these regions often reflect political hegemony more than strategic alliances. In that era, relations between countries were generally formed because of the dominance of military power. Currently, although military power is still an important factor, it seems that geoeconomic competition based on technological strength will be more prominent. Therefore, superpower countries have changed their strategy from relying on military power to relying more on economic and technological strength. Although military power has been replaced with economic and technological power, building a new global balance will still be difficult. Another interesting sector to pay attention to is the rapid development of maritime technology, both related to modernization of transportation modes, mastery of navigation, and modern business patterns. The development of maritime technology is expected to affect changes in the map of power and competition in the global supply chain. The development of the power of maritime technology is predicted to affect the geopolitical landscape in the future. This economic and political battle that is driven by maritime control takes place both at the global and regional levels. The interesting question is whether the development of maritime technology will strengthen the hegemony and control of developed countries over developing countries or will create global

prosperity and the creation of a balance of power. These issues will be discussed in this paper.

11. Prof. Tirta Nugraha Mursitama, Ph.D.

Technology and Geostrategy

Basic question that given to us that actually how to advance the maritime technology can contribute to the secure and balanced Global architecture in a fragmented world like today. Technology is indispensable for the international relations today. The one more important point is that the advancement of the technology. We know that the creation of the space is beyond the geographic, beyond the boundaries of the land or maybe also including the aerospace or others. But this is, I think, much more important that the digital technology created digital territory. So, we need to understand that beyond the land, air, sea, we know entering the era that there is additional territory which is a digital territory.

12. R. M. Wibawanto Nugroho Widodo, Ph.D., M.A. (Brad.), M.A., War College Dip. (NDU), M.P.P. (GMU), Ph.D. (Exon.)

The Human Asset Within The Context of Globally Emerging Technology, Regional Maritime Capability Development and the Coherence of Republic Indonesia (RI) Strategic Policy Response

Republic of Indonesia as an archipelagic state actor within the international system plays her significant role to build, secure, and use her maritime domain in the most strategic sense to protect and advance her national interests within the cooperative, competitive, and conflictual setting at the world stage. This effort is not however built-in vacuum but shall be placed within the context of her interaction with Indo-Pacific region, Quad states, AUKUS states, the Five Eyes, and China (PRC). The main argument of this paper constructs the justification that globally emerging technological advancement is indeed an independent variable for RI maritime capability development that in turn will contribute to the coherence of RI strategic policy response within the maritime domain that covers three strategic objectives: human security/economic prosperity; national security; and international security.

Therefore, this paper has three thesis questions: 1) how RI shall take the most out of globally emerging technology for her maritime capability development that in its turn will contribute to the coherence of RI's strategic policy response?, 2) what does constitute the maritime capability development?, 3) what does constitute the coherence of RI's strategic

policy response within the maritime domain? Based on these three thesis questions, this paper has proposed three possible answers: 1) given RI's non-alliance defense policy, RI shall accelerate her readiness to adopt new technology available by constructively engaging the global markets based on constructed common values and interests; 2) RI shall give the priority to the development of national maritime infrastructures and regionally respectable naval forces (2022–2045); 3) RI shall ensure the fundamental elements in policy coherence that covers the sound-basis and strategically future oriented policy (2022–2045), the acceleration of formulation and implementation of the respected policy through a sophisticated policy-making process that includes all significant variables in the respected policy that is suitable for preparing RI in the cooperative, competitive, and conflictual setting.

At the bottom line, answers to these three questions depend on RI human asset as the lynchpin variable to take the most out of globally emerging technologies to develop RI maritime capability that in turn will contribute to the likely achievement of the RI maritime strategy toward 2045. The data in this paper is primarily drawn from the open source while using the policy as the unit of analysis. The analysis is mostly qualitative with some quantitative analysis to supplement the qualitative one so that contributing to the research question of this panel: "How would the advancing maritime technology coincidentally contribute to secured and balanced global architecture under such fragmented situation?"

**RUNDOWN OF THE EVENT
THE JAKARTA GEOPOLITICAL FORUM VI/2022
"GEO-MARITIME: CHASING THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL STABILITY"**

**DAY I
WEDNESDAY, 24 AUGUST 2022
OPENING SESSION**

GMT+7 (Jakarta time)

07:50 – 08:00 **ANNOUNCEMENT**

(10 Minute) By Master of Ceremony

08:00 – 08:05 **Video Profile of Lemhannas RI**

(5 Minute)

08:05 – 08:25 **OPENING REMARKS Incl. GEOPOLITICS IN OVERVIEW**

(20 Minute)

Dr. Andi Widjajanto

Governor of National Resilience Institute of The Republic of Indonesia

08:25 – 08:35 **KEYNOTE ADDRESS**
(10 Minute) Ir. H. Joko Widodo
President of the Republic of Indonesia

08:35 – 08:45 Group Photo
(10 Minute)

THE FORUM ADJOURNED

08:45 – 09:00 **Media Conference**
(15 Minute)

PLENARY SESSION – 1 “MARITIME DEFENSE AND SECURITY IN DYNAMIC UNCERTAINTIES”

09:00 – 09:05 **Introductory Speech by Moderator**
(5 Minute) Ms. Curie Maharani Savitri, Ph.D,
Lecturer for Streaming of Conflict and Security Studies at
BINUS University

09:05 – 09:25 **Speaker 1**
(20 Minute) Collin Koh Swee Lean, Ph.D.,
Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies

09:25 – 09:45 **Speaker 2**
(20 Minute) Admiral (Ret) Prof. Dr. Marsetio
Professor of Maritime Defense Science Indonesian Defense
University

09:45 – 10:05 **Speaker 3**
(20 Minute) Mr. Sam Roggeveen,
Director of International Security Program of Lowy Institute

10:05 – 10:25 **Speaker 4**
(20 Minute) Dr. Andi Widjajanto,
Governor of the National Resilience Institute of the Republic of
Indonesia

10:25 – 11:45 **Question and Answer**
(75 Minute) Managed by Moderator

11:45 – 12:00 **Doorstop Interview**
(15 Minute)

12:00 – 13:00 **BREAK**
(100 Minute)

PLENARY SESSION – 2
**GEO-MARITIME POLITICAL ECONOMY: GENERATING GROWTH,
 SUSTAINING RESOURCE, AND GAINING POWER**

GMT+7 (Jakarta time)

- 13:00 – 13:05 (5 Minute) **Introductory Speech by Moderator**
 Ms. Curie Maharani Savitri, Ph.D,
 Lecturer for Streaming of Conflict and Security Studies at
 BINUS University
- 13.05 – 13:25 (20 Minute) **Speaker 5**
 Timothy R. Heath, Ph.D.
 Senior International Defense Researcher at the RAND
 Corporation
- 13:25 – 13:45 (20 Minute) **Speaker 6**
 Philips J. Vermonte, Ph.D.
 Dean of School of Social Sciences at The Indonesian
 International Islamic University
- 13:45 – 14:05 (20 Minute) **Speaker 7**
 Alan Dupont, Ph.D.
 The CEO of Geopolitical Risk Consultancy the Cognoscenti
- 14:05 – 14:25 (20 Minute) **Speaker 8**
 Alexander Korolev, Ph.D.,
 Associate Professor, Deputy Head of the Centre for
 Comprehensive European and International Studies, Higher
 School of Economics
- 14:25 – 15:25 (60 Minute) **QUESTION AND ANSWER**
 Managed by Moderator
- 15:25 **CLOSING ANNOUNCEMENT**
 by Master of Ceremony

DAY II
THURSDAY, 25 August 2022
OPENING SESSION

GMT+7 (Jakarta time)

- 07:45 – 08:00 **ANNOUNCEMENT**
 By Master of Ceremony

PLENARY SESSION – 3

ADVANCING MARITIME TECHNOLOGY IN GEO-STRATEGIC CONTEXT

- 08:00 – 08:05
(5 Minute) **Introductory Speech by Moderator**
Ambassador Prof. (Ris) Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, Ph.D.
Head of the Political Research Centre of Lembaga Pusat
Penelitian Indonesia
- 08:05 – 08:25
(20 Minute) **Speaker 1**
Mr. Ryan Hass,
Senior Fellow and the Michael H. Armacost Chair in the Foreign
Policy Program at Brookings Institute
- 08:25 – 08:45
(20 Minute) **Speaker 2**
Prof. Tirta Nugraha Mursitama, Ph.D.,
Vice Rector for Research and Technology Transfer BINUS
University
- 08:45– 09:05
(20 Minute) **Speaker 3**
Prof. Dr. Ir. Dadan Umar Daihani, D.E.A.,
Professional Expert on Natural Resources and National
Resilience, Lemhannas RI
- 09:05 – 09:25
(20 Minute) **Speaker 4**
R. M. Wibawanto Nugroho Widodo, Ph.D., M.A. (Brad.), M.A.,
War College Dip. (NDU), M.P.P. (GMU), Ph.D. (Exon.), Deputy
Head of Defence and Security for IKAL Strategic Center
- 09:25 – 09:45
(60 Minute) **QUESTION AND ANSWER**
Managed by Moderator
- 09:45 - 10:10
(30 Minute) **Dancing and Music Entertainment**
- 11:05 – 11:15
(10 Minute) **SUMMARY OF THE FORUM**
Drs. Berlian Helmy, M.Ec
Director for Ideological and Political Strategic Analysis at
National Resilience Institute of the Republic of Indonesia
- 11:15 – 11:25
(10 Minute) **CLOSING REMARKS**
Dr. Andi Widjajanto
Governor of National Resilience Institute of the Republic of
Indonesia

11:25 – 11:35
(10 Minute)

**PRESENTING A TOKEN OF APPRECIATION, PROCEEDING
AND GROUP PHOTO**

- Governor of Lemhannas RI presents certificates, Proceeding of JGF VI/2022, Token or Placards to Guest Speakers and to Moderators
- Group photo

11:35

CLOSING ANNOUNCEMENT

By Master of Ceremony



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KEYNOTE ADDRESS THE 6TH JGF 2022

**Ir. H. Joko Widodo
President of the Republic of Indonesia**

Saat ini kita sedang berada di era Industri 4.0, era yang bisa dikatakan sebagai era disrupsi teknologi karena otomasi dan konektivitas di suatu lapangan akan membuat pergerakan dunia industri dan persaingan kerja menjadi tidak linier. Perubahan yang terus terjadi saat ini didorong oleh inovasi ilmu pengetahuan dan teknologi yang semakin berkembang dan terus berubah. Kata kunci untuk bertahan di era disrupsi teknologi ini adalah inovasi.

Memasuki dasawarsa ketiga dari abad ke-21, dimulai sejak 2020, dunia mengalami guncangan yang cukup hebat. Berbagai ujian dan tantangan yang luar biasa, peristiwa demi peristiwa terjadi dalam skala besar, dimulai dari pandemi covid-19 pada tahun 2020 hingga perang rusia – ukraina pada tahun 2022. Semakin sulit bagi kita untuk memprediksi kapan semua peristiwa yang terjadi tersebut akan berakhir.

Dunia sedang mengalami perubahan tatanan geopolitik. Tidak sedikit negara yang mengalami tekanan hebat akibat perubahan tatanan geopolitik yang dampaknya sangat dirasakan, khususnya pada sektor ekonomi. Perjuangan untuk terhindar dari krisis terus digencarkan. Kebangkitan dunia untuk pulih kembali terus digaungkan.

Penguasaan rantai pasok untuk akses logistik bagi pangan dan energi mewarnai lanskap geopolitik global masa kini. Persaingan penguasaan teknologi dan pemutakhiran teknologi adalah hal yang juga menjadi perhatian utama. Perebutan jalur transportasi sebagai koridor perdagangan pangan, energi dan teknologi, akan menjadi akses yang berpotensi menimbulkan persaingan baru. Setiap negara mengklaim wilayahnya sebagai hub konektivitas.

Muncul kekhawatiran ketika persaingan dalam perebutan akses pangan, energi, dan teknologi serta jalur transportasi dalam kerangka rantai pasok ditentukan kemenangannya pada pilar kekuatan militer. Menjadi sebuah ancaman ketika persaingan kekuatan militer mengganggu perdamaian dan stabilitas kawasan.

Apabila kita perhatikan kecenderungan yang berkembang, masa depan dunia terletak pada maritim. Maritim menjadi simpul utama konektivitas bagi rantai pasok untuk pangan dan energy. Maritim juga menjadi ajang utama yang

memberikan ruang terbuka bagi perubahan tatanan dan lanskap geopolitik dunia. Pertarungan geopolitik akan semakin sengit ketika penguasaan maritim dijadikan target oleh negara-negara berkekuatan besar yang semata untuk kekuasaan global.

Perdamaian dunia dan stabilitas global, akan ditentukan pada sikap negara dalam mengelola tatanan geopolitik di wilayah maritim. Diibaratkan dalam film fiksi ilmiah yang tersohor di tahun 2018, "the pacific rim: uprising", menggambarkan dua koalisi robot android berukuran raksasa (jaeger dan kaiju) yang saling bertarung dalam tingkat emosi dan ambisinya yang tinggi untuk menguasai maritim. Namun akhirnya pertarungan keras tidak membuahkan perdamaian.

Memaknai pesan moral dari isi film ini, geopolitik maritim sangat penting untuk dipelajari lebih mendalam guna mengetahui arah perkembangan masa depan dunia. Di tengah pertarungan antar negara yang semakin sengit, koalisi strategis perlu dibangun untuk menjamin dunia yang aman dan stabil. Koalisi global yang dibangun menjadi reaksi strategis dalam menyikapi kecenderungan persaingan antar negara berkekuatan besar yang saling mempengaruhi perubahan geopolitik maritim dunia.

Perubahan geopolitik dunia saat ini bertumpu pada konektivitas dan rantai pasok yang berlandaskan pada kemaritiman. Semua negara terdorong melakukan adaptasi strategis, dengan menyadari kerentanan dan ancaman persaingan keras di ranah maritime yang merusak tatanan geopolitik. Dunia memerlukan koalisi global untuk mengelola potensi kerentanan dan ancaman menjadi peluang terciptanya perdamaian dan stabilitas dunia.

Rantai pasok dan konektivitas berbasis maritim dan teknologi, seolah-olah menjadi titik balik ekstrim dari revolusi industri 4.0. Ketika kemajuan revolusi industri 4.0 berhasil dicapai dengan digitalisasi, namun justru mundur ketika kita kembali ke alam pikiran lama karena ambisi kekuatan. Kekhawatiran semakin bertubi-tubi dengan kemungkinan krisis ekonomi global, yang membawa situasi dunia semakin menyulitkan.

Dinamika geopolitik maritim yang semakin multikompleks, perlu diperhitungkan secara matang. Mengelola tatanan geopolitik maritim di tengah situasi yang semakin sulit, adalah sesuatu yang tidak mudah. Hal ini memerlukan upaya ekstra untuk memikirkan rancangan arsitektur global yang adil dan aman sebagai solusi bagi kita semua. Namun juga hal yang tidak mudah dalam menghimpun kesamaan persepsi universal untuk membangun konsensus global

dalam kerangka multilateralisme bagi terciptanya perdamaian dunia, sementara masih terdapat tarik menarik kepentingan antar negara yang saling berkompetisi dengan mengambil cara-cara yang sifatnya emosional dan unilateral.

Berbagai pendudukan yang membuat situasi geopolitik dunia semakin rumit dan tidak menentu menyadarkan kita untuk selalu waspada. Namun kita perlu mempelajari upaya yang tepat untuk mencegah dampak persaingan antar kekuatan besar. Kita juga harus memahami tantangan dalam proses pemulihan ekonomi agar kita tidak terjebak dalam keterpurukan. Semua hal ini berujung pada dorongan kita untuk mengkalkulasi ulang kebijakan kita untuk mitigasi resiko dan dampak geopolitik secara cermat dari situasi yang berkembang.

Sebuah keniscayaan bagi kita, sebagai sebuah bangsa dan menjadi bagian dari komunitas global, untuk terus menjaga eksistensi dengan turut berperan aktif dalam menciptakan perdamaian dunia, yang berfokus pada upaya memelihara stabilitas global. Apabila kita tidak melakukan upaya ini, dapat dipastikan akan menjadi bom waktu bagi dunia mengalami kegagalan yang akhirnya mengancam keberlangsungan hidup manusia. Navigasi kebijakan yang hati-hati dalam merespons perkembangan situasi geopolitik global saat ini memerlukan kolaborasi sinergis dengan kalkulasi kebijakan strategis agar kita tidak terjerumus dalam krisis persaingan yang berkepanjangan. Kita harus mampu memanfaatkan momentum perubahan geopolitik ini untuk membangun rancangan arsitektur global yang menyelamatkan masa depan dunia.



OPENING REMARKS
Dr. ANDI WIDJAJANTO
THE GOVERNOR OF THE NATIONAL RESILIENCE INSTITUTE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
AT
THE JAKARTA GEOPOLITICAL FORUM VI/2022

Excellency Bapak President Joko Widodo, and distinguished participants,

The Jakarta Geopolitical Forum is an international event annually organized by Lemhannas, specified to focus on geopolitical matters. As we learn from the history, Lemhannas for the first time was established as a school of geopolitics. It is relevant for now the forum to serve as a platform for dialogue and for exchanges of ideas for building a peaceful and secured global geopolitics. I believe this forum will provide an effective opportunity to contribute to the review of global geopolitical dynamics.

Excellency Bapak President Joko Widodo, and distinguished participants,

Let me briefly overview the current geopolitical condition which remains uncertain as we are seeing at a global level, that many modern trends in traditional conflicts abruptly has been the outbreak. It shocks the world, and our hearts and thoughts go out to the millions of people suffering from the horrendous humanitarian tragedy on the ground. The geopolitical tension is also adding new challenges and uncertainties to a world that is already walking a fine line between growth and inflation. In the near term, a recession seems likely in several regions, depending on the eventual path of geopolitical policy and strategy. The margin of error is thin, and a policy-induced hard-landing may pose a considerable threat to risk.

Power competition nowadays has a rapid escalation in the maritime sphere by way of potential modality for the rule is taking place. The extension of power influence would impact the geopolitical landscape when the world suffers from complexities through some interplayed unprecedented events. There is no rule engaged so far, in maritime accessible for power that would be our global challenges. Power projection is underway, even before covid-19 pandemic, to gain benefits grows into common strategy in the competition. Chasing the balance of power through power projection has compelled the world to face its most intractable challenge. This has tested our world in deeper churn. At this

term, power politics would be an object that binds diversified struggle of influence among nations.

Geopolitical dynamics in maritime space is currently overexposed by military rivalry underpinning redistribution of power. The rise of great powers' hegemony in the competition for military balance through military rivalry has determined the military control over maritime space. Therefore, controlling the water ways through the use of maritime power more broadly involve military capabilities at sea would be our focus in the context of protecting maritime-based resources and maritime-based traffic for supply chain and connectivity. The maritime task in geopolitical gameplay considers power instruments with its use in the strategy, associates with military policy based on foreign policy. Nonetheless, maritime order would be our task to commit to build a clarified norms and values at sea circumvent the strategy to pre-empt.

Maritime geopolitics in such circumstances has forced the military to counteract to trigger what would be the devastating implications to the peripheral states. Some hot spots cannot be evaded to maritime issues which are currently raising in dispute such as in the south china sea, east asia, and indo pacific. It represents threats and challenges that interstates should correspond affirmatively. State of the nation is a site of nationalism energies which are now indissolubly linked with only the military force to exert itself as a state against others. The regional political development and power configuration in the region are the excess of remaining cold war structure that so far at the elevated level has emerged the pressure for global stability.

Maritime power, from standpoint of defense and security, lends the country's geopolitics indisputable. However, it is developed in construction and modernization of capabilities that will increase political tensions. Taking note of maritime power capacity through military modernization, particularly in technology, always followed by economic condition, it becomes crucial for states in the region to adapt the capacity refers to power system that encompasses all of the sea's power elements and transfers whole efficiency to national power.

Cooperation is critical now to establish the maritime order to avoid threats from the sea. As the post-modern geopolitics referred to so called geo. V. Dealing with global supply chain for commodity supplies, and connectivity. Effects from the geopolitical fallout are also likely to linger for a while. Depending on their reliance and proximity to commodity supplies, new winners and losers are expected to emerge. We are aware of the importance of geopolitical risks in accurately gauging economic prospects. But although geopolitics may be in

vogue, their relationship has been interdependent. At this point, maritime defense underlies its importance to protect the marine commercial fleet and navy as the backbone of economy. In the twenty-first century, the maritime technological industry is vital to the development of a country's maritime power and capability. The navy is primarily a defensive force at this stage. Furthermore, it is not just a force that guards the coasts, but it is also a force that assures the safety of marine transportation routes. In this term, states must develop new concepts, maritime policies, and tactics within the framework of soft power, as well as economic and technology, commercial, and logistics factors, in order to secure the pathway of maritime-based supply chain and maritime connectivity.

Excellency bapak president, and participants,

In light of all those challenges ahead, the jakarta geopolitical forum is very timely to organize as global dynamics in maritime geopolitics to emulate the tensions of power competition tends to goes on while power gain for resources scarcity tends to escalate. At the same time, advancing technology for gaining power in the context of hegemony would lead to wide disparities among nations. Considering its reliance on energy and other commodities, the protection of supply chain and connectivity may remain high concern, even when the power competition would likely never end that may dampen growth for prolonged periods of time. More broadly, we expect the war, combined with the ongoing effects of the pandemic, to add increased uncertainty to the global landscape and complexity to global trade and geopolitical dynamics.

We expect a success going the jakarta geopolitical forum forward to mean more adequate substantial outcomes come to our mind for policy making. Policymakers, i believe, all over the world, are still looking for ways to contain the spread of geopolitical fallout. Yet, we think current events will eventually serve as a catalyst to accelerate the transition towards the global stability. It calls for a new approach with actions to transform threats into opportunities, by rethinking how we understand, value and norms of maritime geopolitics as a precious resource, catalysing change and building partnerships to achieve the global stability.

I look forward to your ideas, and finally, and therefore, i declare the Jakarta geopolitical forum open! I wish the forum a great success. Thank you!



SUMMARY OF THE 6TH JAKARTA GEOPOLITICAL FORUM "GEOMARITIME: CHASING THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL STABILITY"

Drs. Berlian Helmy, M.Ec.

**Director for Ideological and Political Strategic Analysis at National Resilience
Institute of the Republic of Indonesia
Jl. Medan Merdeka Selatan No.10 Jakarta 10110, Indonesia**

All Participants, Ladies and Gentlemen.

After having had a long discussion on the matter during our two days forum, we have learned some important insights to take into consideration as prominent issues pertinent to the geopolitics in maritime sphere are becoming very significant. Real politics in contested world has already been coming whereby geopolitical dynamics in maritime space tends to be a determinant factor of the global stability as power competition at recent times getting harder. How to navigate the global turbulence, how could we absorb it, and transform it into the strategic stability have been responded through this forum.

With me, I have some notes of ideas and thoughts has been shared by resource persons in diverse-perspectives that would be recommendable, in particular in challenging maritime geopolitics. Let me highlight, therefore, a couple of notes about the development of maritime geopolitics throughout the sessions in which some parts has been touched upon with the following stressing:

1. A world system confronts global norms in hegemonic transition.

The world system is recently characterized by spatial interlinking hegemonic powers that dominate the defying global norms. Underlying rhythm of competition for accumulating power politics to a single-hegemon would be inevitable which would mislead the world system into derailed international order. Reinforcing the international rule-based is necessary, therefore, to conduct under common understanding and good governance at this term.

At this stage, from a world-systems perspective, the rise of China as a challenger to a declining United States appears to mark the beginning of a new cyclical transition phase from one global hegemon to another.

2. The return of classical geopolitics with autonomous technology in expansive threat spectrum.

Power dominance in military in a new cold war between great powers in a mixed strategy by proxy over the others in the era of Geo.V on connectivity and supply chain. This would set aside of international framework for law and order, and peace

between countries and endangers the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries.

More developed, larger, more advanced of China's technology is yet unacceptable to the US and its allies which is still the dominant military power. Nuclear capability would be a cautious calculated measure that may justify growing tension of power competition spreading out its impacts to other countries. No single narratives converged or standardized for such nuclear proliferation for somewhat it refers to considerable deterrence or active defence. It might have an even bigger equilibrium heading into very dangerous directions. Once we subscribe to non-proliferation policy, too much of foreign policy seems to be making the case for proliferation.

3. Strategic competition for strategic hegemony

Maritime has been generated as a space for power competition between great powers. Excessive power projection would potentially be inevitable against opponents, rivals, competitors that may lead to extensive win-lose game. But it is a challenge when most of countries not fall into disorder or anarchy.

The US-China rivalry would roll-coast manipulative economic globalization terms that may blur one to another against each geopolitical backdrop. Yet, power competition between these two great powers may attract its derivative sphere of impacts to the regional hotspots where China-Taiwan, Korean Peninsula, and South China Sea dispute in the constraint of geopolitical manoeuvre might have directed to endless fragmentation. It might have issues become difficult to resolve.

4. Maritime Connectivity disruptions.

Maritime sphere has become a rising spot of contemporary geopolitics. World connectivity through maritime, however, would be in fractured space as the flow of supply chain constrained by discrepancy of engagement with diverse philosophical concept under risky threat of the US and China technology and economic competition. Strategic ambiguity of contrary connectivity context has made difficult to link-up that will defect global supply chain resilience. However, what we can do to discard all these things is to make sure that trusted supply chains should continue to work with functional cooperation.

5. Convergence of maritime, digital and outer-space system.

To correspond complexities of geopolitical dynamics, it is necessary to run at the same time for gaining stability by integrating maritime, digital, and outer space system of technology as a controlling instrument of geopolitics. It is critical for technological giant force of such integration in the application to attempt advanced resolution of potential conflict. Putting the way of such work could emerge a power-house of shared

commitment to deliver for the needs of defence and security in integrated digital world.

6. ASEAN's Role

In the making of exclusive institutional regional balancing, ASEAN should be reinforced, with the more cooperative security or more inclusive institutional balancing. As a liberal or constructivist model, ASEAN should emphasize more active dialogues on confidence-building measures on preventive diplomacy on resulting conflicts with peaceful means.

ASEAN collective regional mechanisms underlies the importance of cooperative securities, not security against but rather security with working in the parallel universe of which realism going contrary with constructivism.

7. Complex interdependence

In the context of sustainable economic development processes, it needs trust that we can rely on one another for complex interdependence. The world is becoming increasingly interdependent in the digital information age. Underlying mechanisms and processes that facilitate contextual understanding of growing maritime geopolitical issues maintains the integrity of the assumptions of complex interdependence adding an understanding of the nature of content is along with sustainable development.

8. Possible combined connectivity?

The US' Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and China's Belt and Road Initiatives in collaboration of the Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum would be a way to engage the region, not just on strategic or security and potentially hostile basis, but on a win-win basis. For this, it needs to have a given thought to steer a direction which does not lead to a hot conflict.

9. Geomaritime in geopolitical context

Geomaritime should not be framed in geopolitical context as long as there is a global new trend going forward to the development of mastery of military submarine technology. The strategy to counter such development becomes anti-access, anti-area denial strategy under multi-domain operation (MDO). This MDO was developed to ensure military manoeuvres are unbreakable and this is the core of MDO strategy.

For Indonesia, however, relying on an anti-access area denial strategy must find a way to have a military that remains free of manoeuvre or freedom of manoeuvre cannot be broken by any system.

10. Options for Indonesia against the uncertain future of global geomaritime dynamic

Indonesia should take a role in balancing power against China by strengthening diplomatic play without making any geopolitical risks.

Indonesia's independence and active foreign policy doctrine will lead only to one policy "balancing" in which the doctrine cannot give another option of bargaining only logical of balancing policy.

Second option for Indonesia is to strengthening ASEAN centrality. ASEAN Mechanism should be pursued to rely on whereby conflict resolution needs process through diplomatic dialogues.

Third option will be focusing on low technical functional cooperation between countries not on high politics, not in highly sensitive issue so low on technical functional cooperation.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

That is all the summary which includes some recommendations, of our two days Forum which I am deeply sure that all of these will promote ways to enhance global efforts to achieve world peace and security, especially in the context of chasing global stability. And it will be an important milestone for global stability that is very inclusive with a strong message as a guide for Government to work.

Thank you very much to resource person for all your valuable contribution. And I thank you to all participants for your attention. I hope in the next Forum, there will be a concrete development of implementation of all our deliberations.

Once again, thank you.

MARITIME DEFENSE AND SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA FOLLOWING COVID-19 AND UKRAINE WAR: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

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Six months into the war in Ukraine, some interesting lessons can be gleaned from the conduct of the campaign – especially for interested bystanders in Southeast Asia as far as the future of maritime defense and security is concerned. First, the war showed that notwithstanding the prior focus on non-traditional security and gray zone challenges, conventional interstate armed conflict remains a real prospect now and in the future. Second, the war also demonstrated that with sufficient political resolve, fighting morale and external military assistance, the smaller and weaker party can still possess the opportunity to stymie the campaign plan of the bigger and stronger adversary, even if yet to completely defeat the latter in the battlefield. Finally, the war also showed the devastating economic impact of a protracted conflict, not just to the belligerents but also, the world at large.

Until February 24, a full-scale conventional war would possibly have been tucked away somewhere unseen in the Southeast Asian policy elites' subconsciousness. There is the constant spectre of armed conflict to be sure, given the extant geopolitical flashpoints that continue to persist in the region – not least of course, the broader China-U.S. rivalry, South China Sea disputes, tensions in the Korean Peninsula, and further afield, the Taiwan Strait. Just not long ago the international community was treated to a spectacle of what a possible armed conflict scenario revolving around Taiwan would look like – in response to U.S. Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi's visit to the island, the PLA conducted unprecedented drills around Taiwan, simulating what some would describe as an air and naval blockade. If anything, the latest Taiwan crisis again reinforces how real the prospect of an interstate armed conflict can be.

Yet the Ukraine war and Taiwan crisis took place at the wrong time. From the second half of 2021, Southeast Asia had started displaying positive signs of recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic. The socioeconomic havoc caused by the virus was unprecedented in scale and impact, compared to past crises Southeast Asia has ever experienced such as the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, SARS outbreak in 2003, and the global economic recession in 2008. Two

years of frenetic efforts to effectively contain the pandemic and mitigate its consequences – not least of course, the loss of lives, serious strain on public healthcare infrastructure, provision of vital social assistance – caused an enormous drag on government coffers. Under those trying times Southeast Asian governments tackled fiscal and budgetary deficits as COVID-19 heavily undermined revenues from trade (especially exports) and tourism, while public expenditures spiked as poverty levels spiked. The Ukraine war hit at a time when Southeast Asia is gradually rebounding from COVID-19, and it created an additional layer of uncertainty – that emanating from inflationary pressures, as well as energy and food insecurities.

The reason why it is necessary to highlight this context is that one ought to remember Southeast Asian governments have traditionally focused on socioeconomic aspects of nation-building for decades. Whenever economic crises struck, the immediate kneejerk response has always been economic remedies – even if it means placing defense procurements on the backburner. Notably, the spate of post-Cold War military buildup in Southeast Asia, largely focused on maritime defense and security, hit speed bump following the Asian financial crisis. Military modernization programmes recovered at the turn of the century and especially following the 9/11 terror attacks, only to be stymied again by the global economic crisis in 2008. Considering that Southeast Asia, with a few rare exceptions such as Singapore, has consistently under-invested on defense, such crises could be debilitating for the maintenance of a viable peacetime deterrence and warfighting capacity.

This situation is especially so the case for air and naval forces, which are crucial for maritime defense and security yet at the same time, compared to land forces, more capital intensive and hence, more costly to operate and maintain. By “maritime forces” this paper refers to both military and civilian law enforcement agencies that possess peacetime constabulary, deterrence and warfighting mandates and responsibilities. These missions can be laid out in a spectrum of low- to high-intensity functions; on the one end, low-intensity functions would be peacetime constabulary tasks such as counter-piracy and counter-smuggling, whereas on the other end, high-intensity functions entail conventional warfighting. In Southeast Asia, militaries performing low-intensity functions is not a strange or new phenomenon. Often, these organizations serve as the first responders to crises such as humanitarian and disaster scenarios. Even under normal peacetime conditions, many Southeast Asian navies especially perform constabulary missions, such as counter-illegal fishing, alongside their civilian maritime law enforcement counterparts.

In the foreseeable future, Southeast Asian maritime forces' roles are unlikely to change. Overlapping responsibilities and mandates across various agencies, both military and civilian, are likely to persist. The extant, longstanding interservice rivalry that is ever prevalent across the world looks set to fuel continued tussle for scarce national resources. As part of mitigation measures against current economic hardships, some Southeast Asian governments still perceive the urgent need to maintain subsidies for the populace, mainly in the fuel sector, despite known questions about the long-term fiscal sustainability of maintaining such schemes. Even targeted subsidies implemented in the long run could still drain state coffers if the current inflationary pressures, energy and food security problems become a more protracted affair.

Southeast Asian economies, heavily dependent on exports and tourism, would focus on alternative sources of state revenues in order to address fiscal and budgetary deficits. Another alternative way to raise funds for government programmes is to issue bonds through the domestic and foreign debt markets, or borrow from regional and international financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank, International Monetary Fund and World Bank. But this results in the debt challenge. The post-COVID circumstances, further augmented by the war in Ukraine, looks set to impose fiscal pressures on regional governments – not least of all, the ballooning debt burden that became more acute following the pandemic outbreak (see Table 1).

Table 1: External Debt-to-Gross National Income of Select Southeast Asian Countries 2018-2020 (in %)

Country	2018	2019	2020
Cambodia	59	60	72
Indonesia	38	37	41
Malaysia	24	23	25
Myanmar	16	14	18
The Philippines	21	20	25
Thailand	36	34	42
Vietnam	46	48	49

Source: Data compiled from *International Debt Statistics 2022* (Washington D.C.: World Bank Group, 2021).

Overall, the above debt trajectories do not bode well for Southeast Asia given the history of prioritizing socioeconomic betterment over defense and security investments. Throughout the past two years amidst COVID-19, assets being inducted into the service of Southeast Asian maritime forces were mainly pre-pandemic acquisitions (see Table 2). COVID-19 fiscal pressures also challenge the implementation of these projects or caused delays. For example, Singapore’s major acquisitions such as the Type-218SG submarine programme encountered some delay. Thailand’s submarine programme, which has long been a national controversy even dating before COVID-19, has fallen victim to the pandemic. Now the programme has been further undermined by disagreement between the navy and the Chinese shipbuilder over propulsion issues. Malaysia’s major maritime forces acquisition programmes have already been beset by problems preceding COVID-19. The Multi-Role Support Ship programme remains outstanding, and yet to be funded. The Littoral Mission Ship programme stopped at just four patrol vessels entirely built and delivered by China. And the navy’s foremost Littoral Combat Ship programme has been stymied by irregularities and serious cost overruns as a result. Meanwhile, the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency would receive its new offshore patrol vessels past the original delivery schedule.

Table 2: Key Southeast Asian Procurements Related to Maritime Defense and Security Pre- and Post-COVID

Country	Designation/Type (Quantity)	Supplier	Year Ordered	Year Delivered	Remarks
Brunei Darussalam	RQ-21 Blackjack unmanned aerial system (5)	U.S	2020	2021	
Indonesia	C-705 anti-ship missile (100)	PRC	2011	2014-19	For locally-built KCR-40 and KCR-60 missile patrol craft
	C-Fire EO search/fire control system (4)	Denmark		2019	For locally-built KCR-60 missile patrol craft
	Scanter-4603 air/surface search radar (4)	Denmark		2019	For locally-built KCR-60 missile patrol craft
	Type-209/1400 submarine (3)	ROK	2011	2019	Designated Nagapasa class

Table 2 (continued): Key Southeast Asian Procurements Related to Maritime Defense and Security Pre- and Post-COVID

Country	Designation/Type (Quantity)	Supplier	Year Ordered	Year Delivered	Remarks
	KaleidoScope hull-mounted sonar (3)	Germany	2011	2019	For Nagapasa class submarine
	MTU-493 diesel engine (12)	Germany	2011	2017-21	For Nagapasa class submarine
	Black Shark heavyweight torpedo (29)	Italy	2013	2017-18	For Nagapasa class submarine
	AS565MBe Panther helicopter (11)	France	2014	2017-20	
	MM-40 Exocet Block-3 anti-ship missile (50)	France	2016	2019-21	For Martadinata class frigate
	VL-MICA naval surface-to-air missile vertical launch system (2)	France	2016	2019-20	For Martadinata class frigate
	GDM-008 35mm close-in weapon system (2)	Switzerland	2016	2019-20	For Martadinata class frigate
	LPD-122m landing platform dock (1)	ROK (licensed)	2017	2019	Locally built under license as Makassar class
	B&W-8L diesel engine (2)	Denmark	2017	2019	For Makassar class LPD
	6V-53 diesel engine (20)	U.S.	2017	2020	For modernization of Indonesian Marine Corps' PT-76 light amphibious tanks to PT-2000 standard
	VL-MICA surface-to-air missile (40)	France	2018	2019-20	For Martadinata class frigate

Table 2 (continued): Key Southeast Asian Procurements Related to Maritime Defense and Security Pre- and Post-COVID

Country	Designation/Type (Quantity)	Supplier	Year Ordered	Year Delivered	Remarks
	ScanEagle unmanned aerial system (6)	U.S.	2018	2021-22	Provided as aid under Southeast Asian Maritime Security Initiative (SEAMSI)
	MHV-60 mine countermeasures vessel (2)	Germany	2019	2023	
	BMP-3F amphibious fighting vehicle (22)	Russia	2019	2021	For Indonesian Marine Corps
	SAK-70 Mk3 57mm dual-purpose gun (4)	Sweden	2019		For KCR-60 missile patrol craft
	SMART-S Mk2 air search radar (1)	Netherlands	2020	2023	For modernization of Bung Tomo class corvette
	STIR-EO Mk2 fire control radar (1)	Netherlands	2020	2023	For modernization of Bung Tomo class corvette
	FREMM frigate (6)	Italy	2021	2024	
	Maestrale frigate (2)	Italy	2021		Second-hand, possibly to be modernized before delivery
	Arrowhead-140 frigate (2)	UK	2021		
Malaysia	Gagah Samudera class training ship (2)	ROK	2011	2017-18	
	MAN-9L27 diesel engine (4)	Denmark	2011	2017-18	For Gagah Samudera class training ships
	SAK-70 Mk3 57mm dual-purpose gun (6)	Sweden	2013		For Maharaja Lela class LCS

Table 2 (continued): Key Southeast Asian Procurements Related to Maritime Defense and Security Pre- and Post-COVID

Country	Designation/Type (Quantity)	Supplier	Year Ordered	Year Delivered	Remarks
	Gowind-2500 class frigate (6)	France	2014	2023	Designated Maharaja Lela class under Littoral Combat Ship programme
	TMX fire control radar (12)	Italy	2014		For Maharaja Lela class LCS
	VL-MICA naval surface-to-air missile vertical launch system (6)	France	2015		For Maharaja Lela class LCS
	Scanter-6000 air/surface search radar (2)	Denmark	2016	2017-18	For modernization of Lekiu class frigates
	LMS-68 class offshore patrol vessels (4)	PRC	2017	2019-22	Designated Keris class under Littoral Mission Ship programme
	Camcopter S-100 unmanned aerial system (2)	Austria	2018	2018	
	Naval Strike Missile (100)	Norway	2018		For Maharaja Lela class LCS
	QSK-50 diesel engine (8)	U.S.	2018	2019-20	For modernization of Perdana class missile patrol craft
	ScanEagle II unmanned aerial system (12)	U.S.	2019	2020-22	Provided as aid under SEAMSI
	AN/APS-143C(V)3 surface search radar (3)	U.S.	2020	2020-21	For conversion of CN235 air transport into maritime surveillance aircraft; provided as aid under SEAMSI

Table 2 (continued): Key Southeast Asian Procurements Related to Maritime Defense and Security Pre- and Post-COVID

Country	Designation/Type (Quantity)	Supplier	Year Ordered	Year Delivered	Remarks
Myanmar	Super Dvora Mk3 patrol craft (6)	Israel	2015	2017-19	
	FC-1 multi-role fighter (16)	PRC	2015	2018-19	
	C-802AK anti-ship missile (30)	PRC	2015	2018-19	For FC-1 multi-role fighter
	RD-33 turbofan engine (16)	Russia	2015	2018-19	For FC-1 multi-role fighter
	Camcopter S-100 unmanned aerial system (5)	Austria	2017	2018	
	Shyena lightweight torpedo (20)	India	2017	2019-20	
	LPD-122m landing platform dock (1)	ROK	2018	2019	Designated UMS Moattama
	Su-30SME Flanker multi-role fighter (6)	Russia	2018		
	Project-877E Kilo class submarine (1)	India	2019	2020	Second-hand, designated UMS Minye Thinkhathu
	AS365N2 Panther helicopter	Unknown	2019	2019-21	Second-hand, used as naval helicopter
	Type-035B submarine (1)	PRC	2020	2021	Second-hand, designated UMS Minye Kyaw Htin
The Philippines	Mulgae class landing craft utility (1)	ROK	2014	2021	Second-hand' provided as aid; designated BRP Mamanwa
	FLASH airborne dipping sonar (2)	France	2016	2019	For AW159 Wildcat helicopters

Table 2 (continued): Key Southeast Asian Procurements Related to Maritime Defense and Security Pre- and Post-COVID

Country	Designation/Type (Quantity)	Supplier	Year Ordered	Year Delivered	Remarks
	TC-90A training aircraft (5)	Japan	2016	2017-18	Second-hand, provided as aid and used as maritime surveillance aircraft
	Spike-ER anti-tank missile (50)	Israel	2016	2018-19	For Multi-Purpose Attack Craft
	Spike-NLOS air-to-surface missile (20)	Israel	2016	2019	For AW159 Wildcat helicopters
	KAAV amphibious fighting vehicle (8)	ROK	2016	2019	For Philippine Marine Corps
	HHI-2600 frigate (2)	ROK	2016	2020-21	Designated Jose Rizal class
	K745 Blue Shark lightweight torpedo (12)	ROK	2016	2019	For AW159 Wildcat helicopters
	AW159 Wildcat helicopter (2)	UK	2016	2019	
	T-800 turboshaft engine (4)	UK	2016	2019	For AW159 Wildcat helicopters
	VT-400 diesel engine (8)	U.S.	2016	2019	For Philippine Marine Corps' KAAVs
	MTU-1163 diesel engine (8)	Germany	2017	2020-21	For Jose Rizal class frigates
	TRS-3D air/surface search radar (2)	Germany	2017	2020-21	For Jose Rizal class frigates
	Orion NA-25X fire control radar (2)	Italy	2017	2020-21	For Jose Rizal class frigates
	Oto Melara Super Rapid 76mm dual-purpose gun (2)	Italy	2017	2020-21	For Jose Rizal class frigates

Table 2 (continued): Key Southeast Asian Procurements Related to Maritime Defense and Security Pre- and Post-COVID

Country	Designation/Type (Quantity)	Supplier	Year Ordered	Year Delivered	Remarks
	EL/M-2022 surface search radar (1)	Israel	2017	2018	For conversion of 1 C-130T air transport into maritime surveillance aircraft
	C-STAR anti-ship missile (15)	ROK	2017	2022	For Jose Rizal class frigates
	Pohang class corvette (1)	ROK	2017	2019	Second-hand; provided as aid; designated BRP Conrado Yap
	EDO-97 hull-mounted sonar (2)	U.S.	2017	2020-21	For Jose Rizal class frigates
	ScanEagle II unmanned aerial system (6)	U.S.	2017	2018	Provided as aid under SEAMSI
	Hermes-450 unmanned aerial system (4)	Israel	2018	2019	
	Sea Giraffe AMB air search radar (2)	Sweden	2018		From U.S. production line; modernization of Gregorio del Pilar class offshore patrol vessels
	Mistral-3 surface-to-air missile (40)	France	2019	2021	For Jose Rizal class frigate
	Hermes-900 unmanned aerial system (9)	Israel	2019	2019-20	
	ScanEagle II unmanned aerial system (8)	U.S.	2019	2021	Provided as aid under SEAMSI

Table 2 (continued): Key Southeast Asian Procurements Related to Maritime Defense and Security Pre- and Post-COVID

Country	Designation/Type (Quantity)	Supplier	Year Ordered	Year Delivered	Remarks
	Shaldag Mk-V class patrol craft (5)	Israel	2021	2022	Under Fast Attack Interceptor Craft – Missile programme
	Spike-NLOS surface-to-surface missile (?)	Israel	2021		For Shaldag Mk-V FAIC-M
	HHI corvette (2)	ROK	2021	2026	
	K745 Blue Shark lightweight torpedo (25)	ROK	2021		For Jose Rizal class frigates
	Pohang class corvette (1)	ROK	2021		Second-hand; to be provided as aid, and slated to have been delivered by late 2021 or early 2022
	PJ-10 BrahMos (2)	India	2022	2023	With 40 missiles; under Shore-Based Missile System programme
	HHI offshore patrol vessel (6)	ROK	2022	2028	
	Makassar class landing platform dock (2)	Indonesia	2022		Follow-on pair of the first two Tarlac class
Singapore	VL-MICA-M naval surface-to-air missile system (8)	France	2013	2017-19	For Independence class Littoral Mission Vessels
	MTU-4000 diesel engine (16)	Germany	2013	2017-19	For Independence class Littoral Mission Vessels

Table 2 (continued): Key Southeast Asian Procurements Related to Maritime Defense and Security Pre- and Post-COVID

Country	Designation/Type (Quantity)	Supplier	Year Ordered	Year Delivered	Remarks
	Oto Melara Super Rapid 76mm dual-purpose gun (8)	Italy	2013	2017-19	For Independence class Littoral Mission Vessels
	NS-100 air/surface search radar (8)	Netherlands	2013	2017-19	For Independence class Littoral Mission Vessels
	Type-218SG class submarine (2)	Germany	2013		Designated Invincible class
	S-70B Seahawk helicopter (2)	U.S.	2013	2018	
	Type-218SG class submarine (2)	Germany	2017	2024	Designated Invincible class
Thailand	DW3000 frigate (1)	ROK	2013	2018	Designated Bhumibol Adulyadej class
	ASO-712 hull-mounted sonar (1)	Germany	2013	2018	For Bhumibol Adulyadej class frigate
	ACTAS towed-array sonar (1)	Germany	2013	2018	For Bhumibol Adulyadej class frigate
	Oto Melara Super Rapid 76mm dual-purpose gun (1)	Italy	2013	2018	For Bhumibol Adulyadej class frigate
	Sea Giraffe AMB air search radar (1)	Sweden	2013	2018	For Bhumibol Adulyadej class frigate
	LM2500 gas turbine engine (1)	U.S.	2013	2018	For Bhumibol Adulyadej class frigate
	Mk-15 Phalanx close-in weapon system (1)	U.S.	2013	2018	For Bhumibol Adulyadej class frigate
	Mk-41 vertical launch system	U.S.	2013	2018	For Bhumibol Adulyadej class frigate

Table 2 (continued): Key Southeast Asian Procurements Related to Maritime Defense and Security Pre- and Post-COVID

Country	Designation/Type (Quantity)	Supplier	Year Ordered	Year Delivered	Remarks
	BVT-90 class offshore patrol vessel (1)	UK	2015	2019	Locally built under license as Krabi class
	Oto Melara Super Rapid 76mm dual-purpose gun (1)	Italy	2015	2019	For Krabi class offshore patrol vessel
	RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (14)	U.S.	2015	2017-18	For Bhumibol Adulyadej class frigate
	TSM-2022 hull-mounted sonar (2)	France	2016	2019	For modernization of Bach Rachan class mine countermeasure vessels
	MAN-16V28/33D diesel engine (2)	Germany	2016	2019	For Krabi class offshore patrol vessel
	STIR-1.1EO Mk2 fire control radar (1)	Netherlands	2016	2019	For Krabi class offshore patrol vessel
	Variant air/surface search radar (1)	Netherlands	2016	2019	For Krabi class offshore patrol vessel
	Hermes-450 unmanned aerial system (4)	Israel	2017	2018	
	S26T submarine (1)	PRC	2017	2023-24	
	C-708UNA underwater-to-surface guided weapon (?)	PRC	2017		For S26T submarine
	Yu-8 heavyweight torpedo (?)	PRC	2017		For S26T submarine
	Orbiter-3B unmanned aerial system (5)	Israel	2019	2019	

Table 2 (continued): Key Southeast Asian Procurements Related to Maritime Defense and Security Pre- and Post-COVID

Country	Designation/Type (Quantity)	Supplier	Year Ordered	Year Delivered	Remarks
	Type-071E landing platform dock (1)	PRC	2019	2023	Designated HTMS Chang
	VN16 amphibious fighting vehicle (3)	PRC	2020	2021	For Royal Thai Marine Corps
	RGM-84L Harpoon II anti-ship missile (8)	U.S.	2020		
Vietnam	Kh-35 Uran anti-ship missile (30)	Russia	2011	2019-21	Probably produced under license as KCT-15 and/or VCM-01 in both ship- and shore-launched versions
	Gepard-3.9 class frigate (2)	Russia	2012	2017-18	Designated Dinh Tien Hoang class
	Kh-35 Uran anti-ship missile (30)	Russia	2012	2017-18	For Dinh Tien Hoang class frigates
	TEST-71 heavyweight torpedo (30)	Russia	2012	2017-18	For Dinh Tien Hoang class frigates
	DT-59 gas turbine engine (4)	Ukraine	2012	2017-18	For Dinh Tien Hoang class frigates
	RGS-9316 submarine rescue vessel (1)	Netherlands	2017	2021	Locally built under license as Yet Khieu; MSSARS-9316 programme
	Pohang class corvette (1)	ROK	2017	2018	Second-hand; provided as aid
	Heron unmanned aerial system (3)	Israel	2018	2021	
	Stan Lander-5612 landing craft (3)	Netherlands	2018	2021	Locally built under license for Venezuela, cancelled and taken over by Vietnam

Table 2 (continued): Key Southeast Asian Procurements Related to Maritime Defense and Security Pre- and Post-COVID

Country	Designation/Type (Quantity)	Supplier	Year Ordered	Year Delivered	Remarks
	Stan Lander-5612 landing craft (1)	Netherlands	2019	2021	
	Hamilton class patrol cutter (1)	U.S.	2019	2021	Second-hand; provided as aid to Vietnam Coast Guard
	ScanEagle unmanned aerial system (6)	U.S.	2019	2022	Provided as aid under SEAMSI

Source: Data compiled from SIPRI Arms Transfers Database and corroborated by official and press reports.

For Southeast Asian countries that appear to recognize the urgency of modernizing their maritime forces due to prevailing threat perceptions and more practical concerns about growing block obsolescence of equipment, there are some notable exceptions. The Philippine maritime forces have been on a roll in recent years – in no small part driven primarily by Manila’s growing threat perceptions in the South China Sea. The navy completed the induction of new South Korean-built guided missile frigates and has recently inked a contract with the same shipyard for a pair of smaller corvettes in December 2021, and another contract for offshore patrol vessels in June this year, and a contract with Indonesian shipbuilder PT PAL for a follow-on pair of landing platforms, dock. The coastguard also inducted new offshore patrol vessels from France and Japan. At the same time, the Philippines became the first export client of the India-Russia BrahMos supersonic shore-based anti-ship cruise missile. Still, threat perceptions-driven armament would run up against the brick wall of fiscal realities. Philippine authorities recognized that fiscal challenges, including the ballooning debt burden, would mean the armed forces is likely to fall short of meeting its set modernization timelines. The submarine programme notably has been shoved wayside.

Indonesia may not feel as acute a threat in the SCS as the Philippines has been in recent years, especially following the brewing up of tensions over Whitsun Reef with China since early 2021. The archipelagic nation has confronted a myriad of security challenges that oblige the Indonesian maritime forces to tackle a whole spectrum of peace- and wartime mandates and responsibilities, yet funding for the armed forces’ modernization programmes has barely been

forthcoming, or consistent. However, the tragic loss of the submarine KRI *Nanggala* in April 2021 marked a crucial turning point. The Indonesian Navy looks set to benefit from the approximately \$125 billion defense fund planned by the Jokowi Administration, even though the official justification that it would be financed through foreign loans instead of burdening the state budget might become questionable given the country's debt situation. Separate agreements have been signed in 2021 alone with British and Italian shipyards for the construction of eight newbuilds – two Arrowhead-140 and six FREMM frigates – as well as a pair of second-hand but modernized Maestrale class frigates. This slate of agreements is unprecedented for the Indonesian Navy. The question of course, is whether funds would thereby be committed to implement these contracts. In any case, the clock is ticking till the lapse of deadline to complete the third phase of the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) buildup by 2024.

Indonesia and the Philippines, however, would seem to be the exceptions than norm in Southeast Asia. Their acquisitions are plausibly driven by the exigency of urgent modernization (to meet the 2024 MEF goals) and threat perceptions (Beijing's coercion in the SCS) respectively. For the rest of Southeast Asia, the overriding political imperative of tackling present socioeconomic challenges would constitute a main policy priority more than anything else even if the respective capitals understand the current geopolitical uncertainties. Just like the Royal Thai Navy with its submarine programme, the Royal Thai Air Force's struggle to convince the country's political elites the need to modernize its combat aviation fleet with purchase of American-made F-35 Joint Strike Fighter being an example of how militaries face the uphill battle to justify defense funding vis-à-vis those socioeconomic priorities. The mere justification based on threat perception and modernization imperative may be diametrically opposed to what political elites desire. Butter not guns bring obvious political mileage with the domestic constituents in such times of socioeconomic hardships.

Yet the immutable challenges in the maritime domain are not going away anytime soon. Before COVID-19 and the Ukraine War, Southeast Asia has confronted a host of maritime security challenges, which look set to multiply and persist in the foreseeable future. Maritime forces continue to be the handmaiden of the regional political elites' pursuit of national interests. Yet at the same time, they do not necessarily get all the resources they require to fulfil their mandates and responsibilities. In such times of fiscal austerity, many Southeast Asian maritime forces would have to make do with the bare essential funding available for the proper maintenance of existing assets and supporting routine peacetime operations. They might be able to implement big-ticket acquisition projects revolving around major warship and submarines for which funding was allocated

before COVID-19, even if they may still be fraught with delays in delivery and cost overruns. They might also be able to make more modest, especially less expensive purchases, or to conduct capability upgrades or system retrofits aboard existing platforms. But new post-pandemic major acquisition programmes would no longer be as forthcoming, and largely dependent on how long the current socioeconomic hardships draw out.

Under such trying circumstances, what would be the available options to pursue? Maritime forces in Southeast Asia, and their political masters, could envisage the following measures to undertake, if they have not yet done so.

- Consider a whole-of-government (nation/society) approach, underpinned by a national strategy that seeks to harness and synergistically coordinate the strengths of each national entity that has, or could potentially have, mandates or responsibilities concerning maritime defense and security. This could help reduce, if not completely eradicate, duplication and overlaps and in turn facilitate optimal allocation of scarce national resources.
- Promote greater inter-agency coordination and collaboration at the national, or intrastate, level. While this is something that some Southeast Asian maritime forces are already accustomed to doing, and in recent years there are new examples of such setups, the current fiscal exigencies and complex challenges in the maritime domain necessitate national efforts in this regard.
- As part of the broader national strategy or policy action plan, a defense procurement policy is necessary to optimize the use of scarce national resources for maritime forces' capability development, provide suitable governance, oversight and supervision of projects to ensure accountability, transparency and adherence to timelines for implementation and completion.
- Beyond acquisition of kinetic systems, regional maritime forces should more seriously invest in command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities. A networked infrastructure, along with persistent investments in appropriate maritime domain awareness tools and supporting assets for information-sharing, is essential.

Finally, if one reviews the history of how Southeast Asian countries tackle maritime security challenges, it is difficult to overlook the traditionally adopted dual-pillared approach of national self-help and seeking interstate cooperation, including the involvement of extra-regional parties to provide common public goods in the maritime domain. While interstate cooperation in the maritime domain is not new in Southeast Asia, given current fiscal realities that can impinge upon national self-help measures such as defense acquisitions, it makes promoting coordination and collaboration between regional and extra-regional

maritime forces even more important. At the intra-ASEAN level, reviewing existing cooperative frameworks, such as the ASEAN Defence Minister Meeting and the ASEAN Maritime Forum, with an eye on promoting greater intramural coordination and cooperation between maritime forces, and even exploring joint acquisition programmes, should be given more attention.

Notes

- The PLA Eastern Theater Command described the exercises as “enhancing joint naval and air blockade capabilities”, whereas the Taiwanese defense authorities earlier reached similar assessment about Beijing’s intent. “东部战区继续开展联合演训 锤炼提升海空联合封控能力,” [Eastern Theater Command continually conducts joint training exercise, enhances joint naval and air blockade ability], *中国军网-解放军报* [China Military Online – People’s Liberation Army Daily], 10 August 2022. “中共於台灣周邊軍演國防部：形同海空封鎖違國際法,” [On Communist China’s military exercises around Taiwan, Ministry of National Defense: Akin to Naval and Air Blockade in Contravention of International Law], *中央社* [Central News Agency], 3 August 2022.
- ² Read for instance, *Southeast Asia Rising from the Pandemic*, Asian Development Bank, March 2022; and *Braving the Storms: World Bank East Asia and the Pacific Economic Update April 2022*, World Bank Group.
- ³ *Joint statement by ILO, FAO, IFAD and WHO: Impact of COVID-19 on people’s livelihoods, their health and our food systems*, World Health Organization, 13 October 2020.
- ⁴ “COVID-19 Pushed 4.7 Million More People in Southeast Asia Into Extreme Poverty in 2021, But Countries are Well Positioned to Bounce Back — ADB,” Asian Development Bank, 16 March 2022.
- ⁵ Read for instance, “This chart shows how much Ukraine and Russia export to the world,” World Economic Forum, 13 April 2022; “War in Ukraine threatens to unleash ‘unprecedented wave’ of global hunger and destitution,” United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 8 June 2022.
- ⁶ Countries in Southeast Asia, such as Malaysia, have started to review fuel subsidies with an eye on a more targeted mechanism that is designed to help the governments save costs. Indonesia has also confronted the financial burden of a massive State fuel subsidy mechanism amounting to IDR502 trillion in 2022 – an amount which President Widodo described would have been utilized for the Nusantara new capital project. The Thai Government, for example, had to revoke subsidies on premium diesel used in luxury cars since April 2022 in order to reduce the burden on State finances. The Philippines Government is also looking at ending fuel subsidies by 2023 when crude oil prices begin to “normalize”. “Govt to review petroleum products subsidy,” *Bernama*, 24 March 2022; Chatrudee Theparat, “Subsidy on premium diesel revoked,” *Bangkok Post*, 30 March 2022; “Jokowi: Subsidi Kita Rp502 T, Bisa Dipakai Bangun Ibu Kota Negara,” [Jokowi: Our IDR502 trillion subsidy can be used to build the nation’s capital], *CNN Indonesia*, 21 June 2022; “Need for fuel subsidies to cease with oil prices projected to normalize by 2023,” *CNN Philippines*, 9 July 2022.
- ⁷ Aqil Haziq Mahmud, “COVID-19 delays new submarines, but delivery of F-35 fighter jets on track: Ng Eng Hen,” *Channel NewsAsia*, 29 June 2020.
- ⁸ “Thai PM defends submarine purchase and explains causes of huge public debt,” *Thai PBS World*, 17 February 2021.

- ⁹ The latest update is that the Royal Thai Navy may accept the Chinese shipbuilder CSOC's proposal to install a Chinese diesel engine, instead of German make as originally stipulated, on the submarine as a way out of the impasse. Wassana Nanuam, "Navy may take sub engines from China," *Bangkok Post*, 10 August 2022.
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- ² Frances Mangosing, "Korean firm bags P25B deal to build PH Navy corvettes," *Inquirer.net*, 23 December 2021.
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- ⁴ "Philippines Procures Two More LPD from Indonesia's PT PAL," *Naval News*, 30 June 2022.
- ⁵ Joyce Ann L. Rocamora, "India-made BrahMos missiles delivery expected 2023: envoy," *Philippine News Agency*, 16 August 2022.
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- ⁷ "Kemhan Tegaskan Anggaran Alutsista Takkan Bebani APBN," [The Ministry of Defense Affirms that the Primary Armament Budget Will Not Burden the State Budget], *CNN Indonesia*, 31 May 2021.
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INDONESIA'S MARITIME DEFENSE AMIDST REGIONAL GEOPOLITICAL DYNAMICS: A REVIEW OF THE US-CHINA HEGEMONY STRUGGLE

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China's rise, since the economic reforms carried out by President Deng Xiaoping in 1978 to 1989, has led the country to become the main challenger to the United States of America as a *superpower*. Since 2010 China has replaced Japan as the world's second largest economy. By 2030, according to estimates by Standard Chartered Plc¹, China will occupy the world's number one economic position displacing the US which will fall to third place, while India comes at second and Indonesia fourth – out of ten countries with world's large economic powerhouse. The other six countries are Turkey, Brazil, Egypt, Russia, Japan, and Germany.

The 21st century is marked by a shift in the center of world economic growth to Asia, which began with the economic rise of Asian countries. China, India, and Indonesia emerged as new economic powers chasing Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, which had already emerged as Asian Tigers. These changes have encouraged the emergence of new geopolitics in the Asia Pacific Region with China as the main actor who has economic power, military power, mastery of high technology, and abundant human resources.

By relying on its power, China seeks to rival and to balance US dominance in the economic, political, and military fields. In the economic field, China is expanding its influence through the *One Belt One Road* (OBOR) program initiated by President Xi Jinping in 2013 which was later renamed to the *Belt and Road Initiative* (BRI) Figure 1, in 2017.² The BRI strategy focuses on China's connectivity and cooperation with land-based and maritime countries. As of 2019, China has signed cooperation agreements with more than 150 Asian, European, African, and Latin American countries within the BRI framework. So far, the US is the only country that openly rejects China's BRI³, while the group

¹ See <https://ceoworld.biz/2019/01/08/by-2030-these-10-economies-will-be-the-worlds-largest/>

² Yudilla, A. (2019). Kerjasama Indonesia Cina dalam Belt and Road Initiative: Analisa Peluang dan Ancaman untuk Indonesia. *Journal of Diplomacy and International Studies*. 2(1), 52-65

³ See <https://dunia.tempo.co/read/1200126/presiden-xi-klaim-150-negara-ikut-belt-and-road-initiative>

of rich countries (G-7) formed the *Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment* to fund infrastructure projects in various countries to stem China's BRI⁴.



Figure 1. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
 Source: *Center for Area Studies Indonesia Institute of Sciences*

The United States and China are also competing for hegemony in the Asia Pacific Region, a geographical area of water stretching from the Indian Ocean, the western and central Pacific Ocean, to the inland seas of Indonesia and the Philippines that is referred to as the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific region's economic growth is the fastest in the world, accounting for 60 percent of the world's economy. The region is also home to more than half of the world's population. Not only that, of the world's 15 advanced economies, seven are in the Indo-Pacific. Physically, the Indian Ocean is 68.6 square kilometers, while the Pacific Ocean is 155.6 square kilometers.⁵

The US seeks to counter China's BRI by creating a *Free and Open Indo-Pacific* (FOIP) initiated by President Donald J. Trump with his slogan *Make America Great Again* and making various policies to reduce China's expanding influence. In 2018, the US also changed its military command in the Pacific from USPACOM to USINDOPACOM⁶ (Figure 2) and sought to embrace India. On the other hand,

⁴ See <https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20220726141834-4-358671/proyek-jalur-sutra-china-kini-tak-laku-pada-takut-ketipu>
⁵ See <https://news.detik.com/kolom/d-4477622/diplomasi-indonesia-merangkul-indo-pasifik>
⁶ See <https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/History/>

the US *National Security Strategy* (NSS) states that China is a challenger to US interests (*strategic competitor*).⁷ In the US' view, China seeks to erode US security and prosperity, so the US has issued various policies, including waging a trade war since 2018 against China.



Figure 2. Indo-Pacific Region
Source: USINDOPACOM

In Southeast Asia and East Asia, the US and China's feud is seen in the dynamics of conflict in the South China Sea and East China Sea, as happened on August 2-3, 2022. The Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Ms. Nancy Pelosi, visited Taiwan and met President Tsai Ing-wen. Pelosi made a commitment that the US would always support Taiwan. Pelosi's visit angered China, which surrounded Taiwan in a large-scale war exercise after Pelosi's visit.⁸ The US monitored the war exercises with its two aircraft carriers, the USS Ronald Reagan and USS George Washington along with accompanying ships ready to be mobilized at any time if needed.

China for four days, August 4-7, deployed more than 10 warships of various types, including nuclear submarines, 100 warplanes in a war exercise China called "Joint Blockade Operation". China surrounded Taiwan in six zones, disrupting the supply chain of semiconductor goods from Taiwan and manufactured goods from Asian factories to various countries. Three of the six

⁷ Al Syahrin, M.N. (2018). China Versus Amerika Serikat: Interpretasi Rivalitas Keamanan Negara Adidaya di Kawasan Asia Pasifik. *Global & Strategis*. 12(1), 145-163.

⁸ See <https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20220804105012-7-361023/gaya-pelosi-tinggalkan-taiwan-usai-bikin-china-naik-darah>

Chinese blockaded areas are in the Taiwan Strait, an important shipping lane for world commerce. China also fired ballistic missiles, with one falling within Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone. The situation that occurred in the Taiwan Strait sparked fears that China could invade Taiwan like Russia did to Ukraine in February 2022.

China's anger was triggered by the Pelosi's visit which was deemed by the Chinese as "playing with fire". China considers Taiwan as part of its territory, and the US action is a violation of China's integrity and sovereignty. The US adheres to the *One China Policy*, but on the other hand is bound by law to defend Taiwan when attacked by other countries.⁹ The US and China's feud has also hardened on several occasions in the South China Sea due to US actions to conduct shipping under the pretext of *Freedom of Navigation operations* (FONOPs) in waters claimed by China as its sovereign territory (Figure 3) but opposed by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam. The potential conflict in the South China Sea is very likely to become an open conflict with the tendency of the US to become the mainstay of power for Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei Darussalam in facing China. The potential conflict has triggered the birth of an arms race that has the potential to accelerate an open conflict in the South China Sea.

The situation in the Indo Pacific is increasingly hectic with the presence of the US-led NATO force and the existence of several defense alliances such as QUAD (*Quadrilateral Security Dialogue*) consisting of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia; and the AUKUS Trilateral Security Pact consisting of the United States, Britain, and Australia. In the event of an open conflict, the alliance of defense forces will be in one axis to face their enemies.

⁹ See <https://www.kompas.id/baca/internasional/2022/08/06/china-simulasikan-serangan-ke-taiwan-taipei-aktifkan-sistem-rudal>



Figure 3. China's claims in the South China Sea
Source: BBC News Indonesia

In relation to changes in the strategic environment as described above, Indonesia as a *middle power* country that is also the Presidency of the G-20 (*Group on Twenty*), as well as the Chair of ASEAN in 2023, can contribute to being an agent of change effectively with a free and active foreign policy *tool*. As a *middle power* country, Indonesia has good flexibility in dealing with various domestic, regional, and global problems in the midst of complex US and China competition.

Maritime Defense

The uncertain global economic situation, since the emergence of the Covid-19 Pandemic and the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War in early 2022, has resulted in a slowdown in economic growth which could trigger a world's economic recession. Although the Covid-19 has subsided in many parts of the world, the competition between the US and its allies against China, which is close to Russia, leaves unending tensions, including in the Indo Pacific region.

The geopolitical dynamics of the region, faced by Indonesia's position as a maritime pivot, require Indonesia to have a strong maritime defense to

anticipate various vulnerabilities that may occur due to the dynamic conditions of the struggle for hegemony between the US and China. Maritime defense is needed to maintain Indonesia's sovereignty, protect the entire nation and the entire homeland of Indonesia, promote public welfare, educate the nation's life, and participate in implementing world order based on independence, eternal peace, and social justice, as mandated by the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. Maritime defense forces are also needed to ensure the safety of navigation of ships sailing throughout Indonesian waters.

In addition to maritime defense as *hard power*, Indonesia can play its role as the largest economy in Southeast Asia to use its *soft power* as the G-20 Presidency and in 2023 as the Chair of ASEAN to strive for the creation of a stable and peaceful Indo Pacific region. During the G-20 Presidency, Indonesia's role becomes crucial, considering that the G-20 is a multilateral cooperation group consisting of 19 major countries and the European Union with a focus on policy coordination in the economy and development. The G-20 represents the world's economic and political power with the composition of its members covering 80 percent of world GDP, 75 percent of global exports, and 60 percent of the global population. The goal of the G-20 is to realize strong, sustainable, balanced, and inclusive global growth.

This goal may not be achieved if there is an open conflict between China and Taiwan in which the US participates, as well as the protracted Russia-Ukraine War, which is now in its seventh month. If China disturbs Taiwan, it will create two conflict *fronts* like what happened during World War II, namely the European *front* with the Russia-Ukraine War, and the Pacific *front* with China versus Taiwan supported by the United States. For this reason, Indonesia needs to do something as President Joko Widodo has done as G-20 President to visit Kiev and Moscow to meet the leaders of the two hostile countries to seek peace. The peace mission carried out by President Joko Widodo to Ukraine and Russia (Figure 4 and 5) is part of President Joko Widodo's *strong leadership* in promoting diplomacy and becoming a *role model* for defense diplomacy in the global era by prioritizing world peace.



Figure 4. President Joko Widodo meets Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kiev, June 29, 2022

Source: Kompas.com



Figure 5. President Jokowi meets Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, June 30, 2022

Source: Kompas.com

As the largest economy in Southeast Asia, Indonesia's role is an important one, especially since in 2023 Indonesia will become the Chair of ASEAN. It is expected

that together ASEAN countries and their partners can realize a stable and peaceful Indo Pacific region. Economically, both the US and China are equally important, given the size of China's *Belt and Road Initiative* infrastructure projects in Indonesia. The US is ASEAN's fourth largest trading partner and source of investment. Thus, the stability of the Indo-Pacific Region is needed for ASEAN countries to continue to advance, becoming a locomotive for developing cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.

In overcoming problems in the *Indo-Pacific* as a continuation of the US and China competition, Indonesia's stance is united in the *ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific*, namely encouraging stability, peace, security, and prosperity in the *Indo-Pacific* region in accordance with the vision of the *ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific* adopted by the ASEAN Heads of State at the ASEAN Summit in Bangkok 2019. The *ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific* is an affirmation of ASEAN's position in maintaining peace, security, and stability and prosperity carried out through the principles of *Centrality, Inclusivity, and Complementary* which are indispensable amid the dynamics of geopolitical and geostrategic shifts in the Indo Pacific region.

CHINA'S MARITIME AMBITIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract

China will inevitably become the leading power in Southeast Asia, largely because of its own economic and military growth but also because American resolve to maintain its place as leader of the Asian security order will decline. This essay discusses both trends, and then makes an argument for how the consequences of this shift can be managed by Southeast Asian states. Nothing can stop China becoming the leading power in Southeast Asia, but the core objective for regional states should be to prevent it becoming the dominant power. In the military realm, this can be done by focusing on two priorities: (1) frustrate or delay Chinese ambitions for foreign bases; and (2) build up air and maritime denial capabilities. These priorities can be achieved without substantially higher defence spending, without moving Southeast Asian states into closer alignment with the US and its allies, and without provoking arms racing or distrust.

Keywords: China, United States, Maritime, Southeast Asia.

1. Discussion

In considering China's future role in Southeast Asia, we should begin by examining two long-term trends which will fundamentally reconfigure the balance of power in this region, and which are outside the control of all Southeast Asian states. One of those factors is the continuing relative decline of American military power. But we will begin with a brief discussion of China's military, on track to become the most powerful in Asia.

China's Growing Military Power.

Military power is ultimately an expression of economic power, and by some measures, China is already the biggest economy in the world. There is no disputing that China will grow much further, but there is robust debate among economists about China's growth potential. In 2017, the Australian government forecast that by 2035 the Chinese economy would be worth

US\$42 trillion in PPP terms, versus US\$24 trillion for the United States. More recently, the Lowy Institute published research which concluded that, due to unfavourable demographics, falling productivity growth, and the strains produced by the need to move away from its capital-intensive growth model, China's growth rate is likely to decline to 2-3% per year rather than 4-5% or more projected by many economists. At the higher growth level, China would become easily the biggest economy in the world. But under the Lowy Institute's more modest assumptions, "China would overtake the United States to become the world's largest economy in nominal US dollar terms by about 2030, but it would never establish a substantial lead."

However, even under these revised economic growth assumptions, and even if defence spending remains at roughly 2% of GDP, China's already impressive military modernisation program is likely to expand further. If China increased spending to 3% (still below what the US spends), it could generate further massive defence capability growth without dangerously unbalancing its economy. China has embraced the lesson from the Soviet collapse that it must prioritise economic development and keep military spending in check, but 3% would still be an affordable figure.

Whether defence spending remains stable or grows further, China is likely to boast the biggest and most capable military in Asia by around 2040. China's navy already has more hulls than the US Navy, though it still lags the US by a long way in capability terms. Nevertheless, China now clearly has the second-most powerful navy and air force in Asia, a remarkable achievement. In the 1980s, China in many respects had a weaker military than Taiwan. Today, China's air and maritime forces dwarf those of Taiwan, and are bigger than that of any Asian nation.

The pace and scale of China's modernisation are globally unprecedented since World War II, and show no sign of slowing. The US Navy predicts that by 2040, China will have a total of 333 combat ships, a figure which includes ballistic missile submarines, attack submarines, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, and amphibious ships, all of modern design. These ships will have the range to patrol the region with the aid of a fleet of new replenishment vessels. It is impossible to compare this estimate precisely against US Navy numbers, because US ship classes are different to China's (eg. the US operates no diesel-powered submarines at all, while such boats will make up most of the Chinese fleet for the foreseeable future), but a rough comparison yields a comparable figure of around 290 combat ships for the US Navy. And we should remember that this navy serves America's

global security interests, most notably in Europe and the Middle East. By contrast, China rarely commits its navy beyond Asia, and has no treaty commitments comparable to NATO.

As well as maritime power, China can project military power throughout Asia with missiles and air power. China has made enormous investments in fielding large numbers of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, with range in the thousands of kilometres. But more importantly, China is the only country in the world building bombers (the H-6 series), which are more a flexible and cost-effective way to project power throughout the region than missiles. China is developing a next-generation bomber known as the H-20, which will have stealth capabilities that allowing it to overcome almost all air defences in the region. We should expect the H-20 to be procured in large numbers.

Finally, we should note the possibility of China developing overseas bases, which will greatly enhance its military presence by reducing transit times for ships and aircraft, and by bringing Chinese forces closer to sources of rest, sustainment, and rearmament. China might already be building a small base at a naval facility in Cambodia, and China is known to have approached the government of Vanuatu about a possible naval base. The announcement that China and Solomon Islands had signed a security agreement also ignited speculation of future Chinese bases there.

What do these growing capabilities tell us about China's intentions? China scholar Nadege Rolland argues that Beijing envisages a 'partial, loose, and malleable hegemony', though the geographic boundaries of this hegemony are unclear. China has not expressed a detailed vision of what it wants Asia to look like. But at the very least, we can say that no nation of China's stature is likely to be content with subordinate status in its own region. China wants to lead, and to do so, it will need to displace the United States. And to do that, China will need the same instruments of national power that the US possesses. Beijing believes the American-led order is built not on its values or the attractiveness of its governance model but on economic, diplomatic, and military power. For China to aspire to lead the Asian order, it needs the same tools.

America's declining power in Asia

Long-term trends are in China's favour in this regard, firstly because China is capable of higher rates of economic and military growth than the US. But more importantly, despite successive US administrations adopting the

rhetoric of competition with China, the US is unlikely to devote itself fully to frustrating China's ambitions. There are a number of reasons to think that American resolve to defend its preferred Asian security order are likely to erode.

Since Soviet-led communism was defeated in 1991, the United States has maintained its military presence in Asia because the costs and risks of doing so were manageable. But those incentives have changed as Asia's security landscape has been transformed. Firstly, North Korea now has nuclear weapons that can reach the continental United States, putting all America's major cities at threat. Secondly, and more importantly, we have seen the rise of the PLA, already described. The PLA is already a more potent threat in Asia than Soviet forces ever were, and the PLA will continue to grow.

Yet despite the scale of the challenge presented by the PLA, it is not a direct threat to the United States. America's territory, its values, and the integrity of its political system are difficult for any nation, no matter how powerful, to threaten. This is partly due to favourable geography – the United States has friendly neighbours to its north and south, and two vast oceans east and west. The US economy is also likely to remain the second biggest in the world for many decades, until India relegates it to third place. In turn, America's large, dynamic, and innovative economy will continue to support a large military armed with nuclear weapons.

Nor is China an economic threat to the United States. There are fears that a Chinese-led order in Asia would exclude the US, but this would be enormously costly for China and the region. Moreover, European powers have continued to trade with and invest in Asia long after they ceased to maintain a strong military presence in Asia; there is every reason to expect that the US would do the same. Lastly, even if China could somehow cut the US off from the Asian economy, this would be a serious but far from decisive blow to the US, which is not heavily trade dependent.

Lastly, China is unlikely to threaten America ideologically. China doesn't really have a coherent ideology to export; communism has been drained of ideas and ambitions other than the core goal of keeping the Party in power. And China has shown no inclination to export its ideology. Indeed, Beijing's main ideological ambition appears to be defensive – to prevent Western liberal ideology from infiltrating China and thereby undermining the leadership of the Communist Party.

In sum, we can say that China does not present a threat to America's core interests. Yet the task of competing with China and potentially confronting it militarily is likely to be extremely high - much higher, in fact, than the Cold War contest against the Soviet Union. In those circumstances, it is difficult to see what would motivate the US to contest China's bid for regional strategic leadership. It is safer for the nations of the region to plan their security on the basis that American power and resolve will continue to decline, rather than rise to meet the China challenge.

What does China want?

What does China aim to do with its economic and military power, and what might Southeast Asia look like in these circumstances, where China is clearly the biggest power and America's resolve to defend the existing security order has diminished? As has already been noted, China's broader foreign policy ambitions have not been clearly stated and are difficult to discern precisely. But we can make some educated assumptions, the most important being that China wants to exercise leadership in Asia, even though the degree of control it seeks, and the geographical boundaries of its ambitions, remain unclear.

What exactly would Chinese 'leadership' mean in Southeast Asia?

We can rule out a maximalist definition of this term. There are examples from the 20th century of great powers maintaining a high degree of control over states within their sphere of influence. For instance, the Soviet Union exercised almost total control over the military and foreign policies of the Warsaw Pact states and intervened to maintain friendly and compliant regimes in those countries. But the Soviet sphere of influence was attained initially by military conquest, and indeed it was kept in place by the threat of Soviet military force, a threat that was then carried out in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968).

It is difficult to see that China could attain a similar level of control over any foreign country without conquering it militarily first. And even in an era of declining American power in Asia, that kind of action risks an American intervention that could spiral into a costly broader war. There are exceptions to this judgment. The US is primarily a maritime power in Asia, so its power to deter China in continental Southeast Asia is weak. For instance, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar are weak states with little or no security relationship with the US. But conquering and ruling these countries would be enormously costly, with unclear benefits compared to exercising more subtle forms of influence. Lastly, China has shown little appetite for using military force in this way, although it clearly regards Taiwan as an exceptional case, and has

signalled its willingness to use military force against Taipei to prevent independence.

In sum, we can rule out 'leadership' by its most direct and dictatorial definition. It is implausible to imagine China attempting to assert that kind of control over its neighbourhood because of the costs, the unclear benefits, the risks of a broader war, and China's historical aversion to such action.

Perhaps, then, Chinese leadership will take on a different form. China will try to exercise a more indirect form of leadership in Southeast Asia, attained not through military force but by combining various forms of state power to bring Southeast Asian states into a sphere of influence in which China is recognised as the leading power, one which can exclude all other great powers and whose views on major regional questions will gain assent largely through a system of implicit threats and inducements.

Economically, such leadership can be attained in part by sheer size. China's status as a leading investor and trading partner are already making it difficult for Southeast Asia to ignore China's political preferences. China's economic size, and the power of its major firms, can also create 'path dependency' for customers of its goods and services. For instance, once a nation commits to one generation of Chinese mobile communications technology, it will be easier and cheaper to roll over to the next generation rather than to start again with a competing provider. This creates political bargaining power.

This subtle and indirect form of leadership can be exercised largely without resort to the use of force, but with the full knowledge that force is available and will be very costly to counter. We can see this form of influence in play already in the South China Sea, where China's territorial claims and rights to the exploitation of natural resources are contested by smaller states. Occasionally, these disputes reach the level of confrontation with Chinese law enforcement vessels. China's Coast Guard and other maritime law enforcement arms are themselves very powerful by regional standards, with China inducting destroyer-sized vessels into service. The smaller nations competing with China over these rights also know that an even more powerful naval force exists over the horizon to reinforce Chinese claims. This knowledge exercises a critical influence on decision-making: even if the smaller state can muster enough of its own maritime forces to overmatch the Chinese Coast Guard presence on the scene, the smaller state knows that China can afford to escalate the confrontation by introducing naval vessels, while the smaller state would have difficulty matching. Thus, the smaller state

is deterred from confronting China in the first place, and has an incentive to acquiesce to China's preferences.

This small example illustrates a broader point about the role that Chinese naval power might play in Southeast Asia in future. As already discussed, one of the most notable features of China's naval modernisation over the last two decades has been the dramatic improvement in the capability of its large, ocean-going surface vessels. China is now just a few years away from boasting the ability to deploy an aircraft carrier, with escorts and replenishment ships, around the region.

It is true, of course, that in a conflict such a fleet would be highly vulnerable to so-called 'peer competitors', major powers which boast sophisticated military forces. In the age of accurate and fast anti-ship missiles, large warships are highly vulnerable. China itself exploited this technological advantage in developing its so-called 'A2/AD' (anti-access/area denial) strategy. It built a naval force designed to make it virtually impossible for the US or other navies to safely operate its surface ships close to China's shores because they would be overwhelmed by anti-ship weapons fired from the air, land, sea, and under the sea.

So why has China chosen to develop a large surface fleet, despite the fact that modern technology has made it so difficult for surface ships to survive on the battlefield? The answer to this question offers us some insight into China's intentions in Southeast Asia.

One plausible answer is that China is not building this fleet to compete with peer competitors at all, much less to fight them. In a war with the US and its allies, China's surface fleet is likely to play very little role because the major fleet units (aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers) are too vulnerable and too costly to risk. Rather, China would use its surface fleet much as the US has done since the end of the Cold War, which is as a constabulary force against small powers with few naval capabilities. Such a constabulary force is designed not win control of the battlefield but in situations where such control is uncontested and can be exploited. It is a force designed to police and enforce the prevailing order rather than to win a war against a peer competitor.

If this interpretation is correct, it suggests that China's surface fleet is not designed to compete with America but to exploit the maritime power vacuum that will be left when the US Navy is no longer the strongest presence in the

region, and when US allies have begun to lose confidence in America's ability to prevail over a rising China. And if the earlier analysis about America's declining interest in maintaining its leadership in Asia is correct, China will inherit strategic supremacy from the United States without having to fight for it. Instead, merely as a function of China's growth as an economic and military power, the US will lose the resolve to remain Asia's leading power and cede this role gradually to China. China's surface fleet can exploit the leadership it is inheriting. Smaller regional powers, no longer assured of the US Navy's balancing role, would be intimidated or coerced into acceding to China's preferences.

However, distances alone can do a great deal to blunt China's power over the vast reaches of Southeast Asia. Naval power moves slowly, so even with China's resources, it will be costly and difficult to project power in ways that will reliably deter or coerce other states. The role of foreign bases will be critical to reduce these disadvantages. Chinese foreign military bases would also serve a symbolic function. They would signal that Chinese power has been accepted and embraced by the host state, and they would demonstrate that America and its allies are powerless to stop the advancement of Chinese influence throughout the region.

Of course, China presently only has one foreign military base, in the east African state of Djibouti. But there is evidence that a small Chinese facility is under construction at Ream naval base, Cambodia. And there was well founded speculation in 2018 that Chinese authorities approached the government of Vanuatu about building military facilities there.

Proposal for a Southeast Asian response

China's ambitions to establish strategic leadership in Southeast Asia ought to prompt a response from the region itself, a response that does not reject China's place as a major power in Southeast Asia or turn its back on China as an economic power. Nor should it imply that Southeast Asia needs to ally itself behind the US and its allies, Australia and Japan. Indeed, as already argued, American power and resolve is in long term decline in Asia, so Southeast Asian states should assume that the US will play a reduced role in balancing Chinese power in future. They will need to do it themselves. Lastly, it does not imply that Southeast Asian states must engage in an arms build-up or arms race with China.

The response should be framed around the principle that, while China will inevitably take its place as the leading economic and diplomatic power in the region, and while all recognise that China will slowly supplant the US as the leading military power in the region, China must never become the dominant power in Southeast Asia. That is to say, China must never be so strong relative to its Southeast Asian neighbours that it can exercise decisive influence over their foreign relations and determine the major policy choices they make about their economies and their security. Southeast Asian states must be strong enough to persuade China that it cannot achieve its foreign policy objectives by coercion, but must do so by persuasion, cooperation, and compromise. In other words, Southeast Asian states should commit themselves to the mission of preserving a balance of power in Southeast Asia and preventing dominance by China.

Given the extreme disparities of wealth and power between China and some of Southeast Asia's weaker states, it may already be too late to meet such an objective. Arguably, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia are already part of China's sphere of influence in Southeast Asia. The Philippines and Thailand may slip into that category too. From the perspective of their governments, it may make more sense to assent to a high degree of Chinese influence in their political decision-making, because resisting such influence is simply too costly.

But for wealthier Southeast Asian states, particularly in maritime Southeast Asia, the task is achievable because of the inherent limitations of maritime power. As already mentioned, projecting and sustaining maritime power over long distances is costly and difficult. Capital ships move slowly and require tremendous resources to protect and support with fuel and stores. For this reason, the task of frustrating Chinese ambitions for military bases in Southeast Asia should be a high priority because such bases reduce these limitations. This is a diplomatic task, not a military one. (Australia also needs to make this a high priority in the Pacific Islands region, since any Chinese military base in that region would have an impact in Southeast Asia also).

Maritime Southeast Asian states should also take further measures to improve their military capabilities, but of a specific character which can avoid the appearance of arms racing and which is not unduly provocative. The emphasis should be on capabilities that can negate Chinese air and maritime power (often referred to in military parlance as 'area denial' weapons), particularly large stocks of advanced anti-ship and air defence weapons, as well as the platforms to fire them, and the surveillance and targeting systems to support them. Southeast Asian states need enough anti-ship capability to make the

PLA Navy believe that operating its capital ships against those states would be too risky. Such capabilities are not unduly expensive, but they would require the re-allocation of funding away from traditional military platforms such as large surface ships, which are unlikely to be useful or survivable on the modern naval battlefield (Southeast Asian maritime states do have an urgent need to upgrade their maritime constabulary capabilities, for which surface ships are invaluable, but these are generally small to medium sized, and lightly armed).

The advantage of such a force structure is that it signals a broader national intent which is limited and modest. It is a defensive capability which can be focused on local airspace and the near seas rather than long-range operations. Its aim is merely to negate Chinese air and maritime power so that China cannot coerce or impose its will. It is not an escalatory force structure and thus is less likely to prompt arms racing or allegations of provocation.

By negating Chinese maritime strength without risking escalation or provocation, military power can be sidelined as a prominent aspect of regional relations. But without investments in maritime and air denial capabilities, Southeast Asian states will become increasingly vulnerable to military coercion. Of course, China can always outspend its smaller neighbours, but in maritime warfare, the advantage lies with the nation which is operating close to its shores, and which is operating relatively cheap anti-air and anti-ship systems. It is much easier to upgrade those capabilities than to build more capital ships.

2. Conclusion: The special case of Indonesia

In relation to China's rising power and how Beijing plans to expand its influence, Southeast Asia is exceptional in one crucial respect. In every other part of Asia, China faces a resident great power that will constrain its ambitions: India in South Asia and the Indian Ocean; Russia in Central Asia; Japan in North Asia. By contrast, Southeast Asia is the only part of the broader Asian region without a resident great power. That gives China more scope to grow its strategic influence than elsewhere in the region.

However, Southeast Asia does have one nation which is on course to become a great power. Indonesia has the population size and economic potential to achieve such a status. It is on track to be the world's fourth-largest economy by the middle of the century, and although it still lacks sufficient state

capacity to summon its already considerable resources, this can change relatively quickly.

To play a leading role in ensuring that no other country dominates the region, Indonesia will need to upgrade its military capabilities. Earlier this year, Indonesia announced major new acquisitions to strengthen its air force. If these announcements are fully realised, Indonesia will move to the front rank of Southeast Asian air forces. We should hope that such purchases are matched with further investments in the air and maritime denial capabilities described above.

But to fully embody the role of a great power, military might is a secondary consideration. First and foremost, Indonesia will need to update its strategic identity and embrace the responsibility that comes with its size, influence, and power. This is not a question of encouraging Indonesia to become more Western-aligned. As already argued, the US is going to be a less decisive presence in Asia in future. The era of Western leadership in Asia is ending.

Rather, Indonesia must lead a regional effort to ensure that no single nation can be the dominant power in Southeast Asia. This implies a more prominent role for Indonesia, one which is likely to create occasional friction with Beijing. But such will be the burden of being Southeast Asia's only great power. Such a role is also consistent with regional diplomatic traditions, and well suited to a nation which has no major foreign policy ambitions other than the maintenance of peace, stability, and sovereignty. It is a role centred on prevention or negation, rather than any ambitious plans for regional comity, or alignment around grand goals. As such, it is reminiscent of the role ASEAN has played for decades. As the eminent Australian foreign policy commentator Allan Gyngell has observed, "From the beginning, ASEAN has been much less about what it can do than about what it can prevent from happening – schisms and divisions in the region and any return to inter-state conflict." That is the spirit in which Indonesia should tackle the task of balancing Chinese power. It is not about 'doing' anything, but about ensuring that a less free and less sovereign future can be prevented. Indonesia will never be big enough to challenge Chinese leadership in Southeast Asia, but it will be comfortably big enough to play a balancing role, and thereby to deny regional dominance to China.

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MARITIME DEFENSE & SECURITY IN GEO V ERA

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Abstract

First is Military Reform, The second keyword is Defense Modernization, The third keyword is defense transformation, The fourth keyword is Indonesia Defense Power. The first Geopolitics era gives rise to two pillars of strength. Land power and Sea power. Then in Geopolitics Two, the first world war and second world war gave rise to the era of air power. Indonesia in this context, has several chokepoints, it has chokepoints in Malacca, in Sunda, in Lombok, in the Sulawesi Sea and so on. Now we must have the ability to ensure that our archipelagic sea lanes are not blocked. Once we fail to address the blockages in the sea lanes, then we will be deemed to have failed to provide freedom of navigation and other countries concerned by it, will step in to open the blockages in any way they deem necessary. This is the first challenge, regarding the obstructions to freedom of navigation

Keywords: Maritime, Defense, Chokepoint

My presentation is about Maritime Defense and Security in the Era of Geopolitics. At Lemhannas, we have conducted studies and then made an evolution of geopolitical developments since this term was first introduced. We are currently in the fifth (V) geopolitical era or I would like to call it as Geopolitics V.

The first Geopolitics era gives rise to two pillars of strength. Land power and Sea power. Then in Geopolitics Two, the first world war and second world war gave rise to the era of air power. In the Cold War, in the geopolitical era three it was the culmination of conventional power coupled with the emergence of (mass) weapons, especially nuclear weapon. Geopolitics 4 changed, when it started to be thought that we were seeing the end of classical geopolitics. We see the end of conventional war so that a new era, The era 4 has emerged regarding the role of resources.

Today we should have entered the fifth era. The era when we talk about connectivity, we talk about global infrastructure, we talk about global supply chains. What is being discussed is no longer land power, sea power, air power.

But what we are talking about is a complex system that requires coordination/combination of technology from maritime digital cyber and space. Everything must coincide, and if we look at the evolution of sea power, it can roughly be divided into four. Globally, the first was the emergence of three countries at that time as the main countries for sea power; Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands. What the three countries relied on, at that time were; fleets, especially commodity carriers. the second is colonization. The third is trade. It brought up Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands.

Then came a new era called British Rules the wave. When it gave rise to the British emporium, an empire that really controlled the world trade. The keys from England are the same as Netherlands, Spain and Portugal. There are fleets, there are colonialism, and there are also trades coupled with industrialization. Britain was then broken, replaced by Pax Americana since 1945. And now Pax Americana is added with one more key, namely a global military alliance. Coupled with the existence of global war fleets up to the seven fleets and very complete. There are aircraft carriers, there are nuclear powered submarines with also nuclear warheads, to strategic facilities around the world. Those are the developments in terms of maritime power, those three developments.

The question is, after the next Pax americana, what is the fourth? Will it remain in the form of one country, or will it be replaced by a new system? If you connect it with the geopolitical era, the five possibilities are not countries that will replace them, but a new global system. The new global pro system, the prediction now is anyone who can produce connectivity, whoever that can produce global infrastructure, anyone who can produce Global Supply Chain. This will replace the Pax Americana.

We now see the problems, and that is, the US always wants one basic theme in securing its vital interests for maritime, that basic theme is freedom of navigations, that's the basic theme. Not possession nor occupation. What distinguishes the United States from Spain, the Netherlands and Portugal is that it does not rely on colonization. He did not rely on physical territorial occupation in the form of colonies. They didn't rely on it. But what is important to United States is free trade. What matters for them is the flow of global logistics, Freedom of navigations.

Therefore, they emphasize on the source points. The choke points. This table (slide no.3) shows the main chokepoints in the world. As recent as it progresses the bigger the challenges there are. There are natural challenges,

which due to technological advances it has been relatively solved with the help of maritime radar monitoring. It may be solved with the help of satellites, it may also be solved with, for example by changing the structure of the ship's design. The challenges of nature are solved. Now the challenges that arise today are geo-economic, geopolitical, geo-maritime challenges. Yes, in terms of navigation, shipping technology, nothing prevents any ship in this world from docking in Odessa, Ukraine. But due to geopolitical challenges, fewer and fewer ships can dock in Odessa, Ukraine. It's not issue of nature obstruction, shipping technology, sensors, radar, or satellites issues. None of that issue, but a geo-maritime, geopolitical issues.

Indonesia in this context, has several chokepoints, it has chokepoints in Malacca, in Sunda, in Lombok, in the Sulawesi Sea and so on. Now we must have the ability to ensure that our archipelagic sea lanes are not blocked. Once we fail to address the blockages in the sea lanes, then we will be deemed to have failed to provide freedom of navigation and other countries concerned by it, will step in to open the blockages in any way they deem necessary. This is the first challenge, regarding the obstructions to freedom of navigation.

The second challenge is, today we should have been in the era of Global Supply Chain. Now, this is just one example of the global chain in the semiconductor sector. It can be seen from this map (slide no 4), that the research is in Europe, but the resources to produce the semiconductor chain could be located in Central America, Latin America. And then later production will be in the United States, in Taiwan. Then the biggest market today is in East Asia. All to produce one Global Supply Chain.

From a global supply chain like this to semiconductors, for example, it should no longer be relevant for the ideological struggle of the cold war. In fact, it would be strange if there was a trade rivalry. For example, the US and China. Then the technological rivalry between the US and China. The Global Supply Chain processes (as seen in slide no. 4 diagram) from number one to number 12 on this map indicate they should be one supply chain. They cannot be disconnected. But since 2017, we have seen the supply chain being cut off. There is a trade war going on, there is a technological rivalry competition going on. What I have said earlier in my opening remarks, was the irony of Geopolitics five. Connectivity produces faults. That's the irony that we need to resolve to ensure maritime stability, which is the theme of this morning's Geopolitical forum.

Moving on to the next slide, these are the things that can be exemplified earlier. These are the faults in global connectivity. Because suddenly we now have basically two mega projects. The first mega project is a belt and road initiated by China. The key word is infrastructure. Whenever we mention global infrastructure, we tend to focus more on China's Belt And Road Initiatives. But on the other hand the US also has its own mega project, the Indo Pacific Economic Framework. In the Indo-Pacific Economic Forum, the key word is Global Supply Chain. That's the key word.

Biden launched executive orders, (similar to Presidential Instruction /Inpres in Indonesia) on Global Supply Chain, February 2021, Last year. Then in June 2021, Biden formed a task force for the Global Supply Chain. The point is to find solution should the Global Supply Chain is broken, to find the issue and solved them, but then it spawned fracture between two blocks, fracture that do not result in global connectivity.

Our challenge is, should we try to connect the Belt and Road Initiative with Indo-Pacific, so that these two projects could become one global project, or should we give the third option. Which we hope somehow to create a link between project 1 and project 2. There are other options that we are developing. Indonesia wants to develop, for example, the World Maritime Axis. Global maritime initiative, but with limited projections, still relatively internal inward looking, not yet projected into the future. Countries like India can have their own initiatives or projects. countries like South Africa can have their own projects. As we can see now Turkey's vital role in overcoming the supply chain crisis in the black sea. We may soon be able to initiate an initiative carried out by Argentina to secure its supply chain related to, for example, global lithium. Because Argentina will be a major player for lithium-based electric batteries. So, those are initiatives that might be done, so that fracture between two main blocks are not going to be too hard on us and disrupt our desire to obtain global connectivity.

Furthermore, other things that we may foresee is the future trend. These are some of the trends that I have tried to map out. The first trend is to see the development and the mastery of submarine technology. Due to high-cost factors, however, is that only few countries can afford to build complex submarine systems. The main country is still the United States, the second country is Russia, the third country is now China. In Europe maybe Germany and France. In Asia, South Korea, Indonesia is also trying to become a submarine producer. But due to the complexity of the systems, leading up to nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed submarines, for now there are only three countries, and they are Russia, United States and China.

The increasingly complex submarines basically provide greater opportunities for these countries to carry out a forced attack, launching an undetected first attack. If countries are then unable to compete, the submarine strategy then becomes anti-submarine, anti-access, becomes an area of denial. This will be the trend worldwide. Anti-Access Area Denial, because among other things, they are unable to overcome this trend.

All across the globe, all submarines proliferation allies has decrease their submarine deployments. North America is decreasing its number of submarines. In Europe the number of submarines decreased, but in two regions of the world, the number of submarines has increased. The first is the Middle East, the number of submarines has increased compared to 20 years ago. And the second one is in East Asia, the number of submarines has increased sharply compared to 20 years ago. Its proliferation is in two areas seabed warfare, and underwater warfare, submarine warfare.

Furthermore, the third trend is amphibious capability. The amphibious capabilities within our defense doctrine, means defending the outer islands. It means defending our islands that are outside our defense compartment. That's the meaning of Amphibious capabilities for Indonesia. Amphibious ability for the opposing countries may be a coastal invasion landing. That is what it probably means for them. Which we, Indonesia, never have any thoughts of forming an Amphibious army to invade the land on the Opponent Beach. Indonesian army build their Amphibious abilities to penetrate the Natuna Island, should Natuna is captured by the opponent. But for other countries, amphibious ability means the ability of the expedition to land on the shores of the opposing country. With their abilities increasing, the main country is still the United States, and following it is China in this region, because there is a need for an invasion scenario for Taiwan.

Furthermore, to overcome this, all countries then form Anti-Access and Anti-Area Defenses. Anti-Access (AA) and Area Denial (AD) are the main ones. Everywhere this ability is developed. Anti Access - Area Denial has been developed by many countries. But then we see also there is a doctrine that tries to break this Anti-Access and Area Denial. This doctrine is said to be mature in 2028 and will be tested in 2025.

Now the doctrine that designed to break AA/AD is multi-domain operation. The multi-domain operation requested by Trump was reviewed by the US in 2018, there will be a prototype in 2025 and then it will mature in 2028. If you look at the purple column on the bottom right, the arrow shapes (see slide no.

11), the dominant word is, expedition. Multi-domain operation is performed to break AA/AD. Multi-domain operation was developed to ensure that there is an effort, whose military maneuvers cannot be broken. That's the essence of MDO. This has not been completed. In the United States, it is only a prototype, it will only be tested in 2025. But it will be mature to be developed into military maneuvers in 2028.

And then what do we do, Indonesia has many challenges with maritime projection capabilities like this, we now rely on AA/AD. That's our mainstay today if we use the general global generic terminology. But three years from now it will be broken by MDO. So we have to find a way how to have a military whose maneuvers remain free, a freedom of maneuver that cannot be broken. MDO however tries to ensure this freedom of maneuver it cannot be broken by any system placement including AA/AD. Meanwhile AA/AD is basically our capacity up until now. Because we are not a maritime projection. We can see that MDO is trying to be implemented, yes, there are still many challenges. In Russia, Ukraine has not yet seen its MDO, but once the Taiwan crisis occurs, China conducts its military exercises simultaneously, which will disturb the freedom of maneuver. Once it causes disturbance, that's where MDO will play its role.

Now the key for Indonesia in the future is how to master technology. To become a maritime power in the future, this means the Navy can no longer only think about maritime instruments, maritime capabilities, maritime technology. When we talked about maritime capacity for the era of supply chain and connectivity then it means these three things must be connected, namely Maritime, Digital, & Space, these three must be connected. We have to figure out how to integrate these three. Maritime, space, and cyber/digital. Without integrating these three, we will not have a strong maritime capacity.

Finally, in the end what we need is a long step. Earlier, Mr. Marsetio mentioned the planning carried out by Xiaoping was stated in 1980 which will end in 2050. Currently they have not finished modernizing their Chinese defense. Now they are in the last stage of 2080 planning, while the third stage 2020 to 2050 is ensuring China's maritime power projection capability in the Pacific. After that, they will think of Indo-Pacific. We can see that they have walked 70 years there. On October 5, 2021, the president actually gave directions to carry out long-term planning. Around the anniversary of the Indonesia's National Army (TNI) on October 5, 2021, the president directed us to continue TNI reform coupled with defense modernization to ensure we are able to carry out defense transformations to form Indonesia's defense force.

So the keywords here are, first is Military Reform, The second keyword is Defense Modernization, The third keyword is defense transformation, The fourth keyword is Indonesia Defense Power. That's the key word that was conveyed by the president on October 5, 2021. This is our homework, how the military reforms that we have carried out since 1998 may then continue towards defense transformation, so that we can form long-term plans towards achieving the powerful regional force of Indonesia's defense, which I believe must go beyond planning 2050 if not maybe until 2070.

That is all from me. Many Thanks.



MARITIME POLITICAL ECONOMY: CHINA, THE UNITED STATES, AND ASIA

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Abstract

The intensifying competition between China and the United States opens opportunities for countries to develop their economies. China can provide funding for infrastructure development and the United States can help countries better manage their maritime resources. However, the competition also raises risks. China's expectations of concessions on issues like fishing or sovereignty and U.S. hopes of closer cooperation can add political pressure on decision makers in Southeast Asia. Countries can manage such pressure by more clearly articulating their own vision for the region's development and by building strategies of compartmentalized cooperation.

Keywords: China, Political Economy, Asia, United States, Economics

1. Introduction

The Indo-Pacific is widely anticipated to become the center of the global economy. The world's most populous countries and largest militaries are in the Indo-Pacific, and already Asian art, cuisine, and culture has spread around the globe.¹⁰ By 2040, the Indo-Pacific is expected to produce 50 percent of global GDP and account for 40 percent of the world's consumption. Asia's working age population could reach 3.4 billion, far exceeding that estimated for Europe at 0.5 billion and North America at 0.3 billion. Almost half of the world's urban population could be located in the Indo-Pacific as well.¹¹ Asia's economy is expected to feature a dense network of intra-regional connections in trade, supply chains, manufacturing, travel, and foreign direct investment.

The maritime economy is expected to play an especially important role in realizing the potential of Asia's economy. Seaborne trade has doubled every decade since 1945, and shipbuilding tonnage worldwide has doubled since 1990. It is estimated that 80 percent of all world trade, or about 5.7 billion tons of cargo, is transported by sea. This maritime superhighway in

¹⁰ Parag Khanna, *The Future is Asian*, New York, NY: Simon and Shuster, 2019.

¹¹ Mckinsey Global Institute, *The Future of Asia Report*, September 2019.

the world economy is supported by a massive infrastructure, including ninety-three thousand merchant vessels with 1.25 million seamen bound for eight thousand ports.¹²

Yet, the same region also holds considerable economic and political challenges. Economically, the most successful Asian economies are experiencing slowing growth. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China face rapidly aging populations and their growth rates have slowed. Developing countries like India and much of southeast Asia lack adequate infrastructure and opportunities for their rapidly growing populations.¹³ Many governments remain brittle, and some countries face unrest, widespread protests, and insurgencies. Moreover, there remain risks of war owing to persistent hot spots, including the standoff between North and South Korea, China-Taiwan disputes, and disputes over land and maritime borders involving China and many of its neighbors.¹⁴

Finding a way to organize the political economy in a way that maximizes the economic potential while minimizing the political risks will be essential if the region, and the world, is to reap the benefits of the Indo-Pacific's potential. Regarding the maritime domain, countries must build port, road, and other infrastructure, trade rules must be agreed upon, and rights to maritime resources such as fish respected. Achieving this in a way that brings stability as well as prosperity requires leadership.

The world's two most powerful countries, the United States and China, have both offered themselves as leaders to help achieve these goals. But the two countries are competitors who invest notions of national strategy into their visions for the Indo-Pacific's development. This means they do not necessarily agree on key topics and in fact may oppose the other. Adding to the complexity, other countries in Asia have their own ideas. In the following sections, we will briefly review the approaches proposed by China, the United States, and Indonesia.

a. China's Approach: The Belt and Road Initiative

¹² Graham Gerard Ong-Webb, "Introduction—Southeast Asian Piracy: Research and Developments," in *Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and securing the Malacca Straits*, ed. Graham Gerard Ong-Webb (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), p. xviii.

¹³ IMF, "Regional Economic Outlook," October 2021.

¹⁴ IISS, "An Introduction to Asia-Pacific Regional Security," Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2021.

China's vision for the region's development and for the maritime domain in particular are captured in the Belt and Road Initiative.¹⁵ In 2013, he proposed a maritime silk road with ASEAN countries while addressing the Indonesian Parliament.¹⁶ The BRI is a global infrastructure development initiative that aims to deepen the integration primarily of the Eurasian landmass and Africa. According to the Chinese government, 68 countries have signed onto the project.¹⁷ China's government has pledged nearly USD \$1 trillion to support the project and it is regarded a centerpiece of Chinese diplomacy under Xi Jinping.¹⁸

The Maritime Silk Road envisions building sea lanes of travel, including: 1) along south Asia and the Indian Ocean to the Middle East; 2) through the South Pacific to Australia; and 3) headed north along Russia's coast, and across the Arctic Ocean to northern Europe.¹⁹ The maritime silk road is understood in China to carry profound political meaning for the country's ambitions as a great power. At the 18th Party congress in 2012, Beijing first outlined the ambition to become a strong maritime country. The idea of a strong maritime country includes both the Maritime Silk Road and policies to exploit the maritime economy throughout waters claimed by China. This includes fishing and mineral resource development in waters throughout the first island chain. It also includes the expansion of access to fishing resources with many Maritime Silk Road partners, in part through the establishment of offshore fishing bases.

China's vision for the Maritime Silk Road and for the development of the "blue economy" overlaps with its vision to establish greater diplomatic and military leadership of the Indo-Pacific. China's navy has continued a robust modernization and today has become the largest in the world.²⁰ China's coast guard aggressively patrol the South China Sea and support Chinese fishermen in confrontations with neighboring

¹⁵ Xinhua, "Essential Guide to Understanding Belt and Road Initiative," May 13, 2017..

¹⁶ Xi Jinping, "Jointly Building China-ASEAN Community of Shared Interest-Speech at Indonesian Parliament," *People's Daily*, October 4, 2013.

¹⁷ Xinhua, "Spotlight: Belt and Road Initiative Brings Win-Win Results," May 16, 2017..

¹⁸ Suisheng Zhao, "China's Belt-Road Initiative as the Signature of President Xi Jinping Diplomacy: Easier Said than Done," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 29, No. 123, 2020, pp. 319-335.

¹⁹ China.org website, "Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative," June 20, 2017.

²⁰ Department of Defense, *Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China*, 2021.

countries. And in 2017 China's government outlined for the first time a policy paper that expressed a vision for greater Chinese leadership of the region's future security architecture.²¹ Underscoring the linkage, Chinese leaders have emphasized the idea of a "community of common destiny" in which improving economic ties with China proceeds hand in hand with the strengthening of security relations with China.²²

b. The U.S. Approach: Free and Open Indo-Pacific

The United States is regarded as having a primarily security-oriented approach to the Indo-Pacific. This in part reflects the fact that the United States has many alliances and partnerships throughout the region. It also reflects the fact that China has displaced the United States to become the top trade partner of most countries in the region. Yet it is inaccurate to say that Washington only sees the region through the eyes of military alliances. U.S. presidents since President Obama have complemented their efforts to bolster the U.S. military and diplomatic position in the region with economic initiatives. Under President Trump, Washington promoted infrastructure investment spending to counter China's BRI.²³ President Biden has sought to revive efforts to conclude a trade agreement with the region through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). The IPEF is expected to have four pillars: (1) fair and resilient trade; (2) supply chain resilience; (3) infrastructure, clean energy, and decarbonization; and (4) tax and anti-corruption. However, the administration has signaled that the framework will not offer tariff cuts and other market-access tools, the usual focus area of US trade agreements. It will instead focus on simplifying bureaucratic procedures to facilitate trade.²⁴

As in the case of China, the U.S. vision for trade and infrastructure development are tied to its ambition to bolster its influence and leadership in the region. Thus the IPEF and other economic initiatives cannot be fully separated from U.S. efforts to strengthen its diplomatic relations with countries such as the "Quad," which includes Japan,

²¹ State Council Information Office, "Full Text: China's Polices on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation," January 11, 2017.

²² Zhang Denghua, "The Concept of 'Community of Common Destiny' in China's Diplomacy: Meaning, Motives and Implications," *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 2, May 2018, pp. 196-207.

²³ Nyshka Chandran, "New U.S. Spending in Asia Won't Match China But It's Significant in Other Ways," *CNBC*, July 31, 2018. As of

²⁴ Niels Graham, "Trade Facilitation and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework," Atlantic Council, May 2022.

Australia, and India.²⁵ Nor can the economic initiatives be fully separated from U.S. efforts to bolster its military position in the region through efforts to conclude access agreements and strengthen alliances.

c. The ASEAN Response: Hedging and Geopolitical Fulcrum

Countries in the Indo-Pacific have generally welcomed the offers of leadership and help from China and the United States. But they have not been entirely passive. Rather than passively simply accept the ideas from the two great powers, some countries have proposed their own ideas. Here I will briefly consider the response in ASEAN and Indonesia in particular. ASEAN countries have shown considerable diversity in their responses to major development initiatives, and to China's BRI in particular. The poorest countries, such as Laos and Cambodia, have generally shown the most enthusiasm and eagerness to take part. Other countries like Vietnam, Singapore, and Thailand, have welcomed BRI projects but sought to more aggressively negotiate the terms of assistance. Still others, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, have shown more reticence about accepting Chinese government to government loans.²⁶

Indonesia in particular has sought to articulate a Southeast Asian perspective on the region's needs and priorities. In 2014, Indonesia's president Joko Widodo put forward the idea of the Geopolitical Maritime Fulcrum (GMF). The GMF originally had five pillars: 1) The development of Indonesia's maritime culture; 2) the commitment to protect and develop maritime resources; 3) the commitment to develop maritime infrastructure and connectivity; 4) maritime diplomacy to invite Indonesia's partners to cooperate in maritime affairs; and 5) the need to build maritime defense capability.²⁷ The most recent version of that vision has seven pillars: marine and human resources development; maritime governance; maritime economy and infrastructure; maritime spatial management and environmental protection; maritime culture; maritime diplomacy; and importantly, maritime defense, security, law

²⁵ Congressional Research Service, "The 'Quad': Security Cooperation Among the United States, Japan, India, and Australia," May 16, 2022.

²⁶ Balazs Ujvari, "The Belt and Road Initiative- the ASEAN Perspective," *Policy Brief*, Egmont Institute, March 1, 2019.

²⁷ Ardhyta Eduard, Yeremia Lalisang, and Darang S. Candra, "Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum and China's Belt and Road Initiative," Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, April 2020.

enforcement, and safety at sea.²⁸ Many experts have observed that President Widodo has downplayed the GMF upon his reelection owing to more pressing domestic priorities including terrorism and natural disasters. However, the government has continued many relevant initiatives.²⁹

2. Discussion

In general, China and the United States have not surprisingly taken a mostly critical stance regarding their rival's proposals. U.S. officials have taken aim at China's BRI proposals, warning of the dangers of "debt trap diplomacy" and highlighting the risks of political dominance that might come with participation in BRI.³⁰ China has rejected the criticisms and denounced U.S. efforts to bolster its relationships with allies and partners in the region as destabilizing.³¹ ASEAN countries have sought to hedge by accepting participation in U.S.-led or Chinese-led initiatives without committing fully to either side.³²

How can all parties navigate these competing approaches to realizing the economic potential of Asia, and of the maritime domain in particular? One way is for countries to engage in the available opportunities through a process I call "compartmentalized cooperation." This approach calls for the management of issues on its own merits apart from other issues. This could allow countries in the Indo-Pacific to maximize potential benefits from cooperation with wealthy great powers such as China and the United States. However, it requires countries to be clear in articulating their demands. In this sense, Indonesia's proposal of the Geopolitical Fulcrum could be a helpful step forward. Illustrations of how this might work can be seen in three major issues related to the political economy of the Indo-Pacific: **infrastructure, fishing, and trade.**

Infrastructure is important because it is necessary to enable economic activity in the first place. There must be sufficient ports, roads, and communications infrastructure to enable trade and investment. Fishing is a key resource of the mariculture, although there are others. And trade processes and rules is important because it is a vital aspect of economic

²⁸ Natalie Sambhi, "Jokowi's Maritime Dreams Thwarted by Land-Based Challenges," *The Diplomat*, October 17, 2019.

²⁹ Evan Laksmana, "Indonesia as 'Global Maritime Fulcrum': A Post-Mortem Analysis," Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, November 8, 2019.

³⁰ State Department, "The Elements of the China Challenge," November 2020.

³¹ Reuters, "China Says 'Fed Up' With Hearing U.S. Complaints on Belt and Road," May 9, 2019.

³² Jenn-Jaw Soong, "Perception and Strategy of ASEAN's States on China's Footprints Under Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): Perspectives of State-Society-Business with Balancing-Bandwagoning-Hedging Consideration," *The Chinese Economy*, Vol. 54, No. 1, 2021, pp. 1-8.

development. And given the fact that almost 90% of trade happens along sea lanes, it is critical to the development of the maritime economy as well.

a. Infrastructure:

Indonesia, like many ASEAN countries, sorely needs infrastructure to support connectivity between its 17,000 islands. The GMF highlighted infrastructure as one of its top five priorities. Moreover, Indonesia requires foreign investors to facilitate development. China's BRI program also lists infrastructure development as a major line of effort. China is also a top trade partner of Indonesia and a natural partner for investing in the development of major ports such as those in north Sumatra, Jakarta, east Java, south Sulawesi, and Papua.³³ The United States could provide some help with infrastructure development perhaps through the involvement of private actors, but China is likely to be a more attractive partner given the size and scope of the investment it offers.

Indonesia can engage with China on infrastructure projects because China's export industries also require better access to markets and resources in Southeast Asian countries. Given the strong incentives on both sides, prospects are good that Indonesia and other ASEAN countries could negotiate acceptable terms for cooperation on infrastructure development. China might demand concessions on other issues such as fisheries as the price of cooperation on infrastructure. This would be consistent with the logic of the "community of common destiny." However, a clear articulation of the goals of each southeast Asian country regarding fisheries would provide a valuable means of setting the terms of cooperation. If China refused to cooperate on such terms, the Southeast Asian country could turn to alternatives such as the United States.

b. Fisheries:

As an archipelagic nation, fishing remains important to Indonesia. However, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing remains a serious threat to this sort of economic activity. Chinese fishing fleets are a major source of IUU activity in Southeast Asia and many other parts of the world. Indonesia could benefit from technologies, training, and systems integration of sensors and capabilities to better control such activity. The United States has shown itself willing to partner with

³³ Sanjeevan Pradhan, "China's Maritime Silk Route and Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum: Complements and Contradictions," Institute of Chinese Studies, No. 12, 2016.

Indonesia to counter such threats and a closer partnership could ensure Indonesia is better able to protect its fishing stocks in the future.³⁴

Indonesia and other southeast Asian countries who articulate goals to promote a legal and sustainable fisheries industry would find much in common with U.S. goals of promoting a rules-based order. If the United States asked for closer cooperation on other issues, such as infrastructure, the southeast Asian nation could again point to their own goals regarding this topic. Cooperation with the United States could be welcomed so long as it was consistent with the southeast Asian nation's goals. Cooperation with both China and the United States on infrastructure could further each southeast Asian country's development even more successfully.

c. Trade:

Indonesia's integration into the global economy has contributed to its robust growth. Yet as the United States and China contend for leadership and influence, the terms of trade can become politicized. China may be Indonesia's top trade partner, but the United States, Japan, and other western countries remain important trade partners as well. The principles of free trade advocated by member countries of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision aim to align international trade along western preferred values that emphasize environmental sustainability, fair labor practices, and respect for fair trade.³⁵ The IPEF advocated by the Biden administration also seeks to facilitate international trade with reductions in bureaucratic red tape. China may be a bigger trade partner, but it advances a lower standard set of trade norms through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.

Indonesia and other southeast Asian countries could benefit most through participation in both trade programs. One way these countries could realize such opportunities would be to clearly articulate their own vision for trade. Negotiations with both the United States and China could result in an acceptable compromise for all parties that maximizes opportunities for southeast Asian countries.

³⁴ State Department, "Fact Sheet: U.S.-Indonesia Maritime Cooperation," May 2022.

³⁵ Tomotaka Shoji, 'Belt and Road' vs. "Free and Open Indo-Pacific": Competition Over Regional Order and ASEAN Belt and Road Initiative and ASEAN,' *National Institute for Defense Studies Commentary*, 09 January, 2019.

3. Conclusion

Indonesia and the nations of ASEAN remain attractive economic partners to the rest of the world, due to the relative youthfulness of their populations, geographic location, and dynamism of their economies. Both China and the United States have eagerly sought to strengthen ties, but politics cannot be fully separated out from the promotion of economic relations. As the brief survey of three maritime economic issues shows, Indonesia can benefit by engaging with both China and the United States on different issues through a compartmentalization of issues and by clearly articulating its goals and demands as part of its cooperation. In sum, Indonesia, like other ASEAN countries, will need to consider ways of balancing economic and political imperatives when considering how to collaborate with Beijing and Washington in building the future of the region's political economy.

4. Recommendation

One option for Indonesia and other ASEAN states who seek to manage the involvement of the United States and China in building the region's political economy and maritime economy is to uphold the ASEAN values of peace, stability, and non-interference in the affairs of other countries while cooperating on economic issues.

A second important step would be for Indonesia and other southeast Asian countries to clearly articulate their own individual goals and values for each issue related to maritime political economy. This is based on the needs of the individual country.

A third step could be the conclusion of an ASEAN-wide agreement that represents a consensus on how to manage issues such as infrastructure development, fisheries, and trade. Though difficult to achieve, such a vision could provide a valuable means of setting the terms of cooperation and maximizing opportunities through fruitful negotiation.

Finally, ASEAN countries should welcome participation in initiatives led by either the United States or China. Calling for a compartmentalization of issues could maximize the autonomy and freedom of decision making for each country.

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FOUNDATIONS OF A MARITIME POWER: SUSTAINABILITY AND SECURITY OF MARINE RESOURCE PRODUCTION AND TRADE - A VIEW FROM INDONESIA

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Outline

- **Background Context:**
 - The value of blue economy
- **Issues for Indonesia**
 - a) Sustainability of Marine Resources: Overfishing
 - Overexploitation of fishing resources and sustainability consideration
 - b) Maritime Security and Threats to Extraction and Seaborne Trade: Non-Traditional and Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia
 - Potential confrontation from the shift in power distribution and power projection towards the maritime domain
 - Non-traditional security threats to marine resources and marine activities
- **Analysis and Way Forward:**
 - a) Current Policies on Marine Economy: Indonesia's Policy and Regulation on Marine Resources and Sustainability
 - b) Analysis on the Issue of Sustainable Fishing
 - c) The Regional Architecture to Sustain Fish Stock and to Maintain a Secure, Stable, Rules-Based and Open Ocean
 - d) Analysis: Indonesia's Effort in Securing an Inclusive, Equitable, and Open Regional Maritime Architecture

Background Context

The Value of Blue Economy in the Context of Geoeconomics


- Geoeconomics entails viewing the value of economics from the perspective and consideration of geography. In its simplest settings in a state-level analysis, geoeconomics means to simply consider the

perspective of one's state economy in relations to its geographical surroundings (states, neighbours, and regions).

- In viewing the geoeconomics of Indonesia's blue/marine economy, therefore, key consideration to be made is about how Indonesia's marine economy can be viewed in terms of its geographical location vis-à-vis other countries and actors in the region, especially those closest and most exposed geographically to Indonesia (direct region of Southeast Asia and East Asia), and the many dynamics surrounding the relationship between them (regional integration and governance; relationship amidst patterns of countries interactions; et cetera).

The Value of Blue Economy for Southeast Asia

- For countries in East Asia and Southeast Asia, the blue economy constitutes of a large portion of their economies. East Asian Seas is home to "80 percent of global aquaculture, 60 percent of the world's capture fisheries," and host 90 percent of the global trade conducted via shipping.¹
- For certain countries, including Indonesia, the Ocean Economy/Blue Economy constitutes of over 20 percent of its GDP. Data from 2018 by PEMSEA shows how Indonesia's Ocean Economy accounts for 28 percent of its GDP.²



PRC = People's Republic of China.
 Source: Global Environment Facility, United Nations Development Programme, and PEMSEA. 2018.
Blue Economy Growth in the East Asian Seas Region.

Figure 1. Share of Ocean Economy to Gross Domestic Product³
Source: ADB, 2021

¹ ADB, "Financing the Ocean Back to Health in Southeast Asia," ADB, December 2021, <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/756686/financing-ocean-health-southeast-asia.pdf>.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

- The importance of the ocean economy for countries like Indonesia has meant that the security of the ocean also represents its livelihood and survival. Not only is Indonesia's ability to sustain its growth is dependent on its ability to produce and extract from its ocean resources, but day-to-day ordinary Indonesians also find themselves dependent towards the ocean. For instance, reports have estimated that around eighty percent of Indonesia's population can be categorized as being **dependent** on fishery resources. Even more directly related, sixty percent of the Indonesian population approximately live **inside**, or around, **coastal areas**.⁴

Argument

- For Indonesia, key to making use the full potential of its blue/marine economy is to sustain its level of production, while also securing its capacity to produce and trade its marine economic resources, via sustaining production and securing its production and trade activities.
- Here lies two of Indonesia's interest: to manage the sustainability of its marine resources and to maintain a secure, stable, rules-based and open ocean. Without a sustainable management of marine resources, Indonesia will not be able to exploit the full potential of its marine economy. Without a secure, stable, and open ocean, all the more so surrounding its direct maritime region, Indonesia will be faced with issues regarding supply shortages (energy and food will be crucial) and thus will face problem in safeguarding economic growth.

Issues for Indonesia

Sustainability of Marine Resources: Overfishing

- At the state-level, two key issues surrounding the development of blue economy in the region have arisen. First are issues related to **sustaining level of production** (to maintain growth). Second is to **ensure** that these **productions**, including its extraction activities, remains optimal and **secure: free from threat of external actors**.
- The first issue relates very much to the sustainability of production and fish stock, in relation with the possible future collapse in face of the vast rise of demands to sea products. In terms of sustainability of production, over the last few decades, the demand towards ocean resources have grown to a tremendous level. Global production of fish and seafood, for instance, have quadrupled over the past fifty years. Data of "Capture Fishery Production" between 1960 and 2018 from Our

World in Data, as sourced from the FAO, have indicated the difference 58 years can make.⁵ In 1960, capture fishery production in East Asia and Pacific, as an indicator, accounts to 11.53 million tonnes. But in 1960, this number has amounted to 40.69 million tonnes. The rise in numbers of seafood produced from fish farming (aquaculture) is even more staggering, from 1.57 million tonnes in 1960 to 94.6 million tonnes in 2018.⁶





Figure 2. Value of Capture Fishery Product and Aquaculture Product for East Asia and Pacific

- As a side note, Indonesia’s capture fishery production accounts for around seven percent of the global market capture production.⁷ Back in 2019, the capture fisheries sector alone represents 1.6 percent of Indonesia’s GDP.

⁴ R. Dahuri, “Pengelolaan Perikanan Tangkap Yang Mensejahterakan dan Berkelanjutan,” in *Webinar Tata Kelola Penangkapan Ikan yang Bertanggung jawab dan Berkelanjutan di Wilayah Pengelolaan Perikanan Tangkap Republik Indonesia, Balai Besar Penangkapan Ikan Semarang (BBIP), Kementerian Kelautan dan Perikanan Republik Indonesia (Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Republic of Indonesia)*, 31 August 2020, <https://kkp.go.id/djprl/jaskel/artikel/22828-tata-kelola-penangkapan-ikan-yang-bertanggung-jawab-dan-berkelanjutan-di-wilayah-pengelolaan-perikanan-tangkap-republik-indonesia-31-agustus-2020>.



Source: Julia Merk, 2022⁸

Figure 3. Indonesia among world's leading fishing nations


- According to Julia Merk, through DW, "with over 7 million tons of catch annually, Indonesia is the second-largest fishing nation after China."⁹ The value of this to Indonesia's export, however, is quite small. "Most is for domestic consumption, with the 270 million-strong population eating more than three times as much fish and seafood as the global average."¹⁰
- This data of the vast increase production in fishery products may suggest the world's tremendous increase in production capability. **But on the other side of the coin, and likely more importantly, it shows the increased pressure on fish stocks around the globe.** For Southeast Asian countries, this is even more important noting the state of Southeast Asian oceans, with a report from 2018 already suggesting 64 percent of fishery resource base across the region being at "medium to high risk from overfishing."¹¹ A report from 2018 suggest how 90% of Indonesian boats draw their catch from areas that are already overfished and overcrowded with boats.¹²

⁵ Hannah Ritchie and Max Roser, "Fish and Overfishing," *Our World in Data*, October 2021, <https://ourworldindata.org/fish-and-overfishing>.

⁶ Ibid.


⁷ Dahuri, "Pengelolaan Perikanan Tangkap Yang Mensejahterakan."

⁸ Julia Merk, "Sustainable Fishing by 2025: What is the Current Situation in Indonesia," DW, 10 January 2022, <https://www.dw.com/en/sustainable-fishing-by-2025-what-is-the-current-situation-in-indonesia/a-60134067>.



Source: DW, 2022¹³

Figure 4. State of Indonesia's Fish Stocks (2018-2019)



Increasing demand for seafood and other marine products which links to growing human populations, coupled with unsustainable fishing practices are expected to result in more extensive overexploitation of stocks and wider ecosystem damage.

Source: PEMSEA

Figure 5. Trend of Overexploitation in Marine Resources¹⁴

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ K. J. DeRidder and S. Nindang, "Southeast Asia's Fisheries Near Collapse from Overfishing," *The Asia Foundation*, 28 March 2018, <https://asiafoundation.org/2018/03/28/southeast-asias-fisheries-near-collapse-overfishing/>.

¹² Julia Merk, "Sustainable Fishing."

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ PEMSEA, *POST-2020 Futures Report and Strategy*, http://pemsea.org/sites/default/files/PEMSEA_Post-2020_Report.pdf.

- The graph projection above illustrates the vast potential of consumption over the ability to produce. The projection for 2050, if viewed from Indonesia's point of view would be quite concerning: report has suggested that the population of commercial fish is expected to decline by 90% from the population of 2006.

Maritime Security and Threats to Extraction and Seabrone Trade: Traditional and Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia


- The stressors to sustain level production is also related to the second issue, the capacity to ensure optimal production from the means to ensure that **resources are there to exploit for the country** and that **the activities and trades conducted at sea are secure from threats.**
- For Indonesia, the existence of important strategic sea lanes of communications such as the Malacca Strait, the Singapore Strait, the Sunda Strait, the Lombok Strait, the Ombai Strait, and the Wetar Strait puts the country in a strategic spotlight of East Asia's blue economy and regional maritime geostrategic calculations.
- The most prominent one, the Malacca Strait, has been well known as the busiest chokepoint in the region, hosting more than 60,000 vessels annually, some of which are of crucial importance (e.g., crude oil, where 90 percent of the total volume flowing through South China Sea will transit, connecting the suppliers traversing the Indian Ocean to their consumers in markets across East Asia).¹⁵ Disturbance in and around these straits will likely amount to shocks in regional, or even global economies.
- The fact that Indonesia and Southeast Asia are home to strategic maritime chokepoints thus often puts the issue of blue economy, when viewed from the geoeconomic lens, to be closely related also with geopolitical and security consideration (due to its geographical consideration). This is mainly because these strategic seas and their importance have also become naturally part of other countries national interests. Some would like to keep them open and secure, while others would like to use them and exploit their resources to safeguard their own people. This simple trait has given born to many of the geopolitical dynamics Indonesia faces surrounding its seas.

¹⁵ December 2017, <https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2017/12/15/indonesia-and-geopolitical-struggle-of-21st-century.html>.

- Geopolitical dynamics of the 21st century have increasingly shifted to cover more maritime dimensions, albeit remaining chapters of “land wars” like the war we are seeing in Ukraine. As argued by Rizal Sukma, the rise of powers like China and India have been heavily denominated in maritime settings, transforming the ocean as theaters of major power competition in their pursuit of national strategic interests – especially if compared with the land-based struggle of power in the 19th or 20th century.¹⁶
- Key reason for this is the vast potential of the ocean. The vast room of unexplored and undetermined areas at sea, often less covered in the conventional sense of international rules and laws, has given states room to compete.
- As a result of this newer domain of competition towards the sea, sparks of rivalries can be seen from not only the competition for sphere of influence, through initiatives and strategies, but also in real settings, through the growth of navies and fleets from major powers followed by its lesser power counterparts. China, for instance has famously overtaken the US as the largest navy in the world in terms of number of fleets.¹⁷
- Data of US and China military expenditure captures periods in which dramatic movements around scale and gap between the numbers committed by the US and China, often used as macro indicators to assess the potential for confrontation between China and the US.

¹⁶ Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia and Geopolitical Struggle of 21st century,” *The Jakarta Post*,”

¹⁷ Benjamin Mainardi, “Yes, China Has the World’s Largest Navy. That Matters Less Than You Might Think,” *The Diplomat*, 7 April 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/yes-china-has-the-worlds-largest-navy-that-matters-less-than-you-might-think/>.



Source: World Bank (2021)

Figure 7. US-China Military Expenditure, Illustrating a Key Indicator in Potential Power Projection at SEA, albeit Indirect

- Power projections at sea have also been observed to be increasing in frequency, judging from the number of missions and operations conducted around the South China Sea. With the increased number of interactions between countries at sea, posturing as being against one another, this also has increased the scale of potential escalation from misperception at sea. Three images portray the current situation:




Figure 8. Military Operations around the South China Sea



Figure 9. US and Chinese Naval Bases – suggesting potential sea curtains in times of military tension





Figure 10. Chinese escalation from one high-profile visit by a United States official to Taiwan

- These seemingly grand dynamics happening further away from Indonesian shores are nonetheless important for Indonesia’s marine economy. Not only direct impacts such as ecological damage should a confrontation in the South China Sea happens that Indonesia’s marine ecology will also bear the burden of – remember, the ocean is ultimately one – in the first place, instability at sea will prevent Indonesia also from exporting, or in other words, making use of the full value of, its marine economy. Southeast Asia and East Asia are in fact sub- regions crucial to the export of our marine economic products. Disturbance to shipping routes connecting Indonesia towards them can influence the security of Indonesia’s marine economy.
- The data below, denominating the top ten countries of destination of major fish and fishery products exported by Indonesia (2018, value [second column] in 1000 USD), is a case in point.




Source: KKP, in Agus Sapari, SEAFDEC, 2019¹⁸

Figure 11. Top 10 Export Destination of Indonesia’s Fishery Products

- Identifying Indonesia’s relations in marine economy vis-à-vis other countries, as represented through fishery products via the graph above can indicate how Indonesia’s geoeconomic/geopolitical economic position stands in relations with others.
- Our top destinations, aside from the US, are quite well spread, from East Asian destinations like Japan, China, and Taiwan, to Southeast Asian destinations like Thailand, Vietnam, and Malaysia, but also Italy, the United Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia. This suggests that in the bigger context, we are likely able to weather potential shifts in relationship between these countries, shifts in economic policies (e.g., sanctions and embargos between competing powers), noting the diversity of actors we are engaged with and their political leanings.

- Our imports, majority of which are fish meal and fishes like mackerel, are also sourced diversely.




Source: KKP, in Agus Sapari, SEAFDEC, 2019¹⁹

Figure 11. Top 10 Import Source of Indonesia's Fishery Products

- As an additional caveat, due to the intense value of our products going to US, Japan, and China, observing the relationship between these countries, and in relation with our own, is also an important lens of observation. East Asia and Southeast Asia is at the moment likely our top region of marine product exports.
- Security incidents around these destinations, including around areas such as South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and Malacca Strait, who impacts logistical situations, will likely also impact the livelihood of Indonesia's marine economy.
- Aside from these conventional threats, Indonesia's ability to generate its growth from its resources are also hampered by existing non-traditional security issues.
- Piracy and armed robbery at seas, as well as maritime terrorism, plagues some of the most vital sea lanes across Southeast Asia. Just in the first three months of 2022, a report recorded 42 percent of the 37 incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships occurring worldwide happened in Southeast Asian waters.²⁰ Numbers of incidents, of course, vary from year to year. Some years, as reported by ReCAAP, Southeast Asia experiences a drop in number of incidents. But this has not stopped Southeast Asia from being labelled as one of the world's most dangerous waters. The TIME magazine reported that 41 percent of the world's pirate attacks between 1995 and 2013 have occurred in Southeast Asia.

²⁰ THƯ NGUYỄN HOÀNG ANH, "Stemming the tide of piracy in Southeast Asia," *Lowy Institute*, 9 June 2022, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/stemming-tide-piracy-southeast-asia>.

- Illegal fishing continues to occur over different periods of the year around the Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zones. A sample data from the Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative indicates the numbers still captured of detected fishing vessels inside Indonesia's EEZ. The issue has been for some time prompted a dilemma for Indonesia as the coastal state on dealing with foreign fishing vessels, that is whether to treat them as pure maritime threats or transnational crime, or to deal with them as management issue of ordinary fishermen.



Source: IOJI (2022)²²

Figure 12. Sample of Illegal Fishing Data: Vietnamese Fishing Vessels in Indonesia's EEZ

- Appearance of foreign survey ships, often accompanied with coast guards of like activities of Haiyang Dizhi 10 detected around the third and fourth quarter of 2021 adds another layer of potential problem, putting closely non-traditional challenges with traditional challenges, due to the appearance of foreign state authorities close to Indonesia seas. The survey ship's activities were reportedly led to the disturbance of Indonesia's own marine resource exploration around the Noble Clyde Boudreaux drilling rig around the North Natuna Sea.²³

²¹ Adam Mccauley, "The Most Dangerous Waters in the World," *TIME*, n.d., <https://time.com/piracy-southeast-asia-malacca-strait/>.

²² Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative, "Ancaman Illegal Fishing dari Kapal Ikan Asing dan Kapal Ikan Indonesia bulan Maret-Juni 2022," *Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative*, August 2022, <https://oceanjusticeinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Press-Release-Ancaman-Keamanan-Maritim-IUUF-Maret-Juni-2022.docx.pdf>.

²³ Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative, "Ancaman IUUF dan Keamanan Laut Indonesia – Oktober November 2021," *Indonesia Ocean Justice Initiative*, 3 December 2021, <https://oceanjusticeinitiative.org/2021/12/03/ancaman-iuuf-dan-keamanan-laut-indonesia-oktober-november-2021/>.

Analysis and Way Forward

Current Policies on Marine Economy: Indonesia's Policy and Regulation on Marine Resources and Sustainability

- Indonesia's regulation related to the management of marine economy are plenty. Most directly related among them would be the laws concerning resources management and protection (Law No. 45 of 2009 and Law No. 32 of 2009); and the laws that covers import-export policy, restriction, and limitation (Law No. 7 of 2014, Government Regulation No. 9 of 2018, Minister [of Marine Affairs and Fisheries] Regulation No. 16 of 2011, and Minister [of Marine Affairs and Fisheries] Regulation No. 66 of 2018).²⁴
- Under the current government, as part of the implementation of its Global Maritime Fulcrum, President Joko Widodo's government has published the Indonesia's National Ocean Policy in 2017.
- Among the seven policy pillars of the Indonesia's National Ocean Policy: a) Marine and human resources development; b) Maritime security, law enforcement and safety at sea; c) Ocean governance and institutions; d) Maritime economy development; e) Sea space management and marine protection; f) Maritime culture; g) maritime diplomacy.
- The Ocean Policy dictates, on sustainable development, that development of various economic activities "must be implemented based on sustainable development principle thus (1) the exploitation of resources must not exceed the regeneration ability of the renewable natural resources or the pace of innovation of substitution of the non-renewable resources, as well as the utilization of non-renewable resource would not cause damage to the renewable resources; (2) the current exploitation of resources may not forfeit (the quality and quantity) the needs of future generation; and (3) the exploitation of resources, which the impact has not been recognized, must be conducted diligently and supported by reliable scientific research."
- This paragraph indicates that clearly that the recognition is there for the government to govern practices in accordance to Law Number 32 of 2009 on the Environmental Protection and Management, to converse and protect marine resources.
- Further, on Blue Economy, the Ocean Policy emphasise on how "Article 14 of Law Number 32 of 2014 on Ocean Affairs stipulates that the central government and local government manage the ocean, in accordance with their authorities, to maximize the welfare of the

people through the utilization and exploitation of marine resources on the basis of the principle of blue economy. The blue economy is a model for economic development which integrates land and maritime development while taking into account the carrying capacity of natural resources and environment. In principle, the resources of land, sea, and air should be synergized to become Indonesia's strength."

- The Indonesian Ocean Policy has since been followed up by the 2016-2019 Indonesia's Maritime Policy Plan of Action and the Plan of Action on Indonesia's Maritime Policy of 2021-2025.

Analysis on the Issue of Sustainable Fishing

- Debates over the establishment of a fishing quota licensing system to local and foreign investors, designed to not only attract investment, but also incentivize unlicensed fishers into the licensing system, and therefore better able to ensure governability of fishing activities, also faces public scrutiny without accompanying protection to local fishers.²⁵
- For now the Indonesian government still face challenges, including resource challenges if they are to realize some of the targets they set on the 2021-2025 PoA.
- For instance, on the target operation days for patrol on IUU Fishing, the government recorded 105 days in 2020, and 122 days in 2021, still far from the yearly target of 180 days.²⁶ On the target on effective management of conservation areas, from the target of 23,8 million hectare by 2025, Indonesia have only managed 12,5 million hectare in 2021, an up from the 10 million hectare in 2020.²⁷
- Among the many obvious ones, certain clauses in the PoA are also dubious with regards the effectivity of them as measures of progress, which requires further analysis and complementary efforts. For instance, the improvement of degraded marine ecosystem is measured by whether or not the government managed to publish a study towards them; On measuring the progress of IUU fishing, the government targets an increase of cases handled by maritime authorities [from the 156 targetted in 2021, the government targets 159 for 2022, 164 for 2023, and so on].

The Regional Architecture to Sustain Fish Stock and to Maintain a Secure, Stable, Rules-Based and Open Ocean

- Indonesia is a member of various regional and global arrangements on fisheries. Indonesia is party to international regimes, conventions, and agreements formulated by various UN agencies, such as the the International Maritime Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the UN Environment Programme, et cetera. From the chief convention that is the the Law of the Sea Convention 1982 (UNCLOS 1982), to the the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, the FAO Compliance Agreement, the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, and many fishing rights agreements conducted bilaterally.
- Different standards in implementation between market countries and producing countries in fishery trade and production standards often results in disputes.
- Regional membership in the Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO), membership in the Regional Plan of Action for Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (RPOA-IUU), or even the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) further substantiates Indonesia's position in regional architecture. But key issue for some of these regional initiatives is that not all members have taken the initiative to implement the management of fisheries resources as set by the regional plan into each their own national plan of action.²⁸
- On maritime security, key reference are the International Maritime Organization (IMO), tasked with establishing guidelines and standards of protection against threats, and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which sets definitions of interactions, jurisdictions, rights and responsibilities between users of the seas.
- In the region, the issue with regional architecture on maritime security is the difference in political priorities to participate in them, noting potential national biases on some of these maritime security regimes.

²⁵ Vincent Fabian Thomas, "Kadin Calls for Local Protection under 2022 Fishing Policy," *The Jakarta Post*, 23 December 2021, <https://www.thejakartapost.com/amp/business/2021/12/23/kadin-calls-for-local-protection-under-2022-fishing-policy.html>; Gokkon, "Indonesia's New Deregulation Law."

²⁶ Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia No 34 Tahun 2022 tentang Rencana Aksi Kebijakan Kelautan Indonesia Tahun 2021-2025, <https://jdih.maritim.go.id/id/perpres-no-34-tahun-2022>.

²⁷ Ibid.

Tabel 1. Illustration of Differing Priorities: the Status of Maritime-Security Related Treaties and Legislation between ASEAN Countries

LOSC: Convention on the Law of the Sea
 SUA Convention: Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
 ReCAAP: Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia
 a: accession s: signature n: notification r: ratification

	LOSC	SUA Convention	ReCAAP	Primary Legislative Instruments
Brunei	s (5 Dec. 1984) r (5 Nov. 1996)	r (4 Dec. 2003)	a (28 Oct. 2006)	Merchant Shipping (Safety Convention) Regulations 2003 (amended in 2004); Maritime Offences (Ships and Fixed Platforms) Order 2007
Cambodia	s (1 Jul. 1983)	a (18 Aug. 2006)	n (3 May 2006)	Law on Counter-Terrorism 2007 (ch 7)
Indonesia	s (10 Dec. 1982) r (3 Feb. 1986)	–	–	Law on Indonesian Waters 1996; Regulation No. 37/2002
Lao PDR	s (10 Dec. 1982) r (5 Jun. 1998)	a (20 Mar. 2012)	n (11 Jul. 2005)	–
Malaysia	s (10 Dec. 1982) r (14 Oct. 1996)	–	–	Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency Act 2004
Myanmar	s (10 Dec. 1982) r (21 May 1996)	a (19 Sep. 2003)	n (6 Feb. 2006)	–
Philippines	s (10 Dec. 1982) r (8 May 1984)	r (6 Jan. 2004)	n (31 Jan. 2006)	Republic Act No. 3046/1961 to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines, as amended by Republic Act No. 5446/1968 and No. 9522/2009; Executive Order No. 57/2011
Singapore	s (10 Dec. 1982) r (17 Nov. 1994)	a (3 Feb. 2004)	n (28 Apr. 2005)	Maritime Offences Act 2003
Thailand	s (10 Dec. 1982) r (15 May 2011)	–	n (3 Sep. 2005)	Prevention and Suppression of Piracy Act 1991
Vietnam	s (10 Dec. 1982) r (25 Jul. 1994)	a (12 Jul. 2002)	n (26 May 2006)	Law on Maritime Code 2005; Law of the Sea of Vietnam 2012

Source: Nasu, et al, 2019 ²⁹

²⁸ Arimadonna, "RPOA Norm Localization for Indonesia in Handling IUU Fishing, International Law and Politics II 17, no. 2 (2020): 211-230.

²⁹ Hitoshi Nasu, Rob McLaughlin, Donald R. Rothwell, and See Seng Tan, *The Legal Authority of ASEAN as a Security Institution*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/legal-authority-of-asean-as-a-security-institution/FC19B526E2DF76CF7736862E241FC93B>.

Analysis: Indonesia's Effort in Securing an Inclusive, Equitable, and Open Regional Maritime Architecture

- The Plan of Action on Indonesia's Maritime Policy of 2021-2025 entails Indonesia's targets and priorities in increasing its leadership roles and in ensuring a condition of peace and security in the maritime setting.³⁰ However, some of the targets set fails to clearly portrays how they will correlate on the overall effort on ensuring regional inclusivity and open regional maritime architecture.
- On increasing Indonesia's leadership in maritime cooperation in bilateral, regional, and multilateral settings, the government targets mere aspects **like "being able to be a member"** of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), **"participating in forums"** like the Indian Ocean Rim Association, the ASEAN Maritime Forum, or **"being able to host or attend an event" on** the framework of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) or the State Parties on the Law of the Sea.
- Similarly, on being actively creating a condition of peace and security in the maritime setting, the government targets mere **"forum participations,"** such as on the Tripartite Technical Experts Group or the ASEAN Regional Forum, or through the number of port visits conducted as part of naval diplomacy).
- Substantiating the goals with target policy objectives thus is the homework going forward for Indonesia. Maintaining presence in regional mechanisms will not guarantee an inclusive, equitable, and open regional maritime architecture.

³⁰ Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia No 34 Tahun 2022 tentang Rencana Aksi Kebijakan Kelautan Indonesia Tahun 2021-2025, <https://jdih.maritim.go.id/id/perpres-no-34-tahun-2022>.

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THE GATHERING STORM: MAINTAINING PROSPERITY AND SECURITY IN ASIA'S MARITIME COMMONS

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Abstract

East Asia's economic growth and development over the past forty years has been impressive by any measure. It might be a stretch to call this a golden period of development and prosperity because the region has not been without its tribulations, disputes and geopolitical tensions. But there has not been a major armed conflict since 1979. Compared with the bloody wars and conflicts of the previous century, historians will undoubtedly characterise the early part of this century as an unusually benign era. The problem is that storm clouds are gathering, posing the question of whether Asia's long peace is coming to an end. If a more turbulent future awaits us, how can we preserve the gains of the past to ensure that when prosperity returns it doesn't have to be built on the ashes of the present?


Keywords: Maritime, Domain, Fish, Coast Guard, Rare Earth.

The Importance of the Maritime Domain to Regional Growth and Security

Meeting the challenges ahead requires an appreciation of where we have come from and the importance of resources and the free movement of people and commerce to the region's economic future. Historically, political tensions and the economic development of East Asia's pre-modern polities largely played out on land. But the maritime domain has featured far more prominently in more recent times. The southward sweep of Japan's Imperial Army in the early 1940s brought home the strategic importance of the sea to a newly liberated, emerging Asian political class. Over time, this was reinforced by burgeoning regional trade on the maritime trade routes running between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and a growing realisation that the seas harboured a rich bounty of natural resources critical to the region's future growth.

The dramatic shift in the locus of political and economic power from the Atlantic to the Pacific over the past 50 years underlines the extent to which Asia's seas have become vital conduits for communications and trade.

Global economic center of gravity



Notes: GDP is measured at purchasing power parity. GDP and population figures are 2015 forecasts.

Sources: *Global Policy* (Vol. 2, Issue 1), IMF World Economic Outlook, UN Population Division; A.T. Kearney analysis

Figure 1. Asian economic power is growing, shifting the world's economic center of gravity to the East

Source: *Global Policy* (Vol 2, Issue 1), IMF World Economic Outlook, UN Population Division

The South China Sea has long been the primary maritime highway for intra-Asian trade, commerce and contact as well as the gateway to Europe and the Middle East. But its strategic and trade significance now exceeds that of all other seas because of Asia's rise and the concomitant increase in trade and energy that flow through its waterways to, and from, the world. The South China Sea carries more than 40 percent of world trade and 50 percent of energy trade, with the Malacca Strait having long overtaken the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal and the Straits of Hormuz, as the world's critical waterway. By 2012, the amount of oil exported through the Malacca Strait was already triple that of the Suez Canal and 15 times greater than the volume of oil which transited the Panama Canal.

East Asia's Growth Story

Japan's rapid post war recovery to become the world's second largest economy was the start of the region's economic and development renaissance. The next cabs off the rank were the four tiger economies of

Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore, followed in short order by most of Southeast Asia. Despite COVID induced setbacks, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations is an emerging economic powerhouse of 682 million people spread across 10 countries. Asia's slumbering giant, China, has long since awakened from a century of decline and internecine warfare to become an economic and military super-power in the space of a single generation.

Today, the Asia-Pacific region produces 41 percent of the world's exports. In 2020, intra-regional trade made up nearly 60 percent of the region's total trade, its highest share in three decades. After a COVID dip, intra-regional trade grew more than 31 percent in the first three quarters of 2021 stimulated by China's trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative. This has turbo-charged maritime trade and investment, driving an infrastructure boom and deepening regional economic integration.

The expansion in sea-borne trade has been mirrored in civil aviation. Increasing numbers of aircraft now criss-cross the region's oceans and archipelagic waters carrying large numbers of tourists, students, migrants, entrepreneurs and holiday makers. Over the past decade, the Asia-Pacific region has become the fastest-growing in the world for airline activity carrying an expanding proportion of global travellers on airlines that are expected to account for 40 per cent of future airliner production. Prior to COVID, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) forecast that global passenger numbers could double to 8.2 billion by 2037 with the industry's centre of gravity shifting to the East.

In 2018, IATA's 20-Year Air Passenger Forecast predicted that Asia and the Pacific would drive the biggest growth in global travel with more than half the total number of new passengers over the next 20 years coming from markets in the region. Robust economic growth, improvements in household incomes and favourable population and demographic profiles are the key drivers. China is expected to displace the United States as the world's largest aviation market by the mid-2020s. Indonesia is forecast to be a standout performer—climbing from the world's 10th largest aviation market in 2017 to the 4th largest by 2030.

The growth in regional trade, investment and people-to-people contact has smoothed the path to cooperation. Once largely devoid of regional architecture, the Asia-Pacific is beginning to rival Europe in the number, scope and density of cooperative institutions. They range from well know

mega institutions like ASEAN, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and the ASEAN Regional Forum to a host of smaller regional arrangements. Collectively, they bring together countries and civil society across a wide spectrum of activities and shared interests.

The region is not without its challenges. Southeast Asia is beset by a host of maritime security threats, including illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, piracy and sea robbery, illegal trafficking in arms, people and drugs, and environmental crimes. But even here, Southeast Asian states are becoming more adept at working together to tackle issues of maritime insecurity." The proliferation of maritime security arrangements drives, rather than impedes, regional cooperation and contributes to trust-building and collective-identification.

Formalising maritime security arrangements promotes interactions between different actors through a myriad of meetings and engagements. In 2010, there were 38 regional arrangements for dealing with maritime security. Today there are 54. When conflict does take place, it largely does so in a managed way due to procedural norms that emphasize cooperative conflict management.

The Return of Great Power Competition

Unfortunately, this transformational period of economic development and security cooperation is threatened on multiple fronts by the recrudescence of great power conflict and the ratcheting up of competition over territory and resources. At its heart, is a contest for regional and global pre-eminence between China and the United States that is aggravating local conflicts and threatening the region's long peace. Trade, tech and geopolitical disputes are metastasising into a wider, more serious confrontation between the two global powers that reflects a dangerous, geopolitical divide rooted in their strategic ambitions, different political systems and sense of exceptionalism.

Many well-credentialed analysts and former policymakers accept that a Cold War is likely, or already underway, foreshadowing an era of heightened strategic competition that will be enormously disruptive to international trade and world order. Tensions over Taiwan, and the muscular response by China to the 2-3 August visit by US House of Representative's Speaker, Nancy Pelosi, suggests that a hot war in Asia is a real possibility.

How did we get to this point? Answering this question requires an understanding of the origin, nature and scope of China's challenge to US primacy and the breadth of the US pushback. At the end of the last century, China's leaders understood that they could never be a superpower without a world class military and mastery of the cutting-edge technology necessary to sustain it, so they launched a major effort to modernise the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) and close the yawning military technology gap with the US.

This resulted in double digit increases in annual defence and national security spending and massive, sustained investment in defence technology. As the new force developed it became clear that Chinese leaders aspired to match, and eventually surpass, the capacity of the US to project military power into the Western Pacific. They reasoned that if a rising America could formulate a Monroe Doctrine in the 19th century as a blunt, but effective instrument for keeping other powers out of the Western hemisphere, why should an ascendant, 21st century China not seek a comparable outcome in its own maritime backyard?

The US has a very different view particularly after China forcibly occupied and garrisoned disputed islands in the South China Sea, began regular incursions into contested areas of the East China Sea and launched its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative which aims to pull large parts of Central, South and Southeast Asia into Beijing's orbit. These initiatives were widely regarded in Washington as a direct challenge to US power and evidence that China had no intention of becoming a 'responsible stakeholder' in a liberal, democratic order.

Territorial and Resource Conflicts on the Rise

But US-China competition is not the primary cause of the rapidly deteriorating regional security environment. Beijing has made it abundantly clear through words, and actions, that smaller countries must know their subordinate place in a China centric world. Under the chairmanship of Xi Jinping, China has been prepared to assert its territorial and resource claims using all elements of its formidable state power, from military force to economic coercion and grey zone activities that include cyber-attacks, influence operations and lawfare.

The use of these techniques to occupy and justify the militarisation of disputed islands in the South China Sea and to claim jurisdiction over 80

percent of the sea on the dubious grounds of customary law has been a festering sore for over thirty years. Although well documented, it is important to understand how China views its territorial and resource claims, the strategy it employs to achieve its objectives and the options open to other regional states to protect their interests given the obvious mismatch in power.

Conventional narratives give insufficient weight to the significance of valuable marine living resources and the role of China's fishing and paramilitary fleets in catalysing the dangerous mix of sovereignty and resource conflicts in the Western Pacific. The rich fishing grounds of the East and South China seas have long provided fish for China's growing population, sustaining a vibrant fishing community and traditional lifestyles. In Chinese eyes fish are as critical to China's future food security as are oil and gas to its energy future. With wild fish stocks in decline and demand rising, fish has become a strategic commodity to be protected and defended, if necessary, by force.

China remains by far the largest fish-producer and consumer. More than nine million fishers – a quarter of the world's total – are Chinese, and they contribute a hefty \$60 billion to the Chinese economy annually. In 2018, its production reached 62.2 million tonnes (47.6 million tonnes from aquaculture and 14.6 million tonnes from capture fisheries) corresponding to a share of 58 percent of global aquaculture, 15 percent of capture fisheries and 35 percent of total fish production.

The problem is that fish yields in the Yellow and East China Seas have fallen dramatically over the past 30 years driven by rising demand and the depletion of wild fish stocks due to overfishing. This has driven China's fishing fleets further afield and placed a geopolitical and economic premium on wild fish. Even though the country has been forced to reduce its fishing fleet by almost 20 percent over the past decade China's fishing fleet totals some 864,000 vessels, making it easily the largest fishing fleet in the world.

Beijing uses this fleet supported by its Coast Guard for geopolitical purposes, pursuing tactics of "fish, protect, contest and occupy" to reinforce its sovereignty and resource claims over disputed islands in the Western Pacific and to coerce other claimants into compliance, and acceptance, of China's position. Wrapping "cabbage leaves" of sovereignty around remote outposts while dismissing legal resolutions and avoiding

large-scale conflict with a slow and patient approach is, as Mark Crescenzi and Stephen Gent document, a deliberate strategy of delay. A recent report for The Asia Society found that “the swarming and anchoring of large Chinese fleets of fishing and maritime militia vessels in other claimants’ exclusive economic zones as well as the harassment of Southeast Asian energy survey vessels in the South China Sea are unrivalled in scale and nature.”

Beijing has adopted a similarly aggressive approach to securing access to oil, gas and high value minerals on the seabed. Like fish, these resources are regarded as vitally important to China’s economic development and to reducing dependence on imported oil from the Middle East. China’s estimates of oil and gas reserves in the Western Pacific far exceed those of all others. The US estimates that the South China Sea contains around 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas compared with China’s much higher estimate of 213 billion barrels and 2,000 trillion cubic feet. China’s dispute with Japan over ownership of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is also about access to the oil and gas that ownership would confer. The area around these islands is estimated to contain 60-170 billion barrels of oil and 1-2 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.

The discovery of rare earths on the ocean floor inside polymetallic nodules has further incentivised China to maximise its maritime claims. Rare earths are central to the emerging green economy. They are used to make the high-performance batteries needed to store power from renewable sources and the lightweight engines that are replacing traditional combustion engines. Essential for a wide range of military products and applications, they are also used to increase performance in wind and hydropower turbines, energy-efficient appliance motors and magnetic refrigeration and fuel cells that help reduce greenhouse gas emissions and dependence on fossil fuels.



Figure 2. Rare Earths in Powder Form

Although it dominates the global rare earths market, environmental pressures and increasing reliance on supplies of rare earths from politically unstable parts of the world has galvanised Beijing to exploit the rich aggregations of polymetallic nodules in the adjacent seas. China has developed the most advanced deep-sea extraction technology in the world. Its “ability to harvest polymetallic nodules and the rare earths within them is unparalleled,” Crescenzi and Gent conclude. “With the emerging mining code coming out of the International Seabed Authority, the best way for China to ensure continued access to these seabed minerals and an offshore supply of rare earths would be to treat these waters as sovereign territory.”

China’s territorial assertiveness is not confined to the sea. Since declaring an East China Sea Air Defence Identification Zone in 2013, China has assiduously tightened control of its own ADIZ while repeatedly infringing on those of neighbouring countries. These zones allow countries to better monitor air traffic in the space between a country’s 12 nautical mile territorial airspace and international airspace. Although an ADIZ is not recognised as sovereign airspace in international law it is standard practice for foreign aircraft when entering an ADIZ to identify themselves and seek prior authorisation from the controlling country.

A 2020 study by Mercedes Trent for the Federation of American Scientists found that Chinese aircraft had committed more than 4,400 intrusions

into the ADIZs of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Often, Chinese forces violate multiple countries' ADIZs on their flights, flying routes that consecutively infringe on South Korea's and Japan's ADIZs or Taiwan's and Japan's. The most serious of these have been multiple transgressions of Taiwan's ADIZ by Chinese military aircraft culminating in a dramatic upsurge during the crisis triggered by Pelosi's visit. While she was there, Beijing sent 27 warplanes into Taiwan's ADIZ before carrying out military drills and firing 11 ballistic missiles, some of which flew over the island and landed in Japan's EEZ.

Trent argues that "China's intrusions into the ADIZs of its neighbours has allowed it to pursue four clear objectives: to conduct training missions to prepare pilots for encountering foreign air forces during long-range flights; to probe and gather intelligence on Japanese, South Korean, and Taiwanese forces; to demonstrate air power capable of protecting its territorial and security interests; and to apply coercive pressure to decouple coalitions resistant to Chinese influence in the region." The big concern for ASEAN is whether China will use its spurious South China Sea claims to declare and enforce an ADIZ over the sea including islands owned, occupied or claimed by Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan.

What can be done?

As US-China relations deteriorate and Beijing's external policies become more muscular and assertive, regional states are caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place. If Xi succeeds in his quest to dominate Asia, then smaller countries will struggle to maintain their hard-won independence and protect their sovereignty. But directly confronting China is a losing proposition because of the massive imbalance in power, the coercive tools at Beijing's disposal and its willingness to use them.

Attempts by ASEAN to negotiate settlements of intra-regional maritime disputes have largely failed. Even if the much-delayed South China Sea Code of Conduct materialises, it is not likely to end the fish, resource and territorial conflicts that continue to bedevil East Asia. It certainly won't prevent China from seeking to establish a contemporary version of its pre-colonial tributary state system in which all other states occupy a subordinate position. ASEAN must face the reality that it is no longer in the driving seat of regional economic or security affairs as once again, Asia becomes the cockpit for great power competition. Non-alignment, or

openly band-wagoning with China or the US, are problematic in an economically integrated world.

An obvious response is for the region's small and medium-sized countries to band together in defence of their collective interests particularly in the increasingly contested maritime domain. This hasn't happened for three main reasons. First, Southeast Asian countries have yet to delimit their overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones or resolve their maritime boundary disputes. Second, ASEAN members have different approaches to China based on their perceived interests which Beijing has adeptly exploited to pressure individual members and prevent coalitions of the willing from emerging. Third, since China is a major investor and trading partner Southeast Asians are understandably reluctant to jeopardise their economic links or risk punitive action. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are similarly conflicted.

Settling intra-mural maritime disputes would bring pressure on China to dial down its coercion. Demonstrating a willingness to adjudicate territorial disputes according to established international law would make it more difficult for China to conduct lawfare and exploit weaknesses in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

There is ample scope for Indonesia and Southeast Asian claimant states to act collectively within ASEAN, even if all ten members of the organisation are unable, or unwilling, to reach a consensus. Realising that Beijing's 9 dash-line infringes on its EEZ, Jakarta now seems ready to accept that it can no longer act as a bridge between China and ASEAN claimant states. As a de facto party to South China Sea disputes, Indonesia has an opportunity to lead from the front – not just from behind - by resurrecting the concept of ASEAN Kecil (inner ASEAN).

The genesis of ASEAN Kecil can be traced back to the early 1980s, when a number of influential officers on the intelligence staff of the Indonesian Armed Forces Headquarters began to argue that the inner countries of ASEAN - Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia - were the key to ASEAN security. Within this sub-region, defined by a circle of 1,500 nautical miles radius from Jakarta, is the strategic heartland of maritime Southeast Asia, containing most of ASEAN's key infrastructure, cities, transport nodes, natural resources and population. It is also where East Asia's key sea lines of communication converge. Resurrecting ASEAN Kecil would allow Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Brunei and Vietnam to

coordinate their declaratory positions on contentious maritime issues, strengthening their diplomacy and amplifying their messaging.

But if the experience of the past decade is any guide, words alone are not enough. China demonstrates resolve by firm action. Supporting declaratory policy with meaningful, collective action is the key to defending smaller nations' interests in a more contested Asia. Led by Indonesia, ASEAN Kecil seems to be moving in this direction. Late last year, Vice Admiral Aan Kurnia the head of BAKAMLA - Indonesia's maritime security agency - invited his ASEAN Kecil counterparts to a meeting to discuss the South China Sea dispute. According to Admiral Aan, the meeting would enable the discussants to present a coordinated approach when confronted with the same "disturbances."

In early August, Indonesia invited several Southeast Asian nations and external partners to an expanded joint military training exercise dubbed Super Garuda Shield 22 which sent a clear message to Beijing that Indonesia is not without friends and will resolutely pursue its "free and independent" foreign policy. Significantly larger in scope and scale than previous exercises, several nations participated or observed for the first time. Indonesia, the US, Australia, Japan and Singapore were joined by nine observer countries: Canada, France, India, Malaysia, South Korea, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Timor Leste and the United Kingdom.

Some of the exercises were held near a small group of islands to the south of Natuna Besar, a strategically located Indonesian island. Its EEZ has been violated by Chinese fishing and Coast Guard vessels on several occasions. Traditionally, the Garuda Shield exercises were confined to the army and paratroopers. But Super Garuda Shield 2022 involved the navies of Indonesia, the US, Japan, Singapore and Australia. The inclusion of navies in the training agenda represents what one analyst characterises as "a shift in strategic thinking that Indonesia's territorial waters and jurisdictions are now becoming more vulnerable to external threats."

In the longer term, reducing China's economic leverage is the key to retaining autonomy of action. The more reliant countries become on Chinese trade and investment, the more difficult it will be to maintain independence and sovereignty. This is a lesson Australia learned the hard way. By placing too many eggs in the China basket Australia came perilously close to subordinating its interests and freedoms to a foreign

power. But after enduring unprecedented economic trade coercion in 2020 that cost the country AUD\$20 billion in lost revenue Canberra has successfully diversified its sources of trade and investment and implemented a raft of measures to prevent political interference in the country's domestic affairs.

Washington's great failure is its unwillingness to ramp up trade and investment in the region, to provide developing countries with an alternative to China's largesse. There have been some attempts to increase aid, infrastructure investment and trade. But the much-touted Indo-Pacific Economic Framework announced on 23 May does not include improved market access measures such as tariff reductions. Nor does it offer the long-term stability in trade relations that Southeast Asians want or reassure them of America's long-term commitment to engagement with the region.

Worse still, the Biden administration has not signed on to the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement or the successor Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. Former President Donald Trump's withdrawal from the TPP nearly 5 years ago was an economic and geopolitical own goal. It cost the US an estimated US\$131 billion in the 12 years to 2030 and allowed China to position itself as the trading and investment partner of first resort for developing Asia.

What Asians want from the US are economic and geopolitical choices that offer genuine partnerships and autonomy, without forcing them to publicly choose sides in the growing rivalry with Beijing. Give them the right incentives and Asians will vote with their hearts and minds for stability, cooperative economic development and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

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CHINA-PHILLIPINES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH CHINA SEA: COOPERATION OR CONFRONTATION?

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Abstract

Philippines and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Cooperation on Oil and Gas Development, demonstrating their willingness to explore joint development as a pathway to collaboration, notwithstanding their territorial disputes. Recent commentaries on joint development are mostly framed on legal challenges, South China Sea (SCS) rows, geopolitics, and state-centric security issues. However, there have been no extensive discussions on the potential contributions from non-state stakeholders that can make joint development agreements environmentally sound, sustainable, and less political. These stakeholders are the oil companies, fishermen and coastal communities. In this regard, this NTS Insight explores potential roles of these stakeholders in promoting joint initiatives to share and develop resources in the SCS. It argues that the engagement and participation of non-state stakeholders in resource sharing and joint management must be pursued to address key non-traditional security challenges in the SCS. It also examines mechanisms to integrate marine environmental protection and sustainable fishing management into joint development agreements.

Keywords: SCS, Phillipines, China, joint development

1. Introduction

The Philippines and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation on Oil and Gas Development during the state visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping in Manila in November 2018. Both countries agreed to establish an Inter-governmental Joint Steering Committee and Inter-entrepreneurial Working Groups that will negotiate and pursue cooperation agreements for oil and gas development within one year. China identified China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) as its representative for each working group. Meanwhile, the Philippines designated the Philippine National Oil Company-Exploration Corporation (PNOC) and private service contractors for oil exploration to represent the country. The joint exploration, if successful in finding oil and gas resources presumably in the disputed

South China Sea (SCS), would pave the way for another cooperation agreement on the exploitation of resources found. The agreement highlights the critical role of Chinese and Philippine oil firms (state-owned and private) and their service contractors as enterprise-representatives of their respective states.

The Philippine-China MoU may signify their readiness to open avenues of cooperation focusing on joint use and development of the assets of the SCS, notwithstanding the contentious issue of sovereignty or ownership of resources. It also indicates the importance of oil exploration companies and public-private partnership in any future joint development. Dr Federico M Macaranas, a Filipino economist, asserted that "*[i]t is joint use of assets, not ownership of assets that matters for our relations,*" referring to improving Sino-Philippine relations.

The SCS is enormously abundant in marine resources and all claimant states have been asserting their exclusive rights to explore, exploit and utilise them. Unilateral initiatives by any of the claimant states to develop/exploit **(1) oil, gas and hydrocarbons and (2) fisheries and marine resources** have caused stand-off incidents involving naval/coast guard vessels and diplomatic spats. A joint development agreement has been suggested as an opportunity for cooperation for claimant states to exploit and share resources (fisheries, oil and gas, or minerals) found within their disputed territorial claims. A joint development agreement will permit claimant states to set aside the question of sovereignty in the disputed areas so as to jointly exploit natural resources.

However, the prominent role of state-led cooperation tends to dominate the discussions on joint use and development of resources. Furthermore, recent commentaries on this issue are mostly framed on legal challenges, territorial rows, geopolitics, and state-centric security issues. This NTS Insight aims to fill in the gap in the recent literature on joint development in the SCS. There have been no extensive discussions on the potential contributions from non-state stakeholders that can make joint development agreements environmentally sound, sustainable, and less political. These stakeholders are **the oil companies, fishermen and coastal communities**.

2. Discussion

The framework on stakeholder engagement in natural resource sharing management is used to examine the key roles of companies, fishermen and coastal communities. Local stakeholders are individuals or groups who directly depend on or influence the specific goals of resource management or conservation action (e.g., energy companies, indigenous landholders,

farmers, fishers, local non-governmental organizations). Owing to the complexities of the marine environment and its many uses as a public good, various non-state stakeholders have diverse interests in the outcome of the environmental and resource management system. These stakeholders include those in aquaculture, oil exploitation, commercial fishing, recreational fishing, shipping, and marine protected areas (MPAs), among others.

In the context of ocean governance and management, multi-stakeholder participation is a key element of an effective resource management system. The UN Environment Program's 2017 report on regional oceans governance accentuates the importance of multi-stakeholder participation and public-private partnerships in sustainable management of maritime resources. Partnerships, in their various dimensions, are acknowledged as the basis for delivery of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) and other ocean-related targets. Partnerships in ocean governance can entail vertical (across, for example, regional-global scales), horizontal (across sectors) and multi-stakeholder partnerships (including civil society, the private sector and others). Normally, such partnerships involve state institutions, civil society organizations, research institutions, regional and international organisations, private companies and faith-based organisations. Across these sectors, stakeholders can deliberate on shared issues of interest. Given the crucial role of the private sector in developing hydrocarbon and marine resources, private-public partnerships can contribute to cross-sectoral cooperation, as well as consolidated efforts for achieving ocean-related SDGs. A broad spectrum of stakeholders, including from the private sector, should participate in resource management and decision-making.

Multi-stakeholder engagement can bring about greater transparency, legitimacy, and trust in the regulatory system and can therefore lead to sustainable compliance. Scholars of ocean management and resource sharing explain relevant outcomes of the inclusion of non-state stakeholders: 1) higher quality decisions and policies that are appropriate to domestic sociocultural and ecological contexts; 2) institutionalising mutual understanding and trust, hence lessening conflicts among stakeholders; 3) stakeholder ownership driven by the support of coastal communities, resulting in successful implementation; 4) deep understanding of the impact of human activities on the ecosystem that can lead to sustainable resource management; 5) detecting, foreseeing and resolving areas of conflict among resource users; and 6) the significant reduction of resource management's implementation cost.

Globally, many scientists, policy makers and resource managers agree that the proactive participation of ocean resource users is a primary factor for a sustainable environmental management regime. Multi-stakeholder engagement emboldens 'ownership' of the plan, engenders trust among all resource users, and eases conflict.

In the context of joint oil and gas exploration, cross-sectoral ocean governance is a multi-faceted framework in which various stakeholders perform a distinct and critical role in managing and regulating offshore oil and gas activities, directly and indirectly. Oil and gas firms, business associations and standards organisations offer their relevant technical expertise, operating experiences, best practices and standards to help shape governance norms. The involvement of the private sector such as oil companies in multi-sectoral efforts to strengthen resource management and sharing is chiefly vital to align incentives and ensure environmental compliance. Since joint oil exploration is to be undertaken by companies, they must be included in institutionalising standards and best practices on combatting marine pollution, together with other stakeholders. In the Arctic Ocean, for instance, there have been concerted activities among consortia of companies on oil spill response technology and mutual assistance in response capabilities. The partnership between resource users and relevant stakeholders can advance sustainable joint development by leveraging their expertise, pooling their resources, and sharing lessons learnt and best practices.

Furthermore, other key stakeholders, such as NGOs, academia, and local communities have important contributions to marine environmental governance such as useful scientific findings, environmental management mechanisms and other inputs to local environmental law enforcement. Meanwhile, in shared or co-managed fisheries, a community-based approach necessitates active participation of fishermen and local communities in the regulatory and environmental law enforcement. In this regard, there is robust motivation for compliance, since the fishermen themselves are part of the formulation, rationalisation and implementation of rules and regulations meant to protect their livelihood.

3. Conclusion

The proposed joint development of resources and assets in the disputed areas of the SCS should not just be about geopolitics, ownership/sovereignty issues, political viability, or legal and constitutional issues. While these issues need to be addressed before joint development can take place, one critical subject that needs to be examined is how non-state stakeholders can

contribute to sustainable sharing of resources in disputed resource-rich waters. This NTS Insight offers a preliminary examination of various roles of oil companies, fishermen and coastal communities in sharing the resources—oil, gas, and fisheries—of the SCS.

As demonstrated by this NTS Insight, it is critical that resource sharing and co-management must be driven by stakeholders themselves who can commit personal investment, ownership, and buy-in to the process, resulting in more effective behavioural change and compliance. But one important requirement is that stakeholders in the region must be able to demonstrate a strong commitment to collaboration and proactive governance. Unilateral attempts by claimant states to exploit the resources have only resulted in maritime stand-off incidents in the region in recent years, while marine environmental degradation in the SCS has been largely ignored. Cooperation among non-state stakeholders from claimant states can help facilitate a better framework for joint development and sharing of resources that can improve diplomatic relations among claimant states. Stakeholder participation can also lead to institutionalising better management system and fair sharing of resources. Furthermore, the intertwined issues of declining fish stocks, destruction of the marine ecosystems, and potential environmental impact of oil exploitation can be comprehensively addressed through practical stakeholder cooperation and proactive participation. The complex and dynamic interplay of environmental problems, rising demand for natural resources, and competing sovereignty claims in the SCS entails flexible and transparent governance mechanism and collaboration that embraces a diversity of expertise, interests, and best practices, among others. For this reason, stakeholder cooperation and participation must be increasing.

4. Recommendation

Claimant states have three options concerning these huge reserves- refrain from exploiting the resources, exploit them unilaterally, or ink a joint development pact with other claimant countries.

But in the context of joint development, a purely commercial agreement between companies may be more feasible to execute and, arguably, may be less susceptible to domestic public opposition than a contentious government- to-government oil and gas exploration agreement. The recent MoU between China and the Philippines on oil and gas exploration appears to adopt this track as it encourages the oil companies (state-owned and private firms) of the two claimant states to jointly study the feasibility of joint exploration.

A commercial arrangement may appear to be an alternative to a formal agreement for exploration between governments, which may be misinterpreted as acknowledging the other country's claims. For example, since 2013, Manila's PXP Energy, together with the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), have been talking with CNOOC on a possible joint exploration agreement in the Reed Bank, an immense offshore area claimed by both the Philippines and China. The 2018 MoU between China and the Philippines was inked in light of their improving diplomatic and economic ties. Since 2005, the Philippines has failed to unilaterally develop the Reed Bank due to maritime tensions with China, which has repeatedly deployed patrol vessels to the vicinity of the Reed Bank to block PXP Energy's survey ships in recent years. But in the current context, once the stated joint study stipulated in the MoU leads to a commercial arrangement between Chinese and Philippine companies, it may present an opportunity for both countries to successfully explore, exploit and share natural gas from the Reed Bank.

Chinese and Philippine oil firms may consider examining existing commercial agreements in the region such as the joint development agreement between Malaysia and Vietnam and the joint development agreement between Vietnam and Thailand in their overlapping claims in the gas-rich Gulf of Thailand. Embedded in these existing commercial pacts are production sharing contracts whereby the rights of each country to develop and utilise oil and gas are managed by their respective national oil companies: Petronas, PTT and PetroVietnam.

Companies can also set up an organised management system in the disputed areas, contributing to overall stability in the relations between claimant states. The sustainability of cooperation in joint development areas is primarily due to the equitable nature of management system governing exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons. For instance, the commercial agreement signed by Petronas and PetroVietnam in 1993 led to the establishment of a Joint Coordination Committee (JCC) to manage the joint development area. JCC consists of eight members equally nominated by Petronas and PetroVietnam with equal voting rights. Meanwhile, Malaysia-Thailand joint development area is managed by a Joint Authority composed of two co-chairs and 12 members of Malaysian and Thai nationals, appointed in equal number by their respective governments.

In the context of the recent MoU on joint oil and gas exploration, Philippine and Chinese oil firms should seriously consider the inclusion of norms and best practices on preventing and mitigating marine pollution in their commercial arrangements and potential joint operations in the future. It must

be noted that existing joint development agreements (e.g., Malaysia-Vietnam, Vietnam-Thailand, and Malaysia-Vietnam-Thailand) in the region do not contain provisions on the prevention and control of marine pollution caused by offshore operations.

Collaboration among fishermen from all claimant states in fisheries co-management can help address marine environmental degradation that undermines their livelihood. One major challenge faced by all fishermen from SCS littoral states is the depletion of fish stocks. Total fish stocks in the SCS have been depleted by 70-95 percent since the 1950s and harvests have declined by 66-75 percent over the last 20 years. Coral reefs of the SCS have been declining at a rate of 16 percent per decade. The depletion of fish stocks and destruction of coral reefs raise economic, food and health security concerns as seafood provides a major source of protein and income for millions of poor people in coastal areas. The countries fringing the SCS are among the most reliant in the world on fish as source of nutrients. Fish catch declines may cause micronutrient deficiencies in developing nations around the SCS.

Fishermen and coastal communities should proactively participate in the sustainable management and sharing of transboundary fish stocks. Peaceful co-existence among fishermen from claimant states of the SCS is not a new phenomenon. In fact, the SCS has been a regional common for generations. In the past, fishermen from all of the surrounding countries could co-exist peacefully and even trade among themselves. This was the case in the Scarborough Shoal, a rich fishing ground that is claimed as territory by both China and the Philippines. Even the Permanent Court of Arbitration's ruling on the SCS states that the Scarborough Shoal has been a traditional fishing zone for fishermen from various claimant states. In the past, when Taiwanese, Chinese, Filipino and Vietnamese fishermen were converging inside the shoal, it was expected for them to assist each other. The peaceful co-existence was reversed in 2012, after a tense stand-off between Chinese and Philippine coast guard vessels. China had placed the shoal under its de-facto control and barred Filipino and non-Chinese fishermen.

A co-management network of South China Sea fishermen may be considered to advance cooperation among them. As seen in the Mediterranean Sea, they can organise themselves into a network, exchanging best practices and ensuring they have a voice in decision making, as primary players in the co-management of resources. This kind of cooperation among

fishermen and their proactive engagement in fisheries management must be replicated in the SCS. One good model is the Mediterranean Platform of Artisanal Fishers (MedArtNet), a network consisting of artisanal fishermen in the Mediterranean Sea, with members from Spain, France, Italy and Greece.

BUILDING A REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE AND A FRAMEWORK OF COOPERATION IN ASIA TOWARDS GLOBAL STABILITY

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Abstract

The international system is facing acute stresses at the same time as great power competition is intensifying. These two dynamics are mutually reinforcing. Russia's invasion of Ukraine is straining food and energy security worldwide. Deepening U.S.-China enmity is eliminating options for both major powers to coordinate responses to pandemics and climate change.

At the same time, maritime Asia is becoming the fulcrum of great power competition. As grand strategist Bruce Jones has written, "The Western Pacific is becoming to today what East Germany was to the Cold War, the front line of tensions between the world's leading military powers. Its deep waters have replaced the European heartland as the fault line of geopolitical tensions."

There are no signs that major power competition in maritime Asia will abate any time soon. Regional actors must improve their ability to manage incidents and lower risk of conflict.

There are steps available to reduce risk. These include forging greater commonality of interpretation around relevant international law, broadening codes of conduct for operational behaviors, expanding practical cooperation in the maritime domain, and organizing existing regional dialogues thoughtfully to spur practical progress on maritime security.

Keywords: China, Indo-Pacific, Institution-building, International Law, Maritime Security.

1. Introduction

The long peace in Asia is breaking down at an accelerating rate. The previous four decades in East Asia were the most peaceful time in this region in the past 125 years. While there were persistent tensions on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait, they were managed below the threshold of conflict. The ensuing peace provided enabling conditions for rapid economic growth and historic improvements to human welfare in every country with the exception of North Korea.

This period of stable security and rapid economic growth appears to be closing. The United States is increasingly wary of China's strategic designs in Asia. Beijing's own actions and rhetoric are amplifying such concerns. These include China's massive military build-up, its growing tolerance for friction with neighbors over territorial issues, and its increasing invocations of ideological struggle to characterize its competition with others. China also is working to establish strategic depth by pushing U.S. and other forces farther from its periphery. What Beijing views as a prudent and necessary step to strengthen its security is seen by many in Washington as a Chinese effort to forge an exclusive sphere of influence.

Without the United States acting as a benign hegemon to deter countries from picking at disputes, regional powers increasingly are taking matters into their own hands. North Korea is barreling forward in its development of nuclear warheads and long-range systems for their delivery. Myanmar's junta is shrugging off external censure and pushing forward in its efforts to grab control of the country. Cross-Strait tensions are rising. And China's disputes with India and Japan are increasingly adopting a military personality, just to name a few examples.

At the same time, the international system is facing a period of stress arguably as severe as any time since the end of World War II. Russia's invasion of Ukraine is disrupting food and energy supplies. The world is still struggling to contain the spread of COVID-19. The effects of global warming are manifesting in major catastrophic climate events. The world faces growing inflation and is also teetering on the edge of economic recession. International institutions are proving incapable of addressing this expanding array of challenges.

Many of these challenges converge in the waters of East Asia. 85% of all global trade moves by sea and more than 90% of global data flows along undersea cables. Within the region, over \$3.4 trillion worth of goods pass through the South China Sea each year, including energy and food to support the populations of China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

Given the centrality of the seas, China is rapidly expanding its naval presence and capabilities. The more China's economy has become central to the global economy, the more it has come to depend upon sea-based trade and data flows to sustain its growth. For the first time since the mid-1500s, China has invested massive sums into becoming a global naval power. The great power competition between the United States and China is playing out foremost in

Asia's contested waters. The national development imperative to protect sea lanes of communication is driving a naval arms race. Not just the United States and China, but also Russia, India, Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom, and others are pouring national treasure into this competition.

Maritime tensions are going to sharpen, not lessen, in the coming years. China's rapid build-up of naval capabilities will introduce greater military parity in maritime Asia. This likely will give Chinese leaders greater confidence in becoming more risk-acceptant in testing other maritime powers. Beijing would like to assert greater control over contested waters and airspace it claims as its own in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and in the Taiwan Strait. China's People's Liberation Army likely will challenge Philippine, Vietnamese, Indonesian, Taiwan, Malaysian, Japanese, American, and other naval and air activities that it believes pose a challenge to its exercise of control over its claimed territories.

Such efforts will be aided by the introduction of new and emerging technologies, such as fully autonomous anti-radiation weapons that are designed to destroy enemy missile launchers. There likely also will be greater use of autonomous unmanned underwater vehicle and unmanned air vehicle surveillance systems, just to name a few technologies that will take on larger roles in the years to come.

Additionally, China likely also will seek to establish a string of bases to support and sustain its maritime operations beyond its shores. Beijing already has built airstrips, docks, barracks, and missile batteries to bolster its force projection capabilities from its outposts in the South China Sea. As the naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan previously observed, a naval power must have a string of naval bases across the geography of its supply lines, each within range of the next, so that its forward bases could be reinforced at times of war.

To date, China is deficient in meeting this criterion for becoming a global naval power. Its only overseas military installation is in Djibouti. China's key supply line for food and fuel runs from the Middle East through the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. It is unsurprising, then, that China reportedly has sought to establish access arrangements for its naval fleet in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Cambodia. Beijing reportedly also is seeking to establish basing access in the Solomon Islands and other areas in the South Pacific, in part as a strategy to blunt the United States' ability to deploy its naval power through the South Pacific into the region in the event of conflict in East Asia.

Additionally, China has shown greater interest in building complementary naval capabilities with Russia. The two countries have undertaken joint naval exercises in the Mediterranean in 2015, in the South China Sea in 2016, the Yellow Sea in 2018, the East China Sea in 2019, and joint drills that also included Iran in 2019 and 2022. Following both countries' announcement of a "no limits" partnership at a leader-level meeting in Beijing in January, such efforts likely will deepen in the coming years. If China gains access to Russia's constellation of overseas naval bases, it will meaningfully enable Beijing to enjoy global military reach.

At the same time, the United States and its partners are not static in the face of China's efforts to develop anti-access/area denial capabilities (A2AD). Washington has embarked on a new strategy, called the third offset, to develop capabilities to frustrate and undermine China's operational advances. The United States also is working closely with Australia and the United Kingdom as part of the AUKUS agreement to develop new and emerging technologies to bolster their ability to maintain a persistent presence in the waters and airspace of East Asia. Washington also is coordinating with European partners to strengthen the presence of NATO members in the waters of East Asia, while also cooperating with its Indo-Pacific counterparts in the QUAD and in other fora to promote regional stability.

There is intense struggle for military advantage along the first island chain – the string of islands from Japan's Ryukyus through Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo. China's military presence around the first island chain has grown considerably as its capabilities have expanded. U.S. officials have registered concerns privately and publicly that Chinese military personnel have become increasingly brazen in conducting unsafe intercepts at sea and in the air in this region. Chinese officials have responded that the root of the problem is the persistence and increasing frequency of American air and naval military operations at China's doorstep.

Left unaddressed, these trends are likely to grow in severity. Absent an intervention from the rest of the region, intensifying tensions in the Asian maritime domain could generate dangerous consequences for the future of global trade, and for the prospects of addressing global challenges such as food and energy security, macroeconomic coordination, and climate change. The central question, then, is how can actors in the region limit risk and claw open diplomatic space for coordination on regional and global challenges?

The best way for countries in the region to limit risk of conflict in the maritime domain will be to build operational predictability, common adherence to rules and norms, and risk reduction and management capabilities. Different actors will need to make different contributions to various elements of this scaffolding. Given the diffuse nature of regional activities in Asia, there likely will not be any central hub for coordinating such an approach. Efforts to limit risk of conflict in the maritime domain will need to proceed organically and in a mutually reinforcing manner, all guided by a common goal of dampening risk of conflict and expanding space for coordination on common challenges.

2. Reinforce support for international law

Every country in Asia depends upon freedom of navigation to ensure goods can reach and depart their shores. There are fundamental differences in views among certain actors, though, over the scope of permissible activities and permissible territorial claims.

There are unresolved disputes over maritime territorial claims in various areas in East Asia. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has a mechanism in place to address such disputes. In 2016, for example, an ad hoc tribunal under UNCLOS invalidated China's expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea. To ensure international law plays a stabilizing role, it is important for disputants to continue to take their cases to UNCLOS tribunals for resolution, and for other countries in the region to recognize the findings of such tribunals, even if China for the time being exercises indignation against the results.

It also is important for actors in the region to narrow differences of interpretations over navigational rights in exclusive economic zones and territorial seas. The United States is an imperfect champion for upholding UNCLOS principles, given that it has not ratified the treaty. It increasingly will need to fall on other countries who have ratified the treaty and have a strong record of abiding by its provisions to advance efforts to narrow differences of interpretation over application of international law to operational behavior. A growing number of countries who meet this standard have taken steps to contest excessive maritime claims through bilateral and multilateral consultations, diplomatic channels, and operational assertions of rights.

These efforts, by and large, do not take a position on competing claims, but rather are intended to demonstrate commitment to upholding the principle of freedom of navigation and secure sea lines of communication. The more that

regional and global actors contribute to such efforts, and narrow differences of interpretation among them over what navigational rights are permissible in different contexts, the more that such principles will be recognized. Importantly, such a chorus effect of contributions by a range of actors also lessens the risk of freedom of navigation issues becoming subsumed as an element of U.S.-China competition.

3. Advance codes of conduct to bolster operational safety and predictability

There has been important progress in recent years to bolster operational safety that should be built upon. Examples of recent progress include the Western Pacific Naval Symposium's development of a Code for Unplanned Encounters (CUES) between ships at sea, and also the 2001 Malaysia-Indonesia agreement for preventing incidents at sea (MALINDO). Regional countries have developed a Malacca Straits Security Initiative to bolster operational safety through this critical waterway. In 2014, the United States and China also adopted rules of behavior for the safety of air and maritime encounters.

Looking forward, it will be important for regional actors to build upon these efforts. They likely will need to show the way for the United States and China by providing a platform for both major powers to join. It is unlikely that there will be near-term progress between Washington and Beijing on expanding bilateral codes of conduct for military activities. Washington and Beijing disagree on the source of the problem and proper response to it. For Washington, the primary source of risk to maritime Asia is unsafe or unprofessional Chinese behavior as Beijing seeks to solidify a sphere of influence in the region. For Beijing, the activities of U.S. and allied military platforms along its periphery are the problem and source of potential conflict. Chinese leaders do not see virtue in creating a more predictable and safer environment for the U.S. and partner countries to operate near their shores.

Efforts to develop codes of conduct for operational behavior likely will need to be built in a piecemeal fashion among various actors. It would be helpful, for example, for the Western Pacific Naval Symposium to forge a common understanding of what constitutes a "safe distance" between vessels in various scenarios and what types of actions would constitute unsafe behavior. Such efforts could helpfully build upon this forum's past work in developing CUES.

Similar efforts should be undertaken to demarcate rules for military aircraft encounters. There are no binding rules specific to such encounters in any international convention. In 2018, defense ministers in Southeast Asia adopted non-binding guidelines for such encounters. ASEAN members could explore expanding the adoption of such guidelines to include participants in the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus), a grouping that also includes Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia, and the United States. If adopted, such guidelines would materially lower risk among many of the key actors operating in the region.

There may also be value in ASEAN leaders pursuing development of an understanding for uses and limits of autonomous weapons systems in the region. Such efforts could build upon the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement and other historical precedents. The purpose would be to establish boundaries of acceptable behavior for interactions involving AI-enabled autonomous platforms in the maritime and air domains in Asia.

4. Advance efforts to develop a common operating picture and patterns of coordination

The Information Fusion Center (IFC), located in Singapore, has provided a tremendous service for the region by helping establish a common operating picture in maritime Asia. The center provides a venue for representatives from 24 nations who represent around 70 percent of global GDP to combat piracy and protect maritime trade. Continuous efforts should be made to broaden the geographic scope, expand the types of activities being tracked, and spotlight operators challenging regional rules and norms.

For example, the region is confronting depleting fish stocks due to illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. This is not a challenge that can be countered by any single country. Addressing the problem requires broad maritime domain awareness as well as coordination between maritime law enforcement and other agencies to counter IUU fishing wherever it occurs.

The region also should not let any future crises go to waste. Habits of coordination have formed in the wake of previous crisis, such as the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami and the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan. Following these crises, the United States and other capable countries coordinated to deliver humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Should future crises emerge in the region, ASEAN or a subset of its members could play a critical role in helping coordinate relief efforts. If such efforts are not U.S.-led, they may hold higher prospect of attracting contributions from actors across the region and beyond.

There also may be value in developing greater regional transparency around seabed natural resource exploration and exploitation activities. Such activities often have served as the spark for escalation of tensions between disputants. If the Information Fusion Center or a different similar body could provide region-wide domain awareness of such activities, it could dampen efforts by parties to try to unilaterally explore seabed resources in contested areas.

5. Expand and regularize dialogue mechanisms and other exchanges to build relationships

As a rule of thumb, it is easier for officials who have genuine relationships with each other to manage incidents and advance maritime security. Such relationships take time and repetition of interactions to build. Given the tyranny of distance in Asia’s geography, this likely will require empowered officials to meet each other at regularly scheduled meetings. To draw senior officials to attend such gatherings, it is important that they be scheduled on a consistent basis and that the gatherings deliver practical progress in addressing common challenges.

There already is a dense collection of regional groupings. These fora can play an outsized role in providing a neutral venue for U.S. and Chinese counterparts to meet. They also can offer an opportunity for the rest of the region to remind both major powers of their need to look beyond each other to address key challenges in Asia and globally.

Table 1. List of Various Regional Maritime Security Forums

Platform	Members
ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security (ARF ISM)	ASEAN, Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the EU, India, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste, the U.S.
ASEAN Defense Minister Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) Maritime Security Expert Working Group (MSEWG)	ASEAN, Australia, China, Japan, India, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Russia, the U.S.
ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF)	ASEAN
Asia-Pacific Heads of Maritime Safety Agencies (APHoMSA) forum	Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Mongolia, Malaysia, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New

	Guinea, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, the Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, the U.S., Vanuatu, Vietnam
Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF)	ASEAN, Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia, the U.S.
Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meetings (HACGAM)	ASEAN, Australia, Bangladesh, Bahrain, China, India, Japan, Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, and Turkey
North Pacific Coast Guard Forum (NPCGF)	Canada, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Russia, the U.S.
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)	ASEAN, Bangladesh, China, Denmark, Germany, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Sri Lanka, the U.K., the U.S.
Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training (SEACAT)	Bangladesh, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, the U.S., Thailand, Vietnam
Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)	Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, France, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Tonga, the U.S., Vietnam

At present, this overlapping spaghetti noodle bowl of regional gatherings does not appear to follow any overarching sequence or logic for meetings. Each dialogue mechanism appears to operate on its own track.

Effective policymaking is the art of timing, sequencing, and prioritization of issues. There may be value in having a group of esteemed former officials take a look at the multiplicity of dialogues to determine if there might be any value in timing and sequencing any of the dialogues to have a cascading effect, whereby progress in one venue generates opportunities for other groupings to build upon gains made to advance work in other aspects of Asia's maritime security agenda.

6. Conclusion

Great power rivalry between the United States and China intersects most directly in the waters of the Western Pacific. The Asian maritime domain is

growing more contested and more crowded. This magnifies the importance of lowering risk of war and reducing incidents that could escalate. These are minimum necessary conditions to build regional architecture that supports cooperation in Asia.

Such enabling conditions for cooperation will not arise automatically. The more that the region's agenda focus is on maritime security, the less likely that leaders in Washington, Beijing, and elsewhere will be able to fixate narrowly on enmity with each other.

Such a task will only grow in importance in the coming years. It is almost a given that the United States and China will invest significantly in expanding their naval maritime technological base in the coming years. They both are rapidly seeking to bolster their deterrent capabilities. The United States is working with its partners to accelerate innovation of new and emerging technologies and develop new doctrine and plans to seek an edge in use of those technologies. China similarly is advancing its own historic naval build-up, looking for ways to expand access for its forces overseas, and appears to be pursuing opportunities for coalition-building with Russia and potentially others as well. Both major powers likely will remain cautious about endorsing risk reduction initiatives until they feel confident in the strength of their deterrent against the other.

There is much work to be done. The risks are too great for the rest of the region to wait idly for a moment when the United States and China feel sufficiently satisfied with their naval capabilities to show interest in reducing risk. Practical efforts to limit risk of conflict and enhance opportunities for cooperation should begin now. Such efforts can begin with: forging greater consensus around international law; building up codes of conduct; advancing practical actions to create greater unity of effort and a common operating picture; and using dialogues to build relationships among key actors. With global trendlines pointing toward growing systemic stresses and great power relations deteriorating rapidly, there is no time to waste.

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TECHNOLOGY AND GEOSTRATEGY

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Ladies and gentlemen, first of all good morning and thank you, governor and all the Lemhannas for inviting me. Having me in this very wonderful occasion today. Today, I would like to discuss what the rule of technology related to the geostrategy and a framework of the international relations. Yeah, this is the agenda.

One thing that, it's quiet, you know, simple question, but actually need more elaboration in answering this question. So, this is the basic question that given to us that actually how to advance the maritime technology can contribute to the secure and balanced Global architecture in a fragmented world like today. It's not easy answer to this. Maybe 1-million-dollar question. Yesterday, we followed very thoughtful discussion and insightful from the governor and all the speakers, about the geopolitics for example. Here, I would like to bring as well that not only geographic, power, politics, but technology. Technology is indispensable for the international relations today.

Okay, I would like to begin with the possible toward the contemporary geopolitics. Our present built upon the governor presentation yesterday about geopolitics, the fifth generation, I think. So, I would like to bring your attention into the importance of the time-bound versus space or territory and then technology-based geopolitics. And if we go further here, that if we know from the time-bound whether they're the geopolitics are geostrategy is just a continuation of the previous events like historically or chronologically, or whether the same actors, whether the same national interest is still remains, and whether the different mechanism where the conflict or cooperation is still there. So, I think we should touch upon this issue as well, the time-bound.

The second, I think the one more important point is that the advancement of the technology. We know that the creation of the space is beyond the geographic, beyond the boundaries of the land or maybe also including the aerospace or others. But this is, I think, much more important that the digital technology created digital territory. So, we need to understand that beyond the land, air, sea, we know entering the era that there is additional territory which is a digital

territory. From the advancement of GIS for example, remote sensing and other technology, artificial intelligence, machine learning and also blockchain technology. I will touch upon that later on.

And the third one, I think I would like to bring your attention on the metaverse world. We don't know whether this is the new sovereignty there, whereas the international actors there, whether the state actor still exist or still relevant. Yesterday, the governors already mentioned clearly that the actors is not only merely the state, but non states, but could be the individual, could be the groups, even us individual here. So, the challenge is there, are we ready to enter the geopolitics of metaverse, who will reign the metaverse world or maybe another first another digital space. I think this is, if we would like to go along to the transformation of the military transformation. I think I do agree that we need to put our attention on the digital technology.

The four, I think here is a regulation versus innovation is like the old history. And innovation is always go further and regulation is like behind and then we fight each other on that bureaucracy, and then the regulator, and finally like what we actually end up facing today that government try to get, you know, taxing for any digital activities. It's not wrong but I think this is the new reality that the government also need to understand that. But on the other hand, the business side, the non-state actors is, you know, going farther and faster rather than we expect in the past.

Then I just read the few papers before my presentation today. That's a very good piece of paper, AI and international politics. It's also available in our... I would be very happy to distribute to all of you from Arsenault and crabs. It's not about because I die harder of the Arsenal, because but the author resembles with my soccer club Arsenal. This is motivation and incentive for international actors pursuing the AI among others, that authors mentioned there. There are three reasons motivation for pursuing AI in international politics. Of course, the first and foremost, I think improving domestic government and efficiency, for sure, using the AI, the only bureaucracy, all the mechanism is getting digitalized, you know, and all the track by the system.

And the second point it is I think related to what we are discussing today, about the capitalizing on military opportunities. So many new opportunities open for the military, including not only for war, for example, but maybe in the joint cooperation among the international actors there. And the last but not least, number three, is that the first tool is focused on the domestic, but the number three here, a power, influence, and global competition bring the international

actors once again to the stage of competition. I think this is one another important point that we need to go to AI as a, you know, one of the, I think indispensable factor for international relations.

Another example, this is my favourite example that I always bring to the people and Lemhannas actually, maybe some of you already familiar with this. This is an application how the technology is implemented with AI. So let's put this way, in this existing world, that the more centralized world there is an authority among others like super power of president, prime minister, government. But by blockchain technology, by digitalization, and here is an example cryptocurrency, even still in the undergoing process but has changed the system dramatically from the centralized to the more decentralized system. There's no need to validate the transaction from the center but the hubs and spoke that validate all transaction using the Blockchain technology is there. It's not only for the financial transaction. It's just a cryptocurrency is chance and one piece of example. But we believe and other activities and our daily life. It could be and bureaucracy and education, higher education. Maybe into the military. How every transaction is tracked by the blockchain technology get validated by every hub, that is decentralized and this is independence and no central authority can control its hubs and spoke. And with that background, I believe that the new world governance on the New World Order will emerge from that. I'm not saying that the sovereignty of the state because I speak before all of you that do most of your military person. I'm not saying that you're still very important but how the government or the military need to pay more attention on this different future of the... maybe the future of international relations and the coming years.

Well, once again, before I answer the previous question, maybe I typically academician, when I, you know, given the question and I try really to answer that based on what I have been saying in the beginning that why the more maritime technology can contribute to the global architecture in this fragmented world. I just imagined maybe it's because this is the way how we perceive the world. There is a tendency of the convergence. There is a great narrative among us, among the scholars, among also the practitioners and including the military. How? At least I have two indicators here. The first is from the industry. Many industrialists, many business people, and also all the bureaucracy or politician, now is campaigning about the sustainable industry, green industry, climate change, and including how to reduce this CO2 and so on, and so forth. So, basically the investment, the financial things, must be inclusive, not only benefit to the business sectors, but the much more important it's to benefit the better of the people. This is one indicator.

My second indicator is that the technology that I already mentioned before. Innovation, invention of the AI, blockchain, machine learning, and so on. Those are issues that become our daily breakfast, dinner meeting, lunch meeting. Everyone talked about that. So I may have a like, you know, like a proposal. Oh, maybe because of the... we have the great narrative at convergent rather than diverge. Then I think the maritime technology, you know, can be one of the solutions.

Hopefully we can go to the more specific answer to the question given to me. I also wrote another piece of paper. It's very good one. Technology and the Construction of Oceanic Space by Daniel Lambach. Okay. Basically, his idea is very simple. They had once again, creating space, there is interaction among actors, technology and environment. So, technological development is entangled with politics. It is not politics itself and technology itself, but in the twine between those two. If we see here, for example, the actor and technology, actor and one hand also affect the technology, but technology also give like good opportunity for the actors to do something about that. Use the technology and the technology and environment technology give, let's say the environments much more, you know, how to preserve the environment for example, and also environment also give the parameters for the technology.

On the other hand, if we see here, the religion among the actors and environment, of course, human beings, multinational corporations, states, have a very, you know, good or bad intention how to use the environment. It's up to us. But the environment would like to preserve the environment, or we would like to abandon the environment. It's up to us. But also in the other hand, environment also give hints to the actors. It's like there's a flood, there is a paper climate change. It's like a jargon that we not consuming every day. So, according to Lambach, these three factors create the special space construction. I think this is the main ideas of language. So, when we talk about the space of territory, it is not only just sea, air, or land. But in this case of this paper, maybe the colleague from the Navy knows very well about this, it's about knots, about the dot under the sea, and then they how to create maps. So, space here is not only the capture of the sea, air, or land, but also create the digital space. Then can be used as a venue for cooperation or even conflict among other actors, in this terms, as international actors.

So, last but not least, basically this is maybe one of the amongst so many possible answers that why the maritime technology that maybe could be very specific on that. I don't touch upon that because I'm not, you know, really master or on the very specific maritime technology. But here by my

presentation, I provide the framework. How to see the technology related to the space? Relate to the ocean here, because we talk about the maritime technology is exist in the ocean. I think I stop here and hopefully we will have a very good discussion after all the presenters or panelist give a presentation.
Thank you very much.



GEOPOLITICS LANDSCAPE IN AN ARTIFICIAL WORLD: ADVANCING MARITIME TECHNOLOGY IN GEO-STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract

The development of sophistication in information and communication technology will have a significant impact on the dynamics of the future geopolitical landscape. Traditionally, geopolitics describes the relationship between regions based on their geographical conditions. Relations between these regions often reflect political hegemony more than strategic alliances. In that era, relations between countries were generally formed because of the dominance of military power. Currently, although military power is still an important factor, it seems that geoeconomic competition based on technological strength will be more prominent. Therefore, superpower countries have changed their strategy from relying on military power to relying more on economic and technological strength. Although military power has been replaced with economic and technological power, building a new global balance will still be difficult. Another interesting sector to pay attention to is the rapid development of maritime technology, both related to modernization of transportation modes, mastery of navigation, and modern business patterns. The development of maritime technology is expected to affect changes in the map of power and competition in the global supply chain. The development of the power of maritime technology is predicted to affect the geopolitical landscape in the future. This economic and political battle that is driven by maritime control takes place both at the global and regional levels. The interesting question is whether the development of maritime technology will strengthen the hegemony and control of developed countries over developing countries or will create global prosperity and the creation of a balance of power. These issues will be discussed in this paper.

Keywords: Geopolitics, Geo-economic, Maritime technology, Strategic alliances, Shifting power.

1. Introduction

The Jakarta Geopolitical Forum is a platform for geopolitical experts to exchange and share the ideas in order to find the best solution to make the

lives of global people more prosperous and peaceful. The theme of the 6th Jakarta Geopolitical Forum is “The Future of Geo-Maritime: Pursuing Global Stability”. The discussion in this session will concentrate on the impact of technological advances, especially maritime technology, in a geo-strategic framework.

Technological advances in the maritime sector provide a new perspective on opportunities and challenges. The US has recently been concerned about the impact of China's rapid advances in maritime technology on the country's overall economic competitiveness. When China's technology, especially in the maritime sector, is increasingly emerging and isolating itself from the rest of the world, advances in maritime information technology will encourage changes to the current rules of the game.

In such conditions, we are faced with the interesting question, whether technological progress can improve human life and will bring world peace or even this technological progress will actually bring new disasters for mankind. These are the issues that will be the focus of this paper.

2. The role of technology in the geopolitics issues

The first interesting aspect to discuss is the influence of technology on geopolitics. The panorama of human life on this planet has changed significantly as a result of technology. The digital era is now a part of our lives and has altered how people live. Technology is a human invention that was purposefully made to enhance and promote the welfare of people. When James Watt was able to successfully create the steam engine, we danced and celebrated. Widespread industrialization allowed people to use their brains instead of their muscles to produce goods. That is the fundamental nature of people as beings made by God who relies more on their minds than their bodies. Digitalization alters not just how people work but also how they think. According to DataReportal, today, 5.03 billion people worldwide use the internet, accounting for 63.1 percent of the global population. Internet users are also increasing, with the most recent data showing that the world's connected population increased by nearly 180 million in the year to July 2022 as shown in figure 1.

It could be noted that nowadays, almost all social and business activities require the use of the internet, therefore this century is called the IoT era, Internet of Things.




Figure 1. Number of internet users worldwide.

Source: DataReportal July 2022.

Technology creates the future of human's life. But, through technological advancements, there is a risk that, as a result of man's own activities, in the future, individuals may either lose their sense of self or become more and more reliant on the world network under the authority of technology's administrators and rulers. It's feasible that man will meet his own individual and societal destruction as a result of the technological advancement of his creation. The questions are, will technology make human life better than before? or could humans become slaves to technology? or whether man will even meet his own individual and collective death as a result of his creation?

Autonomous Technology is starting to emerge, robotization has not only hit industry but has penetrated into various lives, from serving everyday human life to creating war tools with the emergence of robot warriors that are driven and controlled through artificial intelligence. This autonomous system will certainly be one of the driving factors for the creation of new habits that can lead to the birth of a new culture.

Classically the term 'geopolitics' has been used by practitioners and scholars to refer to a country's zones of interest or influence and how they clash with one another. This meaning is both vague and limited; it does not take into account the full significance of the term, and even contains negative connotations due to the emphasis on power politics. Geopolitics is also often interpreted as the interaction between countries in controlling various natural

resources. Starting from the control of natural resources based on their geographical position then shifted to the control of sovereignty politically, economically and now technologically.

Generally, a state's have two basic objectives these are to retain its existence and to be able to develop in order to increase the welfare of its citizens. In this context, the expression "country with control over other countries" is frequently used to refer to a nation that has the ability to influence or exploit other countries in order to enhance its own interests. At that point, the superpowers started to demonstrate their hegemony, or ability to rule the world. Originally used to represent the dominance of one territory over another, or the leadership of one social class over another, the term "hegemony" has come to mean the overwhelming dominance of one state over other nations.

The strategy and patterns utilized to dominate over other nations are changing. The control of economic leadership, as well as control of natural resources, and political authority over a nation, replaced the initial emphasis on military and physical power. As a result, geoeconomics is currently used more frequently than geopolitics. The term "geo-economics" was first used by Edward Luttwak in 1990, who asserted that, despite the economic manifestation of great power rivalry, politics still governs the world. He said, "The world is not governed by the logic of commerce but by the logic of conflict, that is hostility based on zero sum game perspective."

The Power eventually becomes a means to control the world. The philosophy of living hand in hand in establishing world peace is replaced by the spirit of ruling the world to control other countries. This is based on the view that a nation in maintaining its survival cannot be separated from natural law in which only a superior nation can survive. Peacefully or through violence or war and as often as possible by carrying out the will through violence. With this perspective, it can be said that the geopolitical situation and global strategic landscape have changed significantly during the past several years. The civilization is about to face a significant change. These issues may lead to the emergence of brand-new varieties of violent radicalism. Global conflict could be sparked by the struggle for market and resource dominance, notably between the struggling US and the booming China.

Technology has altered the nature of the world economy, as was already mentioned. In addition, the focus of the occurrence competition is technology. Nowadays, the internet seems to foster the development of

fragmentation trajectories rather than the anticipated "flat globe." Geopolitical and security concerns have been made worse by NSA surveillance, which is to blame for the internet's fragmentation and has prompted calls for "cyber sovereignty." Comparatively to China and other nations that have made internet technology a strategic priority, the US lost its hegemonic position in the Information technology/IT industry. Normatively partnerships between countries now can be created by togetherness in the use and innovation of technology, especially network technology. But in reality network technology is used to create new dominance. The idea of creating a borderless world through the support of information technology networks has now disappeared, even now network technology has created a new regionalization.

The phenomenon of globalization has now turned into deglobalization. Cyber technology, which was originally created to increase prosperity and economic development, has now even become a powerful weapon. Cyber warfare and information warfare is even now inevitable.

An interesting case to be discussed is the competition between the two world giants, China and America, which continues in various activities. The rivalry between the United States and China does not stop at the trade war alone. Now the trade war has shifted into an unpredictable technology war before. One interesting case is America's decision to block the TikTok platform in September 2021. TikTok is a platform made by ByteDance Ltd., a large Chinese IT company. At that time, the actual ban would not have been carried out if the TikTok platform could be acquired by American companies such as Microsoft and Oracle. TikTok is very popular in the US especially among teenagers, as well as in the world. According to Business Apps, by the first quarter of 2022, TikTok is estimated to have 1.39 billion monthly active users (MAU) worldwide. The number jumped to 72.17% compared to a year ago. It was noted that in the first quarter of 2021, the number of monthly active users was still 812 million. US officials estimate the platform poses a potential threat to American security, because the data it collects can be used by the Chinese government for profiling US public behavior, which is why TikTok is now banned from use by Americans. In fact, China has already banned its citizens from using American-made social media platforms, namely Facebook and Twitter. Overall, so far TikTok can be downloaded in 154 countries. Interestingly, the TikTok app is also available in 75 languages. This app also has a TikTok creator marketplace platform. Thus, the world of social media which was originally dominated by American-made platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, etc., is being rivaled by platforms

made in China. This case shows us that technology on the one hand will increase convenience for humans, but on the other hand it can be used as a political tool.

3. The Role of maritime technology in increasing competitiveness.

Another strategic issue that is interesting to discuss is the development of maritime technology. Regardless of the fact that some countries remain isolated from globalization, geoeconomic competition will become more common and influential in the global economy and global politics. Strengthening its maritime power is one of the powers that will support this global economic hegemony.

According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), digitization is the primary factor in the shipping industry's potential to recover after the Covid-19 pandemic has occurred, improve the resilience of the global supply chain, and usher in a new age. The digitization of trade and customs processes is necessary for global supply chains that depend on the shipping sector to provide the quick and secure flow of data and information (IMO, 2020). Due to the numerous benefits that digitalization and information technology (IT) provide for the logistics and freight transport industries, the application of digitalization in the logistics industry is regarded as the primary source of differentiation strategies and competitive advantages for logistics companies.

Based on the preceding discussion, shipping digitalization management (SDM) is the management of digital innovation capabilities and the implementation of digital innovation processes in shipping companies. More specifically, refers to the activities of shipping companies and other maritime organizations to develop innovative digital solutions that are unique to the shipping industry, and to integrate them into these industries' and companies' organizational and technical systems. Digital transformation success factors are classified into three categories: organization, environment, and technology.

Let us take a look at an interesting case that is the China's Belt and Road Initiative, which builds land and sea networks to connect various economic centers in various countries. In a closed loop system, China's Belt and Road Initiative connects all of the world's economic centers; this line connects land and sea. The project's goal is to strengthen Beijing's economic leverage by building large-scale infrastructure projects in every member of BRI.

The Belt and Road Initiative combines multiple economic corridors: the land economic silk road and the maritime economic silk road. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) development strategy aims to build connectivity and co-operation across six main economic corridors encompassing China and: Mongolia and Russia; Eurasian countries; Central and West Asia; Pakistan; other countries of the Indian sub-continent; and Indochina. (Figure 2 below).

BRI is a huge growth program that includes the following six economic corridors:

1. New Eurasia Land Bridge: involving rail to Europe via Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus, and Poland.
2. China, Mongolia, Russia Economic Corridor: including rail links and the steppe road—this will link with the land bridge.
3. China, Central Asia, West Asia Economic Corridor: linking to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Turkey.
4. China Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor: Viet Nam, Thailand, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Malaysia.
5. China, Pakistan Economic Corridor: Xinjiang Province will be most affected. This important project links Kashgar city (free economic zone) in landlocked Xinjiang with the Pakistan port of Gwadar, a deep water port used for commercial and military purposes.
6. China, Bangladesh, India, Myanmar Economic Corridor.




Figure 2. Belt and Road Initiative map.

Source: China's Belt and Road Initiative in the Global Trade, Investment and Finance Landscape, OECD Report, 2018.

To construct the six corridors, sophisticated technology is required to control multimodal transportation, control energy, maintain water sources, and conserve the environment, as well as to ensure the security of various development activities and operations management. In other words, without technological support, BRI will not operate effectively. As a consequence, China's leader, Xie Jing Ping, emphasized in his message that various innovations, both technological and social, must be established in order to build BRI. Xie Jing Ping stated that "We should pursue innovation-driven development and intensify co-operation in frontier areas such as digital economy, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology and quantum computing, and advance the development of big data, cloud computing and smart cities so as to turn them into a digital silk road of the 21st century."

From a competitive point of view, the technological development carried out by China and its strategic partners can certainly be seen as a real threat to the American bloc and its allies. Technological development, on one hand, will build shared prosperity, but for other groups it will be seen as a threat. The rapid development of technology, especially in information technology and artificial intelligence, encourages the formation of a new geopolitical landscape that is not only based on geographical area but also based on the grouping of technological strengths. The shift from a trade war to a technology war has already occurred and is expected to continue. The formation of political blocks as a result of technological competition is understandable because technology has two characteristics, namely as an infrastructure and at the same time as a commodity.

Technology as infrastructure is seen as a factor that can increase the acceleration of economic development. Because by using advanced technology, the production process will be more effective, efficient and productive. Likewise, by using the right technology, the value chain network and global supply chain can be expanded. The wheels of economic development will run well, and of course common prosperity can be realized. On the other hand, technology can also be seen as a commodity. High-tech products certainly have high competitiveness too, this will lead to very sharp competition between various countries, especially developed countries. This technological product competition will also encourage the formation of a new geopolitical landscape.

The maritime sector is crucial for many firms aiming to supply commodities, grow, or advance the global economy. Ships and shipping firms must concentrate on new technology if trade services are to be effective.

Technology developments in the shipping industry contribute to a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. Maritime industry also offers substitutes for fossil fuels like fuel cell vessel. These sectors are currently the most widely used form of energy in ships. In conclusion, the primary function of technology is to create a secure environment and aid in the growth and improvement of businesses. Some of the technologies that are developing to support maritime include: 1. Artificial Intelligence, 2. Sensor Technology, 3. Robotics and 3D Printing, 4. Big Data and IoT, 5. Autonomous Control, 6. Augmented Reality, 7. Ship Propulsion Systems and 8. Advanced Materials.

Artificial Intelligence can solve many problems in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the maritime industry. Likewise, with the use of sensor technology, the sensing and navigation of vessels can be carried out properly. Robotic and 3D printing are very helpful in designing various vessel designs and other equipment. Big Data and IoT are very helpful in processing data carefully. Data analytics check the information that comes from large operation systems such as ships and ports. It is data about container types, weight and destination. It can also analyze ship data (trim, stability, engine performance and communication). The **smart ship and autonomous technologies** are examples of developments used in the modern marine sector. Improvements in shipbuilding (megaships), advanced materials, smart shipping, propulsion, robotics, big data, and sensors are making the work on the Earth's waters easier. Thus, advanced technology in the marine sector such as the birth of autonomous ships is no longer just a dream but has become a reality. It's not an exaggeration to say that **a nation who succeed in creating powerful maritime technology will be the ruler of the world.**

Another interesting case is the South China Sea dispute. The South China Sea conflict seems to have yet to show any signs of abating. In our view, China's claim to control of the South China Sea is not only based on historical reasons for the traditional fishing route of its ancestors, but also to perfect the economic corridor of BRI. It is conceivable if the South China Sea is controlled by China then through Belt and Road Initiative, the People's Republic of China has expanded its economic hegemony throughout ASIA, Europe and Africa. This development certainly challenges U.S. economic leadership.

Because the conflict in the South China Sea area is still ongoing, tensions that have the potential to disrupt security stability in the Indo-Pacific region are increasing. Geopolitical tensions have warmed up again, so the balance of

global security has faltered again. This is the challenge for all of us in building a safe and prosperous global society.

4. Conclusion

Two major issues have been discussed in this paper, the first is regarding the influence of technology in shaping the new geopolitical landscape, the second is related to the importance of mastering maritime technology to increase competitiveness.

It is undeniable that technology provides great benefits for human life, but technology can also increase the dependence of a state on other state. Even technology is now often used as a tool to control other countries. The trade war between the two superpowers, the United States and China, has turned into a technology war. China's information and communication technology has penetrated all over the world. America as one of the leading countries in the field of information technology is worried that all of its products will be rivaled. Besides that, America is also worried that the dominance of China's information technology will threaten not only its trade sector but will also threaten the security of its country. This picture shows that technology plays a very important role in creating new geopolitical landscapes. Technology is a ways for improving human welfare, but technology can also be used as a tool to dominate and control other countries.

Maritime is an important part in shaping the constellation of relations between countries. As described above, China as the initiator of BRI is not only building a mainland economic network but also building a maritime economic corridor. The classic silk road, which only covers the mainland network, which is integrated with the maritime silk road, is an enormous global supply chain network, especially with the use of sophisticated maritime technology.

As described above, we can finally say that technology, like a two-edged sword, has two flip side. Because of its nearly uncontrolled development, technology has created doubt about humanity's destiny. As a result of technological development, there is a risk that people as individuals will lose their identity or become increasing reliant on the global network controlled by the rulers and administrators of technology itself in the future. It is possible that man may face individual or societal catastrophe as a result of his creation's technological advancement.

5. Recommendation

As a final note, here are several recommendations that want to be conveyed. Technology should be used as a mean to improve welfare and not as a tool for oppression. Competition in the maritime technology must still be carried out because this will raise the spirit of high productivity. Building maritime power cannot be done alone, therefore international cooperation in various sectors needs to be continuously developed including education, science, technology, culture, sports, tourism, environmental protection and health care.

The maritime vision as the future of the global economy needs to be realized through the development of maritime technology based on three pillars, namely sovereignty, sustainability, and prosperity. Business processes and global supply chain networks need to be integrated with all global resources and directed towards a balance of development that can be enjoyed widely.

Strengthening the national interests of each country must be followed by respecting the national interests of other countries. The principle of strategic partnership needs to be the main guideline, cooperation is carried out based on mutual agreement and fulfillment of common interests.

Nobody knows what may happen in the future, but we must continue to strive to live a dignified life. The wheel must keep turning, and life must remain meaningful. Let us, as human beings, establish a civil society as Mahatma Gandhi mention that

Be the change that you wish to see in the world.

(Mahatma Gandhi)

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THE HUMAN ASSET WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALLY EMERGING TECHNOLOGY, REGIONAL MARITIME CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT AND THE COHERENCE OF REPUBLIC INDONESIA (RI) STRATEGIC POLICY RESPONSE

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Abstract

Republic of Indonesia as an archipelagic state actor within the international system plays her significant role to build, secure, and use her maritime domain in the most strategic sense to protect and advance her national interests within the cooperative, competitive, and conflictual setting at the world stage. This effort is not however built-in vacuum but shall be placed within the context of her interaction with Indo-Pacific region, Quad states, AUKUS states, the Five Eyes, and China (PRC). The main argument of this paper constructs the justification that globally emerging technological advancement is indeed an independent variable for RI maritime capability development that in turn will contribute to the coherence of RI strategic policy response within the maritime domain that covers three strategic objectives: human security/economic prosperity; national security; and international security.

Therefore, this paper has three thesis questions: 1) how RI shall take the most out of globally emerging technology for her maritime capability development that in its turn will contribute to the coherence of RI's strategic policy response? 2) what does constitute the maritime capability development?, 3) what does constitute the coherence of RI's strategic policy response within the maritime domain? Based on these three thesis questions, this paper has proposed three possible answers: 1) given RI's non-alliance defense policy, RI shall accelerate her readiness to adopt new technology available by constructively engaging the global markets based on constructed common values and interests; 2) RI shall give the priority to the development of national maritime infrastructures and regionally respectable naval forces (2022–2045); 3) RI shall ensure the fundamental elements in policy coherence that covers the sound-basis and strategically future oriented policy (2022–2045), the acceleration of formulation and implementation of the respected policy through a sophisticated policy-making process that includes all significant variables in the respected policy that

is suitable for preparing RI in the cooperative, competitive, and conflictual setting.

At the bottom line, answers to these three questions depend on RI human asset as the lynchpin variable to take the most out of globally emerging technologies to develop RI maritime capability that in turn will contribute to the likely achievement of the RI maritime strategy toward 2045. The data in this paper is primarily drawn from the open source while using the policy as the unit of analysis. The analysis is mostly qualitative with some quantitative analysis to supplement the qualitative one so that contributing to the research question of this panel: "How would the advancing maritime technology coincidentally contribute to secured and balanced global architecture under such fragmented situation?"

Keywords: Maritime Capability, Maritime Strategy, Maritime Domain, Innovation.

1. Introduction

The globally emerging technology is indeed a significant variable for RI to build her maritime capabilities -maritime infrastructures and respectable naval forces- that in its turn will contribute to the coherence of RI maritime policy. Therefore, the main challenge for RI is of how to identify, accessing to, and using the globally emerging technology and to have them integrated in the RI maritime capability development as laid out by the RI maritime strategy toward 2045. The main element or lynchpin variable to address this challenge depends, however, on the expected quality of RI human asset that is ready to take the most out of globally emerging techs. Therefore, in order to straightly pinpointing the issue, this paper will prove that the dynamics of geo-maritime whether in the status quo or in the corrective order will be significantly influenced among other variables by how best the involved states prepare their human asset to embrace the globally emerging technology for the purpose of building their maritime capability development that in turn will contribute to the likely success of their national maritime strategy.

a. The globally emerging technology

Emerging technology is a term generally used to describe a new technology, but it may also refer to the continuing development of and existing technology. Alternatively, it is an innovation that significantly modifies the way that consumers, industries, business, or the military operate. A disruptive tech quickly devastates the systems or habits it replaces due to its superior attributes (ex: e-commerce, online news sites,

ride-sharing apps, and GPS). At one time, the automobile, electricity service, TV, and atomic weapons were considered disruptive tech.

According to the 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy, the rapid tech that changes the character of war are Advanced computing, big data analytics, Artificial Intelligence (AI), including Machine Learning/ML, Autonomy (lethal autonomous weapons systems), Robotics, Directed Energy (weapons, Hyper-sonics (weapons), and Biotechnology. Meanwhile, according to the top 10 Emerging Tech that is defined by Comp TIA Emerging Tech Community, such emerging techs include AI, 5G (fifth-generation tech standard for broadband cellular), Internet of Things, Serverless computing, Biometrics, Augmented reality/virtual reality, Blockchain, Robotics, Natural language processing, and Quantum computing (CQ). That said, the challenges for RI maritime stakeholders are of how to be familiar with such techs, to have access to them, know how to use them for building RI maritime capability, and later of how to develop and use them to accelerate RI maritime capability development.

b. The Maritime capability development

The maritime capability development in its essence addresses two main strategic targets: the maritime infrastructures and naval forces that can guarantee RI economic prosperity and national security in years ahead, specifically toward 2045. However, the comprehensive and futuristic understanding of globally emerging technology by the human asset are the prerequisite for the effective RI maritime capability development in years ahead.

INDIKATOR KEBERHASILAN
menjadikan Indonesia Negara Maritim yang KUAT

TUJUAN DAN INDIKATOR TUJUAN	SASARAN DAN INDIKATOR SASARAN	AGENDA/PROGRAM KERJA	INDIKATOR AGENDA/PROGRAM
TS-01: <i>Menjadikan Indonesia Negara Maritim yang KUAT</i> , yaitu Negara dengan struktur ekonomi maritim yang kokoh, yang tumbuh pesat dengan adil, merata dan berkelanjutan, sebagai penopang perekonomian nasional: 1. PDB Maritim (share, green PDB) 2. Indeks Rasio Gini	SS-01: <i>Terwujudnya pemerataan Pembangunan dan hasil-hasilnya</i> , dengan indikator: 1. Disparitas Ekonomi antar Kawasan (Varian Green PDRB) 2. Indeks Kinerja Logistik	AP-01 Pengembangan Sarana Prasarana Maritim	1) Indeks Disparitas Pembangunan Maritim (Investasi, Sarpras Maritim) 2) Indeks Daya Saing Infrastruktur Kemaritiman
	SS-02: <i>Terwujudnya perairan Indonesia yang bersih, sehat dan produktif</i> , dengan indikator: 3. Indeks Kesehatan Laut Indonesia	AP-02 Peningkatan Konektivitas Maritim	3) % Biaya Logistik Terhadap PDB 4) Dwelling Time Nasional
	SS-03: <i>Meningkatnya produksi dan nilai tambah barang dan jasa kemaritiman</i> , dengan indikator: 4. Nilai Tambah Barang dan Jasa	AP-03 Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Alam dan Lingkungan Perairan	5) Produktivitas Perairan 6) Indeks Kualitas LH (Air)
		AP-04 Pengembangan Industri Maritim	7) Neraca Ekspor/Impor 8) Indeks Daya Saing Industri

marves Maritim 2045

Figure 1. Maritime Capability Development Indicators in terms of RI as the Strong Maritime State.

INDIKATOR KEBERHASILAN
menjadikan Indonesia Bangsa Bahari yang UNGGUL

TUJUAN DAN INDIKATOR TUJUAN	SASARAN DAN INDIKATOR SASARAN	AGENDA/PROGRAM KERJA	INDIKATOR AGENDA/PROGRAM
TS-02: <i>Menjadikan Indonesia Bangsa Bahari yang UNGGUL</i> , yaitu Bangsa yang berdayasaing tinggi, yang berdaulat dan mandiri dalam mengelola potensi maritim, didukung SDM yang maju, inovatif serta berkarakter nusantara. 3. Indeks Daya Saing Global 4. Indeks Kedaulatan Maritim	SS-04: <i>Terwujudnya kedaulatan maritim dalam arti luas</i> , dengan indikator: 5. Indeks Ketahanan Maritim 6. Maritime Leadership Index	AP-05 Penguatan Pertahanan, Keamanan & Keselamatan Maritim AP-06 Penguatan Diplomasi & Okupasi Maritim	9) Indeks Hankam Laut 10) Indeks Keselamatan Maritim 11) Indeks Diplomasi Maritim 12) Efektivitas Penguasaan Wilayah Laut
	SS-05: <i>Terwujudnya penatakelolaan maritim yang baik (good maritime governance)</i> , dengan indikator: 7. Indeks Tata Kelola Maritim	AP-07 Penguatan Tatakelola Maritim	13) Indeks Tatakelola Laut 14) Indeks Tatakelola Pesisir & Pulau Kecil
	SS-06: <i>Terwujudnya masyarakat maritim yang inovatif dan berkarakter kuat</i> , dengan indikator: 8. Indeks Pembangunan Manusia (Maritim)	AP-08 Pemajuan Budaya dan Karakter Bangsa Bahari AP-09 Pengembangan Iptek dan SDM Maritim	15) Indeks Pembangunan Karakter Bahari 16) Indeks Literasi (Maritim) 17) Tingkat Kompetensi SDM (Maritim) 18) Marine Science Technology Index

marves Maritim 2045

Source: Kelompok Kerja Visi Maritim Indonesia 2045, Kementerian Koordinator Bidang

Figure 2. Capability Development Indicators in terms of RI as the Globally Competitive Maritime Nation

Source: Kelompok Kerja Visi Maritim Indonesia 2045, Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Kemaritiman dan Investasi.

c. The coherence of RI maritime strategy toward 2045

RI has drafted the maritime vision 2045 issued by the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime and Investment Affairs with the strategic aim to become the world hub for maritime civilization sustained by two main pillars: RI as a strong maritime state and RI as a globally competitive maritime nation. However, the coherence of this strategy -measured by its effective implementation- is significantly influenced by how best the government (as a state) and the civil society (as a nation) to expedite the quality and quantity of RI human asset that can strategically understand and relate the global emerging techs and their causal relationship on RI maritime capacity and on strategic objectives to be achieved.




Figure 3. The Strategic Mapping of RI Maritime Strategy 2045

Source: Kelompok Kerja Visi Maritim Indonesia 2045, Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Kemaritiman dan Investasi.




Figure 4. Roadmap of RI Maritime Strategy toward 2045

Source: Kelompok Kerja Visi Maritim Indonesia 2045, Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Kemaritiman dan Investasi.

2. Discussion

Based on what we have laid out above there are at least several takeaways the RI government can do to prepare RI human asset to be ready to take the most out of globally emerging technology in order to accelerate the maritime

capability development and the realization of the 2045 RI maritime strategic vision.

First. The future strategic leadership of RI maritime domain shall understand the vocabulary and concepts behind the emerging (and potentially disruptive) technologies of AI and ML that impacts the dynamics in maritime domain.

Second. The future strategic leadership of RI maritime domain shall understand the current and potential future applications and capabilities, as well as some of the limitations and concerns, of AI and ML within the context of maritime domain and its relationship with other strategic domains: land; air; space; and cyber domain.

Third. The future strategic leadership of RI maritime domain is to familiarize with innovation and leadership through change, where RI's future strategic leaders can anticipate and lead rapid adaptation and innovation during a dynamic period of acceleration in the rate of change in warfare under global competition and disruptive technology. That said, leveraging the educational system by providing RI human asset with the baseline knowledge and skills, and how to think about these disruptive techs, will be crucial to RI's future economic and security success in the maritime domain that is connected with other strategic domains: land; air; space; and cyber domain.

3. Conclusion

As the conclusion, emerging & disruptive technologies must be seen as both challenging and opportunistic phenomena to manage and exploit for advancing RI's national interests to achieve the maritime strategic objective in 2045 and to become a winning nation at the global level. We shall not have the preconceived mind pertaining to the globally emerging technologies without first preparing our mind to embrace this phenomenon with a truly strategic mindset: critical; thinking in time; synthesis; systemic; creative; and futuristic. Subsequently, we also need to revamp our ways to educate today's leaders for future global competition and contemporary environment relatively to what PRC, NATO, Quad, FPDA, the Five Eyes, and AUKUS are doing. In this case the RI National Resilience Institute (Lemhannas) will have the important role to play.

4. Recommendation

Based on what we have studied in this short paper, we at least can recommend a number of proposed initiatives that are followed by next research questions. Such initiatives and next research questions pinpoint

directly to the value of human asset within the context of globally emerging technology, regional maritime capability development and the coherence of RI strategic policy response.

a. Proposed Initiatives

1. RI is to deepen the understanding of the implications of disruptive and future tech for adversaries, contenders, and us (vis-à-vis PRC, NATO, Quad, FPDA, the Five Eyes, AUKUS).
2. RI is to introduce the current evolution of AI/ML and its challenges, limitations, and vulnerabilities, and also global competition on quick development of AI for both economic development and military dominance (vis-à-vis PRC, NATO, Quad, FPDA, the Five Eyes, AUKUS)
3. RI is to position AI/ML within larger strategic landscape of securing RI's national interests, and how RI could move forward to become the first to develop certain, niche-based AI/ML tech.
4. RI human asset particularly future strategic leaders in the maritime domain is to stimulate thinking and debate –and logically defend- their thoughts and potential biases on the large issue of AI/ML as a disruptive tech.
5. To create the Joint AI Centre (synergy between National Resilience Institute/Lemhannas, Coordinating Ministry of Maritime and Investment Affairs, MOD/KEMHAN, Cyber State Agency/BSSN, and Cyber Quad-helix) to coordinate efforts in using ML and other AI to maintain a comparative lethality and efficiency edge over other nations economic and military capabilities (vis-a-vis PRC, NATO, Quad, FPDA, the Five Eyes, AUKUS). There are at least five following reasons of why the Joint AI Centre is important:
 - a) AI and ML are topics worth the attention of future strategic leaders. Incorporating new tech into governmental or commercial process requires significant leadership and effective direction that all stakeholders can easily understood.
 - b) AI/ML tech is an integral part of our lives already, and its ubiquity will only increase. Strategic leaders will be called on to evaluate how we can better use the strengths of AI –while acknowledging its weakness- to augment our ability to defend our national interests.
 - c) AI/ML can compute the big data intricately and tremendously without fatigue based on the information humans provide, but AI/ML does not understand strategy.
 - d) AI/ML needs humans to take those insights and determine what role they will play in a larger strategy that accomplishes the identified objectives.

- e) We need to harness its strength and acknowledge its weakness to better use these techs for future success.

b. Next Research Questions

1. Could AI/ML advances truly disrupt? Which applications would be the most disruptive? And over what time frame?
2. To what level do strategic leaders need to understand AI/ML and other emerging/disruptive tech to become effective decisionmakers?
3. Commercial sectors and big tech firms are the forefront AI/ML research. How can we benefit from these advances?
4. Which application of AI provides the most potential for our economic and national security interest?
5. What strategic-level actions RI should do today and in near future (vis-a-vis PRC, NATO, Quad, FPDA, the Five Eyes, AUKUS)?

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
PRESENTATION FILES



INDONESIA'S MARITIME DEFENSE AMIDST REGIONAL GEOPOLITICAL DYNAMICS: A REVIEW OF THE US-CHINA HEGEMONY STRUGGLE

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In late 2013 The "One Belt, One Road" Initiative was proposed


In October 2014 Preparation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Silk Road Infrastructure Fund was started

In February 2015 The leading task force was established

In March 2015 The *Vision and Actions* plan was unveiled



CHINA'S PROPOSED BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE



The "One Belt, One Road" initiative aims to enhance the connectivity of roadside countries

- Focus on land-based and maritime connectivity.
- Cooperation with more than 150 countries in Asia, Europe, Africa and Latin America within the framework of BRI.
- The US is the only country that rejects BRI
- The group of rich countries (G-7) formed the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment to fund infrastructure projects in various countries to stem China's BRI

4

Indo Pacific & US - China Hegemony Competition





The US Indo-Pacific Strategy

China's Belt and Road Initiative

GSOMIA

US Indo-Pacific Strategy

The Quad: A quadrilateral security framework proposed by the US, Japan that would comprise the US, Japan, Australia, and India. Although it's not yet official, the Quad has already conducted a breadth of joint military exercises in the Indo-Pacific.

Quad Plus: An inclusion of S. Korea, Vietnam into the Quad framework (announced by Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Bigun on Aug. 31)

The United States and China are also competing to instill their hegemony in the Asia Pacific Region, a geographical area of waters that stretches from the Indian Ocean, the western and central Pacific Oceans, to the inland seas in the territory of Indonesia and the Philippines called the Indo-Pacific

5

US and China feud

in the dynamics of conflicts in the South China Sea and the East China Sea

Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs)

US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's Visit to Taiwan

6

Geopolitics of AUKUS

The situation in the Indo Pacific is getting more and more hectic with the presence of US-led NATO forces and the presence of a number of defense alliances

The QUAD

AUKUS

7




Indonesia as a middle power country which is also the G-20 Presidency, as well as ASEAN Chair in 2023,

Can contribute to being an effective agent of change with free and active foreign policy tools. As a middle power country, Indonesia has good flexibility in dealing with various domestic, regional, and global problems amidst the complex competition between the US and China.

8

INDONESIA'S ROLE

HARD POWER



MARITIME DEFENSE

The dynamic geopolitical dynamics of the region and faced with Indonesia's position as a maritime pivot requires Indonesia to have a strong maritime defense to anticipate various vulnerabilities that may occur due to the dynamic conditions of the struggle for hegemony between the US and China.

9

G20 PRESIDENT

Strive for the creation of a stable and peaceful Indo-Pacific region (G-20 is a multilateral cooperation group consisting of 19 major countries and the European Union)



The peace mission carried out by President Joko Widodo to Ukraine and Russia is part of President Joko Widodo's strong leadership in promoting diplomacy and being a role model for defense diplomacy in the global era by prioritizing world peace.

10

CHAIRMAN OF ASEAN



President Joko Widodo on the 34th ASEAN SUMMIT in Bangkok Thailand, June 23, 2019

Indonesia's stance is united in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, namely encouraging stability, peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with the vision of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific

11






MARITIME DEFENSE & SECURITY IN GEO V ERA

Dr. Andi Widjanto
**Governor of the National Resilience Institute of
the Republic of Indonesia**
email: aw@lemhannas.go.id




01 Geopolitics I-V



The concepts of geopolitics has evolved in line with historical contexts and technological adoptions. There are four key characteristics of geostrategic thinking. First, it tends to propose an expansionist strategy. Second, contests over specific geographical areas often relate to strategic resources. Third, the ultimate aim is to achieve hegemonic power. Fourth, expansionist strategy often lead into great power wars.

Geo V Era is also indicated by the massive development of technology and the expansion of the threat spectrum. Geopolitics dynamics turn synchronization among geopolitical powers domain to be a vital aspect. Multi domain operation becomes a priority in arranging war strategy to prevent all threats to national sovereignty.


02 Global Logistics Risks



Approximately 80% of global trade is being shipped by sea which describes the essential role of maritime transport. Global Intelligence Services (GIS) identifies eight of world's major choke points. In the context of maritime trade, these are usually straits or canals located at strategic locations and have a high volume of traffic. In practice, these vital points pose several risks, both structural such as the recent Suez Canal blockage, and geopolitical risks. The data above represent threats at eight global choke points which vary in terms of type and degree depending on the location.

Sources: Adopted from Geopolitical Intelligence Services AG, Chatham House, and Visual Capitalist

03 Global Supply Chain: Semiconductor




The graphic shows the **journey of semiconductor industry** that involves six major regions (US, South Korea, Japan, mainland China, Taiwan, and Europe) at different stages from the design to manufacturing process.

Despite the proximity to customers being an essential driver, there are **three additional key factors** influencing the global interdependent structure of semiconductor supply chain, such as global R&D networks, geographic specialization, and trade liberalization. In particular, global trade policies enable physical and intangible flows across semiconductor supply chain.


Sources: BCG and Semiconductor Industry Association

04 US-China Strategic Rivalry

Belt and Road Initiative (China)




Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (US)



A core component of geopolitics in this era lies on the competition of **strategies for connectivity**. Recent strategic rivalries between **U.S. and China** is an illustration of this competition. On its part, Beijing has initiated the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) promoting infrastructure development and placing the country at the heart of Asian trade. On the other hand, the U.S. proposed an Indo-Pacific Economy Framework. The idea is to establish a solid regional economy by enacting structural reform in Asia-Pacific countries.

Sources: Adopted from AMTI and Mercator Institute for China Studies



05 Global Trend: Submarine Development

Type of Submarine

Ballistic Missile Submarine



Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missile Submarine



Nuclear-Powered Attack Submarine



Non-Nuclear Attack Submarines with Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP)




Diesel-Powered Attack Submarine



Source: Adopted from IISS Military Balance 2021

Submarine Producers and Export and/or Licence-Production Contract




Submarine capabilities are an increasing focus of global competition. Submarine forces have a strategic role as a platform of power projection due to their potential for clandestine activity in contested maritime domain.

Moreover, submarines are arguably the most complex naval platform. The number of countries able to design and build modern submarines remains limited. However, several countries, including Indonesia, are in the process of developing their capacity to build submarines, through local production or assembly of foreign collaborative design.

06 Global Trend: Amphibious Ship



Global Principal Amphibious Ship Holdings



Amphibious capabilities provide a versatile and responsive force for crisis response and national defense. Amphibious forces can be deployed in a variety of mission profiles, including assault, raid, withdrawals, and support for other operations


Contested maritime domains have increased the attractiveness of amphibious forces due to their ability to deploy and sustain forces in a wide range of areas. Furthermore, growing significance in disaster-relief missions further drives global ambition in amphibious capabilities

Source: Adopted from IISS Military Balances 2022

07 Global Trend: Anti-Ship Missiles



Operator of Major Surface-Launched Anti-Ship Missile




There has been a proliferation of anti-ship-missile capabilities in more countries. These missiles give states an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capability that is disproportionate to their cost and technical requirement. This means that states with a large supply of anti-ship missiles can easily disrupt important sea lanes used by more powerful navies.

Source: Adopted from IISS Military Balances 2020



08 Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)


Military Operations Comparisons




Multi-Domain Operations propose solutions to solve the problem of a layered standoff. The central idea is the rapid and continuous integration of all domains of warfare to deter adversaries. If deterrence fails, the military penetrates and disintegrates enemy anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) systems; exploits the resulting freedom of maneuver to defeat enemy systems; and consolidates gains to force a return to competition on terms more favorable to our strategic objectives.

Sumber: Adopted from US-Army TRADOC (2021)

MDO Illustration



MDO Solutions



09 Maritime Challenges

Indonesia Maritime Boundaries




Geographical conditions and changes in the characteristics of threat pressure the defense paradigm to focus its transformation on anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy. Securing national strategic infrastructures, such as capital city, natural resources exploration sites, and other vulnerable areas is a priority in this paradigm.

Defense strategy must be adapted to its surrounding terrain. Choke points requires a multi-domain operations strategy. On the other hand, the open sea call for a naval-centric strategy.

10 MDO Implementation

Russia-Ukraine Conflict




Taiwan Strait Crisis




Penetrating and disintegrating enemy A2/AD systems is a key tenet of MDO. The Russia-Ukraine conflict and Taiwan Strait crisis clearly illustrate the MDO approach. Denying sea access is China's and Russia's priority to defeat their adversaries.

11 Military Technologies Projection



Russia Cyber Operations in Ukraine



Cyberspace ought to be a priority component Based on the projection of the military technologies, several sectors will experience revolutionary leaps (disruption) such as artificial intelligence/big data, computer hardware, computer software, offensive cyber operations, the internet of things, and robotics systems Russia-Ukraine conflicts illustrate how cyber capabilities are used effectively as part of a large-scale hybrid warfare campaign

Moreover, the development of sea defense should be directed to exploit multi-domain operations and integrate the cyber sector to actualize total control over the sea.

Sources: Adopted from O'Hanlon (2018) and LAB 45 (2022)

12 Defense Transformation

Defense Development Vision 2045



In order to fulfill the vision of "Indonesia Defense Force" 2045, several stages must be passed. President Megawati has given the foundation for military reform in line with the establishment of the UU TNI. President Yudhoyono has prescribed Minimum Essential Force (Kekuatan Pokok Minimum) 2024 which becomes the basis for defense modernization. Finally, President Jokowi has encouraged investment in the defense area by passing the UU Cipta Kerja. Simultaneously, he also realizes defense transformation through the adoption of the principal military technologies.

Source: LAB 45 (2022)



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MARITIME POLITICAL ECONOMY: CHINA, THE UNITED STATES, AND ASIA

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MARITIME POLITICAL ECONOMY:
CHINA, THE UNITED STATES, AND
ASIA

Timothy R. Heath, PhD
Senior International Researcher
RAND Corporation
Jakarta Global Forum 2022

Asia's Shipping Lanes Vital to Global Economy

- Seaborne trade doubled every decade since 1945
- Approximately 80% of global trade travels by ocean
- Shipbuilding tonnage has doubled since 1990
- Most shipping is containerized



Political Tensions Threaten Asia's Sea Lanes

- China-Taiwan
- North-South Korea
- South China Sea
- East China Sea
- U.S.-China competition



China-Taiwan tensions (Business Insider)



U.S.-China tensions (NYT)



Chinese artificial islands in Spratlys (CNN)



East China Sea (Brookings)

How to Maximize Asia's Economic Potential While Reducing Political Risks?

- At least three contrasting approaches:
 - Belt and Road Initiative (China)
 - Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (USA)
 - Geopolitical Fulcrum (Indonesia)



Maritime Silk Road (China)

- Strategic initiative announced in 2012
- Goal is to build infrastructure to support sea lanes
- Maritime economy development a key part
- Overlaps with Chinese geopolitical ambitions



Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (USA)

- IPEF is expected to have four pillars:
 - fair and resilient trade
 - supply chain resilience
 - infrastructure, clean energy, and decarbonization
 - tax and anti-corruption
- Focused mainly on simplifying trade procedures, less on maritime economy
- Part of U.S. vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”



IPEF leaders Kishida, Biden, Modi (VOA News)

Hedging and Geopolitical Fulcrum (ASEAN)

- ASEAN states divided in their response to BRI, IPEF- some hedging
- Geopolitical Forum put forward in 2014 by Indonesian President Joko Widodo
 - The development of Indonesia’s maritime culture
 - The commitment to protect and develop maritime resources
 - The commitment to develop maritime infrastructure and connectivity
 - Maritime diplomacy to cooperate in maritime affairs
 - Need to build maritime defense capability
- Potential for selective participation in both Chinese, U.S. initiatives

Asia's Choice: Menu or A La Carte?

- "Menu:" Cooperating with just one country (U.S. or China)
 - Less flexibility, more obligation
 - Cooperation could be deeper with one country
 - However, could raise tensions with the rival country
- "A La Carte:" Cooperation with either - depends on issue
 - More flexibility, less obligation
 - Cooperation could be shallower with both
 - However, could raise tensions with both rival countries

Infrastructure

- Geopolitical Forum identified infrastructure as a top need for Indonesia
- China likely the more attractive partner due to its ability to provide generous funding
- U.S. offers some limited assistance with private investor funding



Fisheries

- Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUU) a major threat to Southeast Asian maritime economies
- Chinese fishing boats responsible for much illegal fishing
- U.S. likely the more attractive partner in helping combat IUU



Fisheries (NOAA)

Trade

- China a top trade partner of ASEAN countries
- U.S. and allied countries also important trade partners
- Participation in both BRI and IPEF related initiatives likely most beneficial to ASEAN countries



Shipping containers

Conclusion

- ASEAN can advance its interests by clearly stating its goals regarding maritime domain
- Compartmentalizing cooperation could result in maximum benefits
- U.S., China will likely welcome cooperation in whatever form to promote stability, growth



THE GATHERING STORM: MAINTAINING PROSPERITY AND SECURITY IN ASIA'S MARITIME COMMONS

Alan Dupont, Ph.D.
Founder and CEO of the Cognoscenti Group
email: alan@cognoscenti.global



STORM CLOUDS GATHERING

- The early part of this century unusually benign.
- But geopolitical and economic storm clouds are gathering.
- Is Asia's long peace coming to an end?
- If so how can the gains of the past be preserved in a more turbulent era?

WHY IS THE MARITIME DOMAIN SO IMPORTANT?

- Historically, both economic growth and conflict have taken place on the land.
- The maritime domain is increasingly important strategically and economically because of its resources and ocean highways.
- Asia-Pacific produces 41 percent of global exports.
- Increasing numbers of people fly across the region.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL POWER SHIFTING FROM ATLANTIC TO PACIFIC

Figure 12

Asian economic power is growing, shifting the world's economic center of gravity to the East

Global economic center of gravity



Notes: GDP is measured at purchasing power parity. GDP and population figures are 2015 forecasts.

Sources: Global Policy (Vol. 2, Issue 1), IMF World Economic Outlook, UN Population Division; A.T. Kearney analysis

SOUTH CHINA SEA NOW THE WORLD'S MOST IMPORTANT

- Carries 40 percent of global trade and 50 percent of energy trade.
- Oil carried is more than triple that of the Suez Canal and 15 times greater than Panama Canal.
- More than 70 of China's imported oil and gas passes through the Malacca Strait.
- Trade, commerce and shared security concerns have brought the region together.


A NEW COLD WAR?

- Prosperity and cooperation threatened by rising great power competition.
- Some think we are in the foothills of a new Cold War.
- Others that a hot war in Asia is now imaginable.



TERRITORIAL AND RESOURCE CONFLICTS ON THE RISE

- US-China rivalry is worsening. But its not the primary cause of the deteriorating security environment.
- China's aggressive assertion of its territorial claims using military power, coercion and grey zone tactics is the biggest problem.
- This includes the air. Will China declare an ADIZ over the SCS?



RESOURCE CONFLICTS OVER FISH, ENERGY AND RARE EARTHS

- Beijing views the Western Pacific as a valuable resource that must be exploited for China's benefit.
- Fish, oil, gas and polymetallic nodules have become strategic commodities to be defended at all costs.
- Beijing's zero-sum approach has made it difficult for competing claims to be settled amicably and resources shared.

CHINA'S 864,000 STRONG FISHING FLEET



OIL AND GAS DISPUTES



POLYMETALLIC NODULES AND RARE EARTHS



THE BAD NEWS

- The bad news is that intra-regional maritime dispute resolution has largely failed.
- The SCS Code of Conduct won't improve matters.
- Southeast Asia is once again the cockpit for great power competition.
- ASEAN is no longer in the driving seat of regional and economic affairs.

SOLUTIONS

- Small and medium sized countries must band together in defence of their common interests despite their differences.
- Settling intra-mural disputes within the framework of UNCLOS would pressure China to dial down coercion.
- ASEAN Kecil should be revived and strengthened.
- Words are not enough. Action is required and Indonesia has a leading role to play.
- Diversifying trade and investment is the key to protecting sovereignty and independence.

THE END



CHINA-PHILLIPINES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH CHINA SEA: COOPERATION OR CONFRONTATION?

Alexander Korolev

**Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies
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CHINA-PHILLIPINES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH CHINA SEA: COOPERATION OR CONFRONTATION?

Alexander Korolev, 24.08.2022

Introduction

- The Philippines and China signed a MoU on Cooperation on Oil and Gas Development in November 2018
- MoU may signify their readiness to open avenues of cooperation focusing on joint use and development of the assets of the SCS
- It also indicates the importance of oil exploration companies and public-private partnership in any future joint development

Discussion

- In the context of ocean governance and management, multi-stakeholder participation is a key element of an effective resource management system
- Multi-stakeholder engagement can bring about greater transparency, legitimacy, and trust in the regulatory system and can therefore lead to sustainable compliance
- Proactive participation of ocean resource users is a primary factor for a sustainable environmental management regime

Discussion

- Multi-stakeholder engagement emboldens 'ownership' of the plan, engenders trust among all resource users, and eases conflict
- In the context of joint oil and gas exploration, cross-sectoral ocean governance is a multi-faceted framework in which various stakeholders perform a distinct and critical role in managing and regulating offshore oil and gas activities, directly and indirectly
- Other key stakeholders, such as NGOs, academia, and local communities have important contributions to marine environmental governance such as useful scientific findings, environmental management mechanisms

Recommendations

- A purely commercial agreement between companies may be more feasible to execute and, arguably, may be less susceptible to domestic public opposition than a contentious government-to-government oil and gas exploration agreement
- A commercial arrangement may appear to be an alternative to a formal agreement for exploration between governments, which may be misinterpreted as acknowledging the other country's claims
- Chinese and Philippine oil firms may consider to examine existing commercial agreements in the region such as the joint development agreement between Malaysia and Vietnam

Recommendations

- Companies can also set up an organized management system in the disputed areas, contributing to overall stability in the relations between claimant states
- Philippine and Chinese oil firms should seriously consider the inclusion of norms and best practices on preventing and mitigating marine pollution in their commercial arrangements and potential joint operations in the future
- **Collaboration among fishermen from all claimant states in fisheries co-management can help address marine environmental degradation that undermines their livelihood**

Conclusion

- Resource sharing and co-management must be driven by stakeholders themselves who can commit personal investment, ownership, and buy-in to the process, resulting in more effective behavioral change and compliance
- Unilateral attempts by claimant states to exploit the resources have only resulted in maritime stand-off incidents in the region in recent years, while marine environmental degradation in the SCS has been largely ignored
- Intertwined issues of declining fish stocks, destruction of the marine ecosystems, and potential environmental impact of oil exploitation can be comprehensively addressed through practical stakeholder cooperation and proactive participation

BUILDING A REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE AND A FRAMEWORK OF COOPERATION IN ASIA TOWARDS GLOBAL STABILITY

Ryan Hass
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW Washington, DC 20036 USA
email: Rhass@brookings.edu




The slide features a light blue background with a dark blue header containing the Brookings logo. The title 'Increasing Challenges to International Stability' is prominently displayed in the center. To the left of the title is a bulleted list of six global challenges. To the right of the list are two small images: the top one shows a military tank in a field, and the bottom one shows a person's silhouette looking at a financial market display with red and green lines.

BROOKINGS

Increasing Challenges to International Stability

- Return of Great-Power Competition
- Russia's Invasion of Ukraine
- U.S.-China geopolitical rivalry
- Economic Instability
- Food and Energy Shortages
- Inability to coordinate on COVID-19 and Climate Change

Factors leading to Maritime Rivalry in Asia



- China's Growing Military Presence and Naval Capabilities
 - PLA spent \$230 billion in 2022, compared to \$103 billion in 2012
- U.S. allies and partners strengthening maritime presence
 - AUKUS, QUAD, NATO, etc.
- Expansive and overlapping maritime claims in SCS and ECS
 - Struggle for military advantage over First Island Chain
- Efforts to secure commerce and navigation routes

Recommendations for Building Stability and Lowering Risks

- Forge greater consensus on International Law
- Building Codes of Conduct
- Advance common operating pictures and patterns of coordination
- Engage in dialogue mechanisms to build relationships

Reinforcing Support for International Law

- Actively pursuing a common set of rules and norms for maritime disputes and enforcement
- Contest excessive maritime claims through bilateral and multilateral channels
- Role of UNCLOS
- Upholding the principle of freedom of navigation and secure sea lines of communication



Advance codes of conduct to bolster operational safety and coordination



- Code for Unplanned Encounters (CUES)
 - 2001 MALINDO
 - 2014 U.S.-China Rules of Behavior
- Need for a common understanding for “safe distance” between vessels
- No legally binding rules for military aircraft encounters

BROOKINGS

6

Support efforts to develop a common operating picture and patterns of coordination



- Information Fusion Centre (IFC)
- Combatting illegal and unreported fishing
- Coordinating maritime disaster relief
- Encourage transparent joint natural resource exploration

BROOKINGS

7

Expand and regularize dialogue mechanisms and other exchanges to build relationships

- Foster regular and consistent dialogues to deliver practical progress on common security challenges
- Multilateral maritime forums play a key role as a neutral ground for U.S. and China
 - Meet to discuss key challenges with one another as well as regional and global actors
- Overlapping regional dialogues could be sequenced to maximize impacts



BROOKINGS

8

Conclusion

- Great Power Rivalry between the U.S. and China intersects most directly within the maritime domain of the Western Pacific
- Magnifies importance of lowering risk of conflict and reducing risks of escalatory incidents
- Architecture that supports cooperation in region requires maritime security
- How to undertake practical efforts to promote stability?
 - Forge greater consensus around international law
 - Build up codes of conduct
 - Advance practical actions to create greater unity of effort & common operating picture
 - Promote dialogues to build relations among key actors

BROOKINGS

9

THANK YOU!



GEOPOLITICS LANSCAPE IN AN ARTIFICIAL WORLD: ADVANCING MARITIME TECHNOLOGY IN GEO-STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

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**GEOPOLITICS LANSCAPE IN AN
ARTIFICIAL WORLD :**

**ADVANCING MARITIME TECHNOLOGY IN
GEO-STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE**

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Lemhannas RI
Trisakti University
dadan@trisakti.ac.id

**Jakarta
GEOPOLITICAL FORUM**

August 2022

Agenda

- Introduction** (Icon: Gears) Geopolitical dynamics the shape and direction of future development
- Role of Technology** (Icon: Microscope) The role of technology and its influence on geopolitics
- Maritime Technology** (Icon: Ship) The Role of maritime technology in increasing competitiveness
- Final Note** (Icon: Document) Where should we go: recommendations

Background

Technology as infrastructure is seen as a factor that can increase the acceleration of economic development.

By using advanced technology, the production process will be more effective, efficient and productive and global supply chain can be expanded.



Technology can also be seen as a commodity. High-tech products certainly have high competitiveness X



Competition in technology will have an impact on geopolitical dynamics

Dynamic






Internet User

Internet users per 100 inhabitants

Source: International Telecommunication Union



Democracies need data sharing

Data is one of the most valuable assets



The creation, use and control of data will be a significant determinant of future politics and economies



The pervasive collection and use of data by public and private entities affects individual decision-making, human rights, group action and social cohesion.

Robin Niblett, Director and Chief Executive, Chatham House,
Vera Songwe, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)

The new map of power in the modern world

The power of modern world is no longer defined by geography, by control of territory or oceans but rather by control over flows of people, goods, money and data and by exploiting the networks technology creates.



Every connection between nations from energy flows to Information Technology standards becomes a tool of geopolitics.

(Mark Leonard, Director, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR))



technologic algap is an influential factor in geopolitical change

The widening gap between the nature of transnational communication and the growing resistance to it from nation states gives rise to new geopolitics





Underdeveloped countries and developing countries are now very dependent on the technology of developed countries

(Mark Leonard, Director, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR))



Lethal

©DAVEGRANLUND.COM

Every day new technologies are born. We have now entered the digital age, and the Internet of Things.

TOP 10 WORST BOTNET COUNTRIES ▲

1	China	871793
2	United States of America	436008
3	India	431101
4	Indonesia	184397
5	Thailand	180649
6	Brazil	113882
7	Algeria	108208
8	Pakistan	89987
9	Viet Nam	84527
10	Turkey	72135

SPAMHAUS TECHNOLOGY

LIVE BOTNET THREATS WORLDWIDE

The IP address locations of servers used to control computers infected with malware

22:22:04
2022年8月12日

● Locations with the most intense bot activity
● Command & Control botnet servers

Number of active bots in the last 24 hrs
536,900

Choke botnets and automatically prevent users from accessing malware dropper and phishing sites with DNS Firewall Threat Feeds.

Find out more

Share

Spamhaus researchers work constantly to update threat intelligence on your behalf.

About Spamhaus


TOP 10 WORST BOTNET COUNTRIES ▲

1	China	871793
2	United States of America	436008
3	India	431101

TOP 10 WORST BOTNET ISPS ▲

1	amazon.com	310704
2	airtel.in	256673
3	disneyhdz	

Data from the Spamhaus Threat Feeds



- The Question
- Toward A Contemporary Geopolitics

The Role of maritime technology in increasing competitiveness


Strengthening its maritime power is one of the power that will support the global economic

Digitization is the primary factor in the shipping industry's potential to recover after the Covid-19 pandemic has occurred, improve the resilience of the global supply chain, and usher in a new age

Belt and Road Initiative :
Rivalry China VS America

China's Belt and Road Initiative connects all of the world's economic centers; this line connects land and sea

The Belt and One Road Initiative combines multiple economic corridors: the land economic silk road and the maritime economic silk road.



Trade war became Technology War

Rivalry in social media



US officials estimate the platform poses a potential threat to American security, because the data it collects can be used by the Chinese government for profiling US public behavior

Technology on the one hand will increase convenience for humans, but on the other hand it can be used as a political tool.

Maritime Technology

A nation who success in creating powerful maritime technology will be the ruler of the world

1. Artificial Intelligence,
2. Sensor Technology,
3. Robotics and 3D Printing,
4. Big Data and IoT,
5. Autonomous Control
6. Augmented Reality
7. Ship Propulsion Systems and
8. Advanced Materials

Conclusion

1. Technology provides great benefits for human life, but technology can also increase the dependence of a state on other state.
2. Technology, like a two-edged sword, has two flip side. Because of its nearly uncontrolled development, technology has created doubt about humanity's destiny.
3. As a result of technological development, there is a risk that people as individuals will lose their identity or become increasing reliant on the global network controlled by the rulers and administrators of technology itself in the future
4. Technology is a ways for improving human welfare, but technology can also be used as a tool to dominate and control other countries

Conclusion

5. A nation who success in creating powerful maritimetechnology will be the ruler of the world
6. Technology should be used as a mean to improve welfareand not as a tool for oppression.
7. Strengthening the national interests of each country must befollowed by respecting the national interests of other countries.
8. The principle of strategic partnership needs to be the mainguideline, cooperation is carried out based on mutual agreement and fulfillment of common interests


Closing

Nobody knows what may happen in the future, but we must continue to strive to live a dignified life. The wheel must keep turning, and life must remain meaningful. Let us, as human beings, establish a civil society as Mahatma Gandhi mention that




Be the change that you wish to see in the world

(Mahatma Gandhi)




BUILDING A REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE AND A FRAMEWORK OF COOPERATION IN ASIA TOWARDS GLOBAL STABILITY

Prof. Tirta Nugraha Mursitama, Ph.D.
Vice Rector for Research and Technology Transfer
BINUS University
email: tmursitama@binus.edu



Technological changes not only have an impact on changing the way of working,
but also change the way of thinking

People
Innovation
Excellence



AGENDA


ANALOG culture has been transformed into DIGITAL culture

People
Innovation
Excellence



How do advances in maritime technology contribute to a secure and balanced global architecture in a fragmented world today?

People
Innovation
Excellence





TOWARDS A CONTEMPORARY GEOPOLITICS?





• Time-bound vs Space vs Technology-based GeoPolitics

Time-bound	Technology Advancement	"Metaverse World" etc
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continuation from the past, chronologically • Same actors and national interests • Different mechanism of cooperation or conflict 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Digital technology creates "Space" • "Digital territory" • GIS & remote sensing • Artificial Intelligence (AI), Machine Learning • Blockchain Technology 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Metaverse: New Space? Sovereignty? • Geopolitics of "Metaverse"? • Digital technology mastery • Regulation vs Innovation

People
Innovation







THANK YOU

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HP: 0817835055

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Excellence



**THE HUMAN ASSET WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF
GLOBALLY EMERGING TECHNOLOGY, REGIONAL
MARITIME CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT AND THE
COHERENCE OF REPUBLIC INDONESIA (RI)
STRATEGIC POLICY RESPONSE**

**R. M. Wibawanto Nugroho Widodo, Ph.D., M.A. (Brad.), M.A.,
War College Dip. (NDU), M.P.P. (GMU), Ph.D. (Exon.)
Deputy Head of National Defense and Security Affairs
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**THE HUMAN ASSET WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALLY EMERGING TECHNOLOGY,
REGIONAL MARITIME CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT AND THE COHERENCE OF REPUBLIC
INDONESIA (RI) STRATEGIC POLICY RESPONSE**

R.M. Wibawanto Nugroho Widodo, Ph.D.
Deputy Head of National Defense and Security Affairs, IKAL Strategic Center
RI National Resilience Institute Alumni Association (IKAL)

Jakarta Geopolitical Forum VI/2022
RI National Resilience Institute

August 25th, 2022

8/24/2022

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Content

- I. Thesis
- II. Globally Emerging Technology
- III. The Maritime Capability Development
- IV. The Coherence of RI Maritime Strategy toward 2045
- V. Key Takeaways
- VI. Conclusion
- VII. Recommendation

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I. Thesis

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Thesis Questions and Policy Statements

1) How RI shall take the most out of globally emerging technology for her maritime capability development that in its turn will contribute to the coherence of RI's strategic policy response?, 2) what does constitute the maritime capability development?, 3) what does constitute the coherence of RI's strategic policy response within the maritime domain?

- 1) Given RI's non-alliance defense policy, RI shall accelerate her readiness to adopt new technology available by constructively engaging the global markets based on constructed common values and interests;
- 2) RI shall give the priority to the development of national maritime infrastructures and regionally respectable naval forces (2022–2045);
- 3) RI shall ensure the fundamental elements in policy coherence that covers the sound-basis and strategically future oriented policy (2022–2045), and the acceleration of formulation and implementation of the respected policy through a sophisticated policy-making process that includes all significant variables in the respected policy that is suitable for preparing RI in the cooperative, competitive, and conflictual setting.

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4

Thesis Questions and Policy Statements

At the bottom line, answers to these three questions depend on RI human asset as the lynchpin variable to take the most out of globally emerging technologies to develop RI maritime capability that in turn will contribute to the likely achievement of the RI maritime strategy toward 2045.

The data in this presentation is primarily drawn from the open source while using the policy as the unit of analysis. The analysis is mostly qualitative with some quantitative analysis to supplement the qualitative one so that contributing to the research question of this panel: “How would the advancing maritime technology coincidentally contribute to secured and balanced global architecture under such fragmented situation?”

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II. Globally Emerging Technologies

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Definitions

Emerging technology: a term generally used to describe a new technology, but it may also refer to the continuing development of and existing technology. Alternatively, it is an innovation that significantly modifies the way that consumers, industries, business, or the military operate. A disruptive tech quickly devastates the systems or habits it replaces due to its superior attributes (ex: e-commerce, online news sites, ride-sharing apps, and GPS). At one time, the automobile, electricity service, TV, and atomic weapons were considered disruptive tech.

Top 10 Emerging Tech

Rapid Tech that changes war (2018 NDS):

- Advanced computing Big data analytics Artificial Intelligence (AI)
- including Machine Learning/ML
- Autonomy (lethal autonomous weapons systems)
- Robotics
- Directed Energy (weapons)Hyper-sonics (weapons) Biotechnology
-

(CompTIA Emerging Tech Community): the character of

- AI
- 5G (fifth-generation tech standard for broadband cellular)
 - Internet of Things
 - Serverless computing
 - Biometrics
- Augmented reality/virtual reality
 - Blockchain
 - Robotics
- Natural language processing
- Quantum computing (CQ)

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III. The Maritime Capability Development

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INDIKATOR KEBERHASILAN
menjadikan Indonesia Negara Maritim yang KUAT

TUJUAN DAN INDIKATOR TUJUAN	SASARAN DAN INDIKATOR SASARAN	AGENDA/PROGRAM KERJA	INDIKATOR AGENDA/PROGRAM
TS-01: Menjadikan Indonesia Negara Maritim yang KUAT , yaitu Negara dengan struktur ekonomi maritim yang kuat, yang tumbuh pesat dengan adil, merata dan berkelanjutan , sebagai pencipta kesejahteraan nasional. 1. PDR Maritim (phase, gross, PDR) 2. Indeks Rasio Gas	SS-01: Terwujudnya pemerataan Pembangunan dan hasil-hasilnya, dengan indikator: 1. Disparitas Ekstensi antar Kawasan (Varian Coesen PCKRI) 2. Indeks Kinerja Logistik	AP-01: Pengembangan Sarana Prasarana Maritim AP-02: Peningkatan Konektivitas Maritim	1) Indeks Disparitas Pembangunan Maritim (Investasi, Sarpras Maritim) 2) Indeks Daya Saing Infrastruktur Kemaritiman 3) % Biaya Logistik Terhadap PDR 4) Dwellling Time Nasional
	SS-02: Terwujudnya perairan Indonesia yang berair, sehat dan produktif , dengan indikator: 3. Indeks Kesehatan Laut Indonesia	AP-03: Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Alam dan Lingkungan Perairan	5) Produktivitas Perairan 6) Indeks Kualitas LH (Air)
	SS-03: Meningkatnya produktivitas dan nilai tambah barang dan jasa Kemaritiman, dengan indikator: 4. Nilai Tambah Barang dan Jasa	AP-04: Pengembangan Industri Maritim	7) Neraca Ekspor/Impor 8) Indeks Daya Saing Industri

marves Maritim 2045

Capability Development Indicators in terms of RI as the Strong Maritime State and as the Globally Competitive Maritime Nation.

INDIKATOR KEBERHASILAN
menjadikan Indonesia Negara Maritim yang KUAT

TUJUAN DAN INDIKATOR TUJUAN	SASARAN DAN INDIKATOR SASARAN	AGENDA/PROGRAM KERJA	INDIKATOR AGENDA/PROGRAM
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marves Maritim 2045

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
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IV. The coherence of RI maritime strategy toward 2045

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Strategic Mapping and Roadmap of Maritime Strategy toward 2045.

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V. Key Takeaways

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The Human Asset as the Lynchpin Variable

1. The future strategic leadership of RI maritime domain shall understand the vocabulary and concepts behind the emerging (and potentially disruptive) technologies of AI and ML that impacts the dynamics in maritime domain.
2. The future strategic leadership of RI maritime domain shall understand the current and potential future applications and capabilities, as well as some of the limitations and concerns, of AI and ML within the context of maritime domain and its relationship with other strategic domains: land; air; space; and cyber domain.

Assumption: a low level of prior knowledge about AI/ML.



The future strategic leadership of RI maritime domain is to familiarize with innovation and leadership through change, where RI's future strategic leaders can anticipate and lead rapid adaptation and innovation during a dynamic period of acceleration in the rate of change in warfare under global competition and disruptive technology. That said, leveraging the educational system by providing RI human asset with the baseline knowledge and skills, and how to think about these disruptive tech, will be crucial to RI's future economic and security success in the maritime domain that is interconnected to other strategic domains: land; air; space; and cyber domain.

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VI. Conclusion

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Conclusion

Globally emerging & disruptive technologies must be seen as both challenging and opportunistic phenomena to manage and exploit for advancing RI's national interests to achieve the maritime strategic objective in 2045 and to become a winning nation at the global level. We shall not have the preconceived mind pertaining to the globally emerging technologies without first preparing our mind to embrace this phenomenon with a truly strategic mindset: critical; thinking in time; synthesis; systemic; creative; and futuristic.

Subsequently, we also need to revamp our ways to educate today's leaders for future global competition and contemporary environment relatively to what PRC, NATO, Quad, FPDA, the Five Eyes, and AUKUS are doing. In this case the RI National Resilience Institute (LEMHANNAS) will have the important role to play.

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VII. Recommendation

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Proposed Initiatives (Cognitive Wise)

1. RI is to deepen the understanding of the implications of disruptive and future tech for adversaries, contenders, and ourselves (vis-à-vis PRC, NATO, Quad, FPDA, the Five Eyes, AUKUS).
2. RI is to introduce the current evolution of AI/ML and its challenges, limitations, and vulnerabilities, and also global competition on quick development of AI for both economic development and military dominance (vis-à-vis PRC, NATO, Quad, FPDA, the Five Eyes, AUKUS)
3. RI is to position AI/ML within larger strategic landscape of securing RI's national interests, and how RI could move forward to become the first to develop certain, niche-based AI/ML tech.
4. RI is to stimulate thinking and debate –and logically defend- their thoughts and potential biases on the large issue of AI/ML as a disruptive tech.

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Prospective Initiatives (Organizational Wise)

5. To create the Joint AI Centre (synergy between National Resilience Institute/LEMHANNAS, Coordinating Ministry of Maritime and Investment Affairs, MOD/KEMHAN, Cyber State Agency/BSSN, and Cyber Quad-helix) to coordinate efforts in using ML and other AI to maintain a comparative lethality and efficiency edge over other nations economic and military capabilities (vis-a-vis PRC, NATO, Quad, FPDA, the Five Eyes, AUKUS). Why?
 - a. AI and ML are topics worth the attention of future strategic leaders. Incorporating new tech into governmental or commercial process requires significant leadership and effective direction that all stakeholders can easily understand.
 - b. AI/ML tech is an integral part of our lives already, and its ubiquity will only increase. Strategic leaders will be called on to evaluate how we can better use the strengths of AI – while acknowledging its weakness- to augment our ability to defend our national interests.
 - c. AI/ML can compute the big data intricately and tremendously without fatigue based on the information humans provide, but AI/ML does not understand strategy.
 - d. AI/ML needs humans to take those insights and determine what role they will play in a larger strategy that accomplishes the identified objectives.
 - e. We need to harness its strength and acknowledge its weakness to better use these tech for future success.

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Next Research Questions

1. Could AI/ML advances truly disrupt? Which applications would be the most disruptive?, and over what time frame?
2. To what level do strategic leaders need to understand AI/ML and other emerging/disruptive tech to become effective decision makers?
3. Commercial sectors and big tech firms are the forefront AI/ML research. How can we benefit from these advances?
4. Which application of AI provides the most potential for our economic and national security interest?
5. What strategic-level actions RI should do today and in near future (vis-a-vis PRC, NATO, Quad, FPDA, the Five Eyes, AUKUS)?

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**Who Thinks Win, Who Dares Win.
The Winning Nation is the Thinking and Daring One.**

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THE REPUBLIC INDONESIA
presents
**JAKARTA GEOPOLITICAL
FORUM VI/2022**
Geomartime: Chasing the Future Global Stability
24 - 25 AGUSTUS 2022

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CLOSING REMARKS
Dr. ANDI WIDJAJANTO
THE GOVERNOR OF THE NATIONAL RESILIENCE INSTITUTE OF
THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
AT
THE JAKARTA GEOPOLITICAL FORUM VI/2022

Jakarta, 24 August 2022

**Para Pembicara dan Hadirin Sekalian,
Ibu-Ibu dan Bapak-bapak.**

Setelah mengikuti dan mencermati jalannya acara yang berlangsung dua hari ini, banyak substansi dan konsepsi pemikiran strategis yang telah disampaikan oleh para narasumber.

Forum Geopolitik Jakarta ke-6 ini telah menuju ke arah yang lebih baik, dimana kita bisa mencermati analisa serta pandangan tentang geopolitik dunia ke depan yang mengarah kepada pencarian keseimbangan baru khususnya pada aspek maritim, dimana dunia sudah saatnya meminimalisir resiko konflik geopolitik yang sifatnya militer dan memaksimalkan kompetisi maupun kerja sama yang sehat untuk memanfaatkan maritim sebagai pusat konektivitas dan produktivitas perekonomian.

Kerja sama tersebut tentunya perlu ditopang dengan kemajuan teknologi, optimalisasi energi yang ramah lingkungan, serta kesepahaman strategis, saling pengertian antar pihak demi terciptanya stabilitas global yang berkelanjutan.

Lemhannas RI sangat berterima kasih atas partisipasi pemikiran Bapak/Ibu sekalian, semoga Tuhan Yang Maha Kuasa merahmati dan melindungi kita semua.

Demikian hal-hal yang dapat saya sampaikan, akhirnya pada hari ini, Kamis, 25 Agustus 2022, **Forum Geopolitik Jakarta ke-6** dengan tema "**Geo-Maritime: Mengejar Masa Depan Stabilitas Global**" saya nyatakan ditutup.

Terima Kasih.

Wassalamu'alaikum Warohmatullahi Wabarakatuh. Shalom. Om Santi Santi Santi Om.

QUESTION-ANSWER

DAY 1/ 24 August 2022

Maritime Defense and Security in Dynamic Uncertainties

1. Host:

Mr. Roggeveen you mentioned about the need for a balancing role and Pak Andi mentioned about the need for a connector role. Those two are quite different in my point of view but I think the the objective is more or less the same, we want to manage we want to navigate the geopolitical shift and also the risk of competition between superpower in a way that the global security and stability could be achieved and it also serves the interests of medium and small powers in the region.

[Uh] Mr Roggeveen can you elaborate more on the role of balancer as you mentioned before. How do you envision who is supposed to be the Pioneer? I know you mentioned about Indonesia what makes you sure about Indonesia what Indonesia can offer by being a balancer?

Sam Roggeveen:

Thank you I think the first thing I'd say about the necessity for balancing the objective. I'm sure in this country and throughout the region and certainly in Australia that our relations with China are fundamentally about issues of mutual benefit and that those are going to be largely economic issues and that disputes ought to be resolved through cooperation and compromise. Now of course that is not possible or in fact it's extremely unlikely that relations will be based on cooperation and compromise if one of the parties is militarily dominant over the other.

In a position of military dominance any country, not just China but any great power that is militarily dominant over other countries is going to be tempted to use that power to coerce and to intimidate smaller Powers. Goodness knows the United States is guilty of this in the past and we should expect that China will behave the same way if it ever becomes a militarily dominant power in this part of the world; that is simply how great Powers behave. So I don't think it's realistic as I said in my paper for [uh] any country in Southeast Asia or or even southeast Asia collectively to aim for China not to be the leading power in this region.

China inevitably will become the leading power but what is realistic is and what is in fact I think urgent and very necessary is for Southeast Asian countries led by Indonesia to stop China from becoming the dominant military power. In this part of the region now that is an achievable objective and I think it is the the unavoidable basis upon which [uh] we can hope to have constructive Cooperative relations with Indonesia if there is not a balance of military power then China as I said like all great Powers will be tempted to use its power to intimidate and to coerce smaller Nations. So I think a military balance between China and the region is absolutely essential to making sure that uh you know military issues can actually be pushed to the sidelines.

But if there's not a balance if there is military domination, then I fear that military issues will become much more Central and it will not serve the interests of Indonesia or or the rest of Southeast Asia.

2. Host:

How do you foresee the Southeast Asian countries achieving the so-called military balance, what kind of military balance are we talking about which is realistic and achievable in the near future?

Collin Koh Swee Lean, Ph.D.:

[Uh] Curie thanks so much for the question when we talk about balance, I think it's important to draw the distinction between the qualitative aspects of military buildup and the qualitative aspects of relationship buildup. I think in terms of the defense spending as well as the quantity of Acquisitions and the rate of acquisition I don't think it is possible for Southeast Asian countries to match any of the extra Regional Powers surrounding us. However, there's always what we call the same unique type of balance and not the same as our balance right and what I'm referring to earlier was you know the asymmetric relationship between Southeast Asian parties and extraterritorial Powers. But within Southeast Asia you know, when we talk about a number of these countries and their military sharing more or less, I say Baseline capabilities or capacity then it is possible to attain some form of balance in a more comprehensive manner both quantitative and qualitative.

However, if we talk about balancing against extra original powers like China now, I think the way to go forward is to rely on two aspects. One is certainly to rely on qualitative buildup. We are not going to look at you

know the one for one you know comparison with China in terms of ship, ship for ship, aircraft for aircraft, tank for tank that's not possible. But it should use appropriate strategies as well as concept of operations as well as the right for structure consisting of what I will see as predominantly the Nile type capabilities, or you know in other words Southeast Asia's own version of the anti-access and area denial capabilities. I think it is possible to maintain some form of a qualitative balance of sorts. Or if you don't call that balance that at least you know in true pragmatic terms it means that you know possibly you know these capabilities might be able to make the potential aggressor which is stronger think twice in terms of the cost that you will have to pay right. So that is one, the second is that of course this is already being placed for decades in Southeast Asian countries that have been engaging in defense and security cooperation with extra Regional Powers. So that sort of external balancing is still going to be the case and in fact if you have seen the tone of my presentation earlier, I think due to the post covid-19 and post recruit Ukraine war fiscal realities at least in the forcible future we're going to see countries in Southeast Asia going to rely more on the external balancing expert. And in fact, in recent years we have seen a more intensified speed of such activities taking place and that truly reflects the trend that we just discussed earlier. Thank you.

3. Host:

Allow me to ask Pak Marsetio. Southeast Asia as mentioned by Dr KO we will have difficulties in matching the capabilities of other great power military so balanced military must be operationalized in such a way that it would be achievable by South Asian countries and also for Indonesia um another aspect of balancing would be cooperation.

How do you assess the cooperation within South Asia? You as a former scholar Soldier and sailor but you have many experiences and navy is actually one of the, one of the Forefront in our defense diplomacy. So how do you see the cooperation being enhanced in the future to create a balanced military in the region. What is the opportunity and what are the challenges for Southeast Asian military cooperation?

Admiral (Ret) Prof. Dr. Marsetio:

Okay. Terima Kasih mbak Curie. Jadi kalau kita bicara how the role of Indonesian Navy, to maintain the stability in Southeast Asia. When we talk about Southeast Asia, it means we talk about the role of the Asian.

So I would like to highlight that, uh, jadi mbak pada 3 hari lalu. Jadi baru saja berakhir dilaksanakan Attentive Navy Meeting di Bali.

Jadi dalam Asean Navy Meeting itu adalah merupakan momentum juga, jadi momentum bagi navy bagaimana kita memerankan. Jadi mereka hadir semua negara-negara di Asean. Disitulah disampaikan bagaimana pandangan-pandangan Indonesia tentang tadi yang disampaikan oleh Mas Andi bagus sekali itu. Menyadarkan kita kedepan kalau kita ingin mempunyai peran di dalam menjaga, tadi disampaikan juga balancing, membuat keseimbangan. Memang kalau kita lihat kawasan Asia Pasifik kemudian Laut Cina Selatan. Intinya adalah bagaimana memperebutkan hegemoni antara Amerika dengan Cina. Jadi kita sudah bahas China dengan BRI nya 2017 yang diawali dengan 2013. Kemudian bagaimana peran Indonesia, kemudian pemerintah dalam hal ini juga kita sepakat bahwa untuk meningkatkan peran diplomasi maritim kita. Nah ini juga tentunya diperankan oleh Angkatan Laut. Bagaimana amerika untuk mengajak negara-negara di kawasan Asia Pasifik. Tidak ada satupun negara yang tidak ikut latihan di bawah [ee] kode operasi. Yang pertama adalah terkait dengan Rimpac, It's every two years.

Before 2015, China also fought together with the huge maneuver. It has more than 200 workshops.

It means that tahun 2015 bagaimana Amerika mengajak semua negara di dunia. Artinya dia ingin mempengaruhi kekuatannya dengan melaksanakan latihan Rim Pacific. Mulai 2015, Cina udah nggak diundang. Karena dianggap wah ini kalau diundang berarti bapak ibu sekalian kita lihat bagaimana kebijakan maritim Cina. Cina, semua kebijakan politiknya, kebijakan maritimnya, kebijakan untuk membesarkan coast guardnya. Inilah hebatnya Cina. Dia mengambil, karena sebelum Covid, lebih dari 350 siswa yang mereka ikut di dalam lembaga-lembaga pendidikan. Ikut disekolah-sekolah top di US, Harvard, MIT, dan seterusnya. Mulai tahun 2016, nggak boleh lagi sekolah dan latihan Rimpac. Kenapa? Karena semua dikloning. Juga bagaimana persoalan terkait dengan konsep-konsep. Seperti yang disampaikan tadi, kemudian bagaimana Cina, Amerika punya coast guard. Tadi yang disampaikan, konsep coast guardnya adalah sama dengan konsep navy-nya; beyond the horizon. Kalau Indonesia kan dengan mempertahankan, kita kan bukan negara aggressor. Sehingga kedepan bahwa Amerika akan tetap menggunakan konsep ini.

Dia menyatukan armada ketujuh dengan armada kelima. Kenapa? Amerika menyatukan, kita lihat, kapan 2020. 2030, tampilkan 2050. 2013, Xin Jinping dia punya konsep yang sangat luar biasa dan dia dianggap sebagai meneruskan great konsepnya dari Ling Xiaoping. Makanya presiden Jiping diangkat sebagai presiden seumur hidup. 2018, amerika menyatukan armada kelima dengan armada ketujuh. 2019 akhir, Cina membuat pangkalan terbesarnya di luar Cina. Itu adalah suatu lompatan yang di luar biasa.

Tujuannya apa, pada saat itu Cina sudah punya satu kapal induk. Walaupun kapal induknya masih 45 hari di laut. Karena kalau kita lihat kapal induk nuklir dia bisa tahan 25 tahun di laut tanpa refill.

Kedepan bagaimana? Cina sudah merencanakan membangun 2 kapal induk nuklir. Artinya, balance of power di kekuatan asia pasifik ini konsep-konsep pengembangan kekuatan maritim dari Cina, dia mengimbangi dengan amerika. Artinya apa? Untuk mengontrol kekuatan Amerika menjadi satu. Kalau kita lihat kawasan Asia Pasifik. Mulai dari dia bangun pulau ferry cross yang menjadi naval base terbesar di Laut Cina Selatan. Kemudian kita masuk ke bawah, kita lihat Myanmar. Myanmar sekarang sudah 100% ekonominya dikontrol oleh Cina.

Saya kemarin baru saja kontak dengan Myanmar, bahwa [ee] pipa-pipa gas, pipa-pipa minyak, sudah dialirkan dari Timur Tengah. Dari negara-negara sekutunya Cina, kemudian masuk laut Myanmar. Nggak perlu lagi muter lewat South Malaka. Makanya nggak perlu lagi membangun terusan. Artinya Myanmar dipegang. Kemudian Sri Lanka, ekonominya sudah digadaikan pada Cina. Kita lihat lagi ke Pakistan, dia demikian juga. Nigeria, semua negara-negara sekarang sudah Afrika, sudah semua dari kontrol, dari Cina. Nah inilah bagaimana dunia ini saat ini kita akan melihat. Bagaimana kita memainkan peran.

Kebijakan pemerintah, pak jokowi mengajak negara-negara hadir ke G20. Artinya apa, kita memiliki peran yang luar biasa. Tinggal bagaimana Indonesia ini me-redesign sisi pertahanannya sesuai dengan yang disampaikan tadi. Demikian mbak.

4. Host:

Before I open the Q&A session for the audience. Governor, the last, and hopefully the most difficult question for you. How can we pioneer the

role of being the connector between the two different architectures in the Pacific and BLI. What's the opportunity for us, and what do you think will be the challenges that we need to overcome? You mention technological comments, questions will probably be raised about that by the audience. So I will just focus on those two questions?

Dr. Andi Widjajanto:

I think Indonesia experiences hegemonic transition in a very hard way. Most of our liberation movement back in 1930's 1940's culminated due to hegemonic transition in the world. Due to the competition, especially in the Pacific War between the US and Japan. Indonesia studied how the military maneuver of Japan in December 1941 until April 1942 to invade our Nusantara Island at that time. So we learn a lot from that experience. Until now we realise that we don't have the capacity to significantly build up our maritime power as Colin says, to compete with other major powers in the region. It is not realistic for us to aim as, for example, the third power between the US and China. It will not be realistic. It is also not realistic for Indonesia for example to initiate a kind of new alliance between Southeast Asia countries, to compete with the US alliance network to compete with China's presence in the South China Sea for the next 30 years, which will not be possible for us. So we need to find another way. Normatively, if we have to address the question of how to mitigate the competition between two big powers. Then our first normative answer is return to our independence and active foreign policy doctrine. That will be our first normative question. This doctrine will lead only to one policy; balancing. This doctrine cannot give another option. Only have one logical policy of balancing. The second option will be strengthening Asean centrality. That will be our second answer. To strengthen Asean centrality for example, to handle the situation in the South China Sea. Then, we rely on Asean mechanism, and we rely on the OC, we rely on out of conduct, we rely on the South China sea and so on. And then we realise it will need a long process but that is Asean. Asean is very important in the diplomatic process. The result may come in the next 10 or 20 years. The third answer for us will be focusing on a low technical functional cooperation between countries. Not on the high politic, highly sensitive issues. So low technical political functional cooperation/corporation. Low technical political functional cooperation, one of the issues will be maritime cooperation, for example upgrading/accelerating the process of digital network between ports, Pak Marsetio is one of the commissioners of our Pelindung. So he clearly

understands the requirement for us to digitalize our port and not only digitalize but also to create a connection between major ports in the region. And the last insight for me will be if we see the capability of naval projection in the world. The only country that has a global naval projection is the US. You can trace the route for example of USS Ronald Reagan. From Hawaii-Guam-Japan, can be in Singapore, back to South China Sea, Thailand, back to Singapore, Malaka Street, Diego Garcia, Mediterranean. Only the US can have that kind of manoeuvre capability. China, mainland China-Hainan-south china sea-return to hainan back to mainland china, that's it right now. Indonesia, Tanjung Perak, Tanjung Priok, North Natuna return to Tanjung Priok, Makassar, that's it. We cannot protect the South China Sea because we do not have any logistic network and infrastructure to support the presence of our ship beyond our territorial sea. Only the US can manoeuvre freely globally. They really have the freedom of military manoeuvre globally, only the US. China right now doesn't have that kind of capability. So, the next war between China and the US, the worst scenario in the South China Sea will be in Asia. Why? Because it cannot project its power to Guam. China cannot project its power to attack the Australian navy in Darwin, they can't. They do not have the infrastructure. But in the US, they can. They can attack Balikpapan because they have support from Darwin and Singapore. But China, they're not in the position to do that kind of maritime projection. That's why right now the biggest power is still the United States. In the theory of hegemonic transition, we are going to differentiate two blocks. Status quo against revisionism. Right now, the status quo is the US and revisionist is China. Logical policy when you have this kind of competition between status quo and revisionist. Only two with status quo balancing with revisionism against the status quo. Our foreign policy dictates we don't have a bandwagoning policy. Active policy means balancing, not bandwagoning. That's already creating a kind of limitation of our strategic option in the next future. Thank you.

Mr. Sam Roggeveen

I very much agree about the point that you make or about the limits of Chinese power projection capabilities. I very much agree, and about the importance of basing arrangements for the United States to project its Maritime power. And I think there's a lesson in that for Southeast Asia, which is that for China to become [uh] you know a really powerful Regional Maritime force.

It doesn't just need the military capabilities which it is already building and which we cannot stop it from building. It also needs bases in the region and so I think that needs to be absolutely the highest priority for Australia as well in the Pacific Islands region but for Indonesia and for Southeast Asian countries generally to delay and frustrate Chinese Ambitions for military bases in this part of the world. That is a core priority, but it is not a military Mission it is overwhelmingly a diplomatic and a task of statecraft for this region not not a military task. And that should be a focus for all of us including Australia very much.

5. Major General Tri Hartono:

Thank you very much. My name is Major General Trihartono from Army headquarters. I want to ask this address to Admiral Marsetio, former chief of staff of the Indonesian Navy. Speaking of global stability, we should pay close attention to regional and domestic stability. My question is how is our Maritime defense system Readiness at the regional level, is it still relevant to the ongoing threat of their near-barrier conflict? Thank you.

Host:

Thank you for the question Major General [uh]. Professor Marsetio, if we talk about Maritime power Readiness, I think we should um feel this in a broader sense which is military capability. And we cannot just limit ourselves talking about how many warships we have, or how many people we have. But we also need to ask whether they are properly trained, whether they have the right strategy and doctrines or if they have enough experience. And also knowledge about the adversaries. What's your take on the Readiness of the military in our region?

Admiral (Ret) Prof. Dr. Marsetio:

Thank you uh if you're back today uh how the English Navy actually our poor projection uh to maintain so that I think mas Andi already told. That's uh our power projection uh if you look again how the Manpower, we have so uh we're never talking about the aggressor so that's why he would like to to have a look I understood accommodate our power to maintain, to maintain the stability and Security in this area. So I would like to say how the Indonesian Navy right now for example how all the Asean countries right now support the core team of the operation carrot for example.

A cooperation of float ignition training led by the United States not less than a single candidate including China, except China, Japan, and South Korea. Also, they participate in this kind of the current exercise led by the United States. Why? this one of the uh how Indonesia would like to to maintain the capability, to maintain the manpower, to maintain the same method, the same Doctrine. That's the way that even we have enough worship for example, or we have the submarine, so it's mean that how Indonesia, so we spoke before that three days ago our chair Navy also invited all the chief of Navy of the Asian country. And at the time also uh somebody of Navy as the officer from the other country to give an example that how Indonesian navy, we would like the older asean Country to maintain the diplomacy, to maintain the cooperation so if we talk about the Asean, Indonesian navy we still seek to the policy from the government we're starting from Asian how the president would like to support as an example. Give example give the role Indonesia as the the leader for the Asean. Knowledge together that next year Indonesia will be the uh the chair for the Asean.

Kalau kita kembali pada bagaimana Asean ini untuk dapat menjaga keamanan. Seperti yang disampaikan mas Andi bahwa dalam konteks keamanan Laut Cina Selatan. Cina ingin mengembangkan kekuatannya, menyelesaikan persoalan batas wilayah dengan bilateral. Tapi Asean sepakat kita ingin menyelesaikan dengan payung Asean. Jadi saya mengatakan bahwa memang beda antara dengan Cina dan Amerika. Amerika ingin menguasai dengan fighting force, Cina ingin menguasai dunia dengan ekonomi. Jadi kekuatan yang dibangun juga berbeda. Kalau Amerika mengedepankan fighting force, China ekonomi. Kemudian baru kekuatan militernya mendukung. Sama dengan Jepang, dalam doktrin pertahanan negaranya. Jadi memang terkait dengan itu maka doktrin kita harus disesuaikan.

Doktrin pertahanan negara kita, sebab jika ingin mengembangkan pertahanan negara. Kita harus melihat 4 produk pertahanan negara kita. Kalau doktrinnya berubah, strateginya juga harus berubah. Dan yang keempat adalah bagaimana membangun confidence.

6. Host:

Thank you professor Marsetio. We have a question from an online audience who unfortunately cannot be on Camp. It's from refining Agnes from the IP Institute. The question is uh directed to all the speakers but it's actually about Asean countries so Sam you can take rest for a moment. How Asean countries especially Indonesia made their strategies to uphold a favorable in the Pacific balance of power with the current Regional strategic Outlook? We have two representatives of asean here Dr KO and governor.

First, I would like to ask Colin. Colin, how is the Singapore government strategy in dealing with the Indo-Pacific balance of power? What is Singapore's perspective on what do you consider as ideal in the Pacific balance of power in the region?

Collin Koh Swee Lean, Ph.D:

Very difficult question uh to address well I'll try my best. Now um first of all I'm going to speak as a Singaporean instead of you know claiming to represent the government.

But as a Singaporean perspective to this is that you know if you look at Singapore's experience, we have very often been sandwiched in between the two major powers. In particular China and the US and in recent years these particular problems have started to emerge and become more prominent. And you know if you have seen the recent discussions and public statements by Singapore's policy makers, I think it's clear that Singapore doesn't want to choose sides right. And one way to try to ensure a balance of power: in this case you know debate you know to which side you know Singapore tends to prefer right, but you know generally I think it's clear that Singapore continues to view the U.S as a primary security partner. At the same time, it is also important to note that Singapore has all also been trying to cultivate a much wider set of security relationships with China. However, there are some practical difficulties I think one certainly to do with the fact that you know with China security cooperation has very much been a very recent phenomenon. And of course, that also reflects China's very nascent growth of its defense diplomacy in the region as well. However, the Practical difficulty is like the fact that Doctrine in terms of the organization, in terms of equipment the Singapore Armed Forces tend to

be more aligned to the West in particular the U.S. and that also limits the type of exercises that we can conduct with China. so that is one difficulty in terms of trying to draw that balance uh in that regard. So, one good example would be in 2019 when Singapore signed and enhanced the defense and security exchange agreement with China by the same time it also signed an amended protocol that gives the U.S continued access to military facilities in the region in Singapore right.

And that is based on the 1990 mou between the two countries so there's this attempt to try to draw that balance um but I don't think it's right to say that Singapore has reached an optimal position uh for what I understand is Beijing, China will have liked to have much more much deeper and more comprehensive defense cooperation with Singapore. But in a way the restrictions tend to fall on the side of Singapore, so that is one. The other is that given the reason uh talk about China's growing military three capabilities as well as the growing threat to U.S military presence in the region I think there's one observation that I want to point out is, I think Singapore also tries to contribute towards the viability of U.S military presence. A good example would be around the time when there was discussion about the growing missile capabilities that could potentially Target Guam in 2019 that year Singapore signed an agreement for a permanent Air Force training Detachment in Guam. I don't think that it should be seen purely as a training Arrangement per se; it certainly carries much greater underlying strategic undertones in terms of trying to maintain that balance that of course Singapore appears to view to be rather precarious in recent years. So, I hope that addresses your question and I look forward to any further questions on that thanks Curie.

7. Host:

Mr. Governor. Do you think Asean should have their own strategy, to afford the favorable in the pacific balance of power.

We are now in the Pacific now, but we also realize that asean consists of ten different countries with different sets of concerns and priorities. And when we talk about asean here, do you think we should go with multilateralism of Asean countries?

In the maritime area or should we as Asean can keep ourselves together anytime to face the uncertainty of geopolitical race.

Dr. Andi Widjajanto

Thank you mbak Curie. In my academic perspective, Indo Pacific gives us new challenges. If we focus on the name, Indo Pacific. Especially the Indo-Pacific Economic Forum. It seems that this is a multilateral cooperation proposal. But if we look closely at the four pillars offered by Biden for the Indo-Pacific Economic framework, the connected economy, the resilient economy, the clean economy, and another one is fair economies. These four pillars basically require a bilateral agreement between US and individual countries within the Indo-Pacific Area. So, Indonesia must come and choose for example, seven cooperation from the first pillar. One of them is the digital economy. Do Indonesia want to join the US digital economy to have a special digital trade cooperation between Indonesia and the US. This will be a multilateral agreement. One multilateral Indo-Pacific economy framework, but there will be several agreements between the US and its countries within the framework of the Indo-Pacific. One of the confusing parts of this proposal is that for the US, this is not a trade agreement. So, it has not, it will not be approved, it doesn't have to be approved by congress. This is just an agreement. Four areas, four pillars of economic agreement. The fourth one, the fair economy agreement, is a very new offer for this region. Fair economy, related to taxation and related to anti-corruption regime. For example, but for the one and the second one. Connected economy and the resilient economy, the issue is on the supply chain. On the US global supply chain. Our colleague from CSIS Washington DC explained to us that there is also no deadline on when the Indo-Pacific economy framework should be signed by all countries in this region. But the deadline, the possible political deadline, I think will be on November 2023. When the US hosts the APEC meeting. When the US hosts the APEC meeting in November 2023, that could be the deadline for Biden before the upcoming election of 2024. But right now, this is a new framework, just [uh] initiated by Biden in November 2021. And I don't think this will be a new regional [uh] system. The new regional economic integration, but the US will create several bilateral agreements in four different pillars from connected economy to fair economy. And we still have to see what kind of initiative from Washington DC to complete this new scheme for our region.

8. Host:

The next question is from the audience in this studio. I would like to call Professor Dadan Umar Daihani. Go ahead, sir.

Prof. Dr. Ir. Dadan Umar Daihani, D.E.A. :

Thank you very much. I would like to address a question to Mr. Governor. It is very interesting. Thank you for your presentation about the strategy of the position of Indonesia. We know Indonesia is located in the middle between BLI on the left side, and US in the Pacific on the right side. Should we be a Breach or Balancer or what I call the Wild Card? Wild Card means if I go to the right, so the right will be the winner and vice versa. So, what is the best, again, can you elaborate, the best strategy for us to make this world very peaceful and the geopolitical connected again. Thank you very much.

Host:

Thank you, Prof Dadan. It's very interesting how other parties outside southeast asia perceived the regional approach towards the superpower competition. If i'm not mistaken, last year there was a criticism toward asean countries which says that when you stay neutral you actually give advantage to either superpower. And in this case, the speaker was talking about the south china sea. The southeast asian neutrality means benefit for one party. So how to achieve the delicate balance between right and, between two choices?

Dr. Andi Widjanto:

It will be much easier if the belt and road initiative or the Indo-Pacific economic framework just offer us options. For example, to build our digital infrastructure. For example we just focus on the belt and road initiative, there is an option to integrate and synergize our digital infrastructure and our 4G capacity that will be upgraded to 5G. Or we just focus on the pillars or connected economy of the US and we are going to choose suitable technology for us. If that's the only problem, then it will be easy. We can focus on the G-to-G agreement followed by B-to-B cooperation. And then we are going to have a strong global colosseum for example for upgrading our digital infrastructure. But the problem is not that simple. This is not technical functional cooperation alone. This is the competition between economic paradigms. Economic framework. US ofcourse the economic framework will be economic liberalization, free trade, globalization. The economic paradigm of the US will be the role of the private sector. China is quite different. The role of the state is very dominant. Centrality of the state is very dominant. It's not necessarily that China will develop the belt and road initiative to

create a new free trade area. That's never the paradigm. The main paradigm of China. But for the US we can see the evolution of the free trade paradigm. For example, from the era of early free trade liberalization after the second world war to the era of WTO. And now interestingly enough for the four pillars of the Indo Pacific Economic forum. The US uses the word fair economy. Usually, the third world countries that impose the importance of the use of the word fair economy. but not fair economy, fair trade. Now the US impose this terminology, not fair trade but fair economy. If we want to join the Indo Pacific Economic forum, the fourth pillar is related to taxation, related to the anti-corruption regime. So, behind these proposals of economic integration, behind this proposal of economic connectivity we should learn very carefully what is the paradigm behind them and of course we in Indonesia have our own economic paradigm. We have our own political economy. We are dictated, mandated, by our 33 articles of our constitution. To develop our national economic system, and it is not liberal. It is not also controlled by the state. We try to create our own special economic system. So, we cannot jump in too quickly efore we understand what is really the economic paradigm, what the ideology between these competing mega projects right now. Thank you pak Dadan for the question.

9. Host:

Thank you Governor um I would like to highlight that um the need for technology enhancement and economic recuperation should not be framed only in the light of silver Power rivalry. That doesn't mean that our choice of economic cooperation and Technology can be translated into our preference for either superpower. I think a state has its own set of Interest values as well as consideration behind every decision.

I would like to invite our online audience pak Nasrudin. Pak Nasrudin, are you there?

Mr. Nasrudin:

Pertanyaan saya ini merujuk ke pak Marsetio dan akan kami integrasi dengan gubernur Lemhanas. Dengan perencanaan strategi dan isu prevalensi pergerakan Cina kepada Taiwan dengan memantapkan bahwa itu adalah satu daratan Cina, tetapi di lain sisi sayangnya klaim mengenai sampai ke laut Cina selatan. Bagaimana Indonesia

menyangkut kebijakan strategi pertahanan keamanan dalam perspektif, sebenarnya kedaulatan maritim sumber daya dan modernisasi alutsista terutama mantra laut. Mantra laut itu kekuatannya masih Amphibi. Tidak mempunyai destroyer, apalagi destroyer yang sangat pemukul, belum ada. Terus bagaimana dengan presisi mengenai pertahanan dan keamanan menghadapi G20, dan konflik Rusia-Ukraina. Seperti apa strategi konsesi kita? Terus integrasi dengan pak Gubernur, menyangkut investasi infrastruktur dan connectivity. Tetapi ada satu lagi mengenai rantai harga. Seperti harga minyak goreng yang menyangkut ketahanan, kedaulatan.

Bagaimana sih konsepsi kita dalam menghadapi semua isu itu? Terima Kasih. Assalamu'alaikum Warahmatullahi Wabarakatuh.

Host:

Due to our connection, I couldn't get all of the questions actually, but I will try to uh highlight some of the points. Pak Nasrudin asked about our strategy to strengthen our Naval power especially in the context of the South China Sea conflict. He mentioned why we didn't have a Destroyer or even a more technological intensive level of power. Pak Nasrudin, I would also like to highlight one of the points mentioned by Dr Koh about a lesson from Ukraine. I think a symmetrical power could also work in dealing with a higher capability adversary in terms of conventional war. And I remember a couple of days ago I thought the Indonesian Ministry of Defense was sort of pondering a new capability. That is a smaller warship, because apparently in Ukraine Russia doesn't get lots of benefits from having their Destroyer or big naval ship in place. It could get easily attacked by an entire ship missile. So, Pak Marsetio, what is the best way forward for strengthening our Naval power?

Admiral (Ret) Prof. Dr. Marsetio:

Tadi ada tiga hal. Yang pertama mengenai Taiwan. Di tengah gejolak dunia, kita ketahui bahwa ketua DPR US datang ke Taiwan. Memang pada saat itu terjadi klimaks, [ee] dinamika geopolitik yang bisa menimbulkan tension-nya menaik. Dalam konteks keamanan di Laut Cina Selatan.

Walaupun amerika mengatakan bahwa dia sepakat dengan One China Policy. Namun kenyataan inilah dinamika politik, kebijakan politik luar

negeri As memang sangat dinamis dan diperankan oleh siapa yang memimpin pada saat itu. Kita lihat pada saat kunjungan pelocyc ke Taiwan memang terjadi puncak. Ada dua kapal amerika dari sana, kemudian Cina juga menyerahkan dua kapal induknya. Cina menyerahkan 10 kapal perangnya. Kemudian pesawat tempurnya. Namun kembali lagi bahwa tidak satupun negara yang menginginkan terjadinya perang. amun menunjukkan bagaimana perseteruan dan unjuk kekuatan. Sebuah negara berprinsip bahwa jika kita cinta damai, kita siap untuk berperang. Pastinya bahwa amerika dan China menahan diri. Dan semua melihat bahwa krisis di Ukraina saat ini berdampak pada Indonesia juga. Krisis pangan, kemudian energi. Bagaimana dengan Indonesia? Tentunya dalam situasi seperti ini kita lihat bagaimana peran diplomasi pak Jokowi. Beliau datang ke Kiev, ke Moskow. Kemudian tidak semata-mata dalam konteks untuk mengundang hadir di G20. Namun juga memberikan signal kiat agar kedua negara mengakhiri perang tersebut. Sebab perang menimbulkan dampak yang luar biasa, tidak hanya negara negara-negara Eropa.

Namun saat ini seluruh negara-negara di dunia mengalami dampak dari ketegangan yang ada di Taiwan. Yang kedua mengenai kapal. Dulu betul di Era pak Soekarno pada waktu perebutan kembali Irian Barat, bahwa kita memiliki kapal cruise ship. Kita sudah memiliki 12 kapal selam, destroyer. Bagaimana dengan saat ini? memang situasinya berbeda di era saat itu dengan saat ini. Di era saat ini walaupun sebuah negara tidak memiliki kekuatan pertahanan yang cukup. Target pemerintah misalnya apakah sudah tercapai di tahun 2024. Kita sampai saat ini kita memegang MAF. Harusnya ini meningkatkan dari minimum, kemudian optimum. Ini juga butuh waktu dan sangat tergantung dengan dukungan anggaran pertahanan negara yang kita terima. Apakah kita belum memiliki dasar? Tidak mesti.

Sebab kita bukan negara agresor. Kita adalah, kita ingin mempertahankan negara ini. Kita menyiapkan satuan-satuan yang tidak untuk di deploy over the horizon. Namun kekuatan yang akan mempertahankan keutuhan dan kedaulatan NKRI. Dan saat ini tentunya tidak semata-mata kekuatan, namun lebih merupakan diplomasi.

Tadi saya ingin menekankan kembali, bahwa semua negara-negara di Asean termasuk Taiwan, termasuk Jepang, Korea. Semua mengikuti latihan carat nya. Artinya, bahwa negara-negara ini tadi, one command.

Ujung-ujungnya adalah one command dari US. Kita bukan negara yang memihak kepada salah satu fakta. Namun bagaimana kita tadi, membuat balancer tadi. Negara kita dengan negara yang bebas-aktif sepanjang diabdikan untuk kepentingan negara. Kita lihat, kita diundang datang CARAT kita ikut. Kemudian kita ada kapal perang Cina datang ke Indonesia, kita terima dalam konteks diplomasi. Kemudian ada kapal perang dari Pakistan datang, kita ikut juga. Artinya bahwa kita ingin membuat balance.

Ini adalah satu momentum untuk Indonesia memainkan peran sebagai negara yang bebas aktif. Kemudian terkait dengan G20, ini merupakan salah satu keypoints juga. Sebagai safety dalam konteks kita menjaga stabilitas di kawasan. Bagaimana kita terus menjalin hubungan dengan negara-negara di Timur Tengah, dalam konteks membangun negara, investasi.

Yang ujung-ujungnya inilah yang merupakan model diplomasi menjaga stabilitas keamanan di kawasan. Artinya dengan diplomasi kita ingin menjaga stabilitas di kawasan. Jadi ada message yang disampaikan bahwa tahun depan Indonesia menjadi ketua ASEAN.

Sekarang kan sudah terkesan apakah ASEAN plus 1, plus 2, apa iya sudah menjadi ASEAN minus 1 karena Myanmar sudah tidak diajak. Tentu inilah peran diplomasi Indonesia dalam menjaga stabilitas keamanan. Terima Kasih mbak.

Host:

Pak Andi, would you like to address the questions about our national resilience with regards to the impact of the Ukraine war?

Dr. Andi Widjajanto:

Yeah, I think the president several times already warned us about the upcoming Global crisis that can impact Indonesia economy. So we at Lemhanas already provide several policy recommendations on how we prepare a kind of Crisis management here to anticipate the possible Global crisis in terms of food and energy commodities that may happen in October 2022 and 2023 until March or April 2023. So I think we are now in the process of creating a kind of crisis response. Yeah, we are

now focused on making sure that the rise of commodity prices can be managed by controlling our inflation rate. I think yesterday the governor of our Central Bank increased 0.75 point of our credit rate. It will be followed by strengthening the policy to control inflation rates especially in seven major cities in Indonesia. I think the focus is on several cities in Sumatra, one in Java, one in Sulawesi, and so on. We already create a kind of roadmap and also timeline to prepare for the possible upcoming crisis in terms of pricing commodity price. Strategic price strategy commodity price of food and uh energy yeah but we have to be very very careful yeah uh the challenge is great especially uh during the month of October 2022 until March or April 2023.

10. Host:

Ladies and Gentlemen, we have questions coming in from the audience in the studio. I would like to invite Admiral Edi Sucipto.

Admiral Edi Sucipto:

Okay, thank you moderator. Edi Sucipto right now from National Resilient Institute I think this is the good momentum so my question will be addressed to Mr Sam, and KO let me place my question in Bahasa um. Kalau kita ikuti dari presentasi seluruh narasumber, sepertinya makin memperkuat evolusi geopolitik yang disampaikan pak Andi. Terkait apa yang saya sampaikan barusan, saya kurang sependapat tentang yang disampaikan pak Sam tentang Cina bukan kekuatan militer yang besar karena belum punya pangkalan yang besar seperti Amerika. Kalau kita lihat Amerika sebagai pemenang, kalau tidak salah ada 7 pangkalan di seluruh dunia. Betul Cina bukan kekuatan militer sebesar Amerika, tapi dari kekuatan geopolitik tadi, kelihatannya Cina untuk memenangkan atau memenuhi national interestnya memanfaatkan berbagai momentum untuk menjadi pemenang. Bisa saja Cina menjadi pemenang, misalkan dengan cara, tadi dikatakan oleh pak Andi masalah Belt and Road initiative. Perang dagang juga digunakan.

Kemudian Terkait dengan kebijakan AUKUS, apakah kira-kira tidak memicu perlombaan senjata di kawasan? Atau bisa jadi semakin menjadikan China semakin agresif dalam menciptakan hegemoninya dalam kawasan Asia Pasifik.

Kemudian saya ingin pendapatnya pak KO tentang kebijakan AUKUS sebagai warga Singapura.

Host :

One point regarding Mr Edi remarks about how China exploits some momentums for its Advantage even though China is behind the United States in terms of American power but it does have um the uh that neck in exploiting some momentum for example last year when we had submarine accident China was among the first to offer help to um to recover the submarines and we didn't get the same offer extended by the United States.

So I think Mr Edi Mark has some good points in it your response?

Mr. Sam Roggeveen:

Yeah, thank you thank you for the question I I um I don't at all want to diminish what China has achieved in the maritime sphere over the last 30 years in fact I don't think the world has seen anything like it since the second world war the sheer scale of the buildup of its Maritime Force particularly its Naval forces but also Coast Guard and other constabulary forces. And also, long-range air power and missile power that can be directed against Maritime threats. So it's a very comprehensive modernization program. In fact, just yesterday some of you may have seen circulating on social media the image of a Chinese Shipyard which is at the moment constructing five new destroyers at once. These are vessels of around 10 000 tons roughly similar to the Hobart class destroyers that Australia now has in its Navy. We have three of those.

It took us more than 10 years to build China's building five of them at once so I wouldn't at all want to diminish China's capabilities and uh uh you know the achievements of China's Maritime modernization. And I think it will continue well into the future. The only point I was making earlier is that [uh] you it is difficult to be a comprehensive Regional Maritime uh great power without foreign basing. It is simply in the nature of Maritime power that it moves slowly uh and that it is very difficult to concentrate power in one particular area uh and to replenish it without foreign bases. [Uh] now from Australia an Australian point of view the fact that China lacks these regional bases is very much in our interests, distance is our best friend in Australia it is the greatest defense

asset that we have is our distance. I often say to people, and they are surprised to hear this but Beijing is closer to Berlin than it is to Sydney. Now you wouldn't know that when you're when you're in Sydney and you listen to the uh the tone of the Australian debate about China you wouldn't necessarily know that China is a long way away, but it is and it's very much in our interests. That that dis the distance between Chinese military power and Australia is never reduced and that's why I think uh delaying or frustrating Chinese attempts to develop military bases in Southeast Asia and in the Pacific Islands region is uh is so important. On the second question about AUKUS um I I'm in a minority in Australia amongst defense commentators in that I'm very critical of AUKUS I do think that it has the potential to provoke a counter-reaction from China which ultimately is not in Australia's interests. But actually, I think the main objection to AUKUS is is much more practical than that which is that uh the the timeline for this project is extremely long it's measured in decades not in years. [Uh] it'll be uh you know before we get a fully operational uh nuclear submarine capability, we're looking well into the 2040s.

So uh if we are doing if we are getting involved in this project in order to balance Chinese power then boy we're really leaving it very late. [Uh] we ought to be acting much more swiftly than that. [Uh] but even then, I think yes it if we ever do get these submarines and I think there's real doubt as to whether we will ever get any of them but if we ever do then yes I do think it has the potential uh to provoke a counter-reaction. A response from China which will ultimately make Australia less secure not more secure.

Host:

Okay uh can you enlighten on us on Singapore take on August I know that Singapore is taking a cautious approach but there's also a impression that Singapore is rather supportive to that kind of initiative?

Collin Koh Swee Lean, Ph.D.:

Thanks, thanks Curie and many thanks to uh Pak Edi for the question. [Uh] as it has been quite well known as the Singapore at least if you look at the tone of the official statements in response to AUKUS one will argue that it is generally positive. it's positive from the perspective that I what I see as more of a real political perspective. That you know it is

seen as you know part of the balancing game in the region and it also takes into account that both Australia, the US and the UK are long-time security partners of Singapore. So there has been a long-standing set of cooperation with each of these three partners. And because of that there is a certain Comfort level there is already an established reservoir of confidence in the kind of um you know security public goods that these three powers could offer. As well as you know the knowledge that you know this AUKUS goes beyond the nuclear uh submarine deal because I think very much of course I agree with um you know, Sam regarding the potential risk of these uh AUKUS deal.

But much of the emphasis especially played out by the media has always been on the submarine itself. But if you look at it AUKUS is more than the submarine it looks at a whole variety of security cooperation it looks at Cyber you know Hypersonic for example it also talks about potential basic uh opportunities. And all these if you look at it all together contribute as I believe to be seen from the lenses of Singapore's policy Elites to be seen as helping to at least maintain some sort of balance. Because I think one way to look at it is whether we like it or not with or without AUKUS the PLA Navy build up is a fact I mean it is continuing with or without AUKUS. The only thing about AUKUS is that it offers you a brand-new justification and ammunition for the Chinese to argue that you know they need to invest more in their own build up. Which in any case has been ongoing anyway with or without AUKUS and the main target has always been the US anyway. So, I think I hope that helps to clarify uh you know Singapore's position and look forward to any further exchange with your Pak Edi.

11. Host:

Thank you so much thank you Colin I would like to call the next question from the audience Major General Dr Yanto from the national resilience Institute go ahead sir.

Major General Dr. Yanto:

thank you thank you um I'd like to ask to um Colin. Colin, can you hear me?

Well um thank you in your talk earlier you discussed about the security issues in the region. You mentioned about the um Taiwan and also other

Maritime security issues in the region and particularly also I would like to ask on the south China's issue. That involve four Asian member states and also China involved and Taiwan also uh concerning about the South China issue. [Um] on the uh particularly on the South China security issues [um] [uh] what should the asean particularly all the uh asean member state that involved in this uh South China Sea issue what should this Asean as a guru Asean as the institution organization do or to respond or to manage this security issue uh from growing or from uh bigger conflict that is very short uh question for you thank you.

Collin Koh Swee Lean, Ph.D.:

Yeah, sure uh thank you Pak for the very good question. The way I look at it is that firstly you know very much the hype about the South China Sea this field has revolved around two main aspects one is of course the sovereignty and jurisdictional disputes in the South China Sea.

And then occurs the bigger elephant in the room uh about some I know you as a rivalry. So, the South China Sea security problem is multi-layered if you look at it. One on the traditional front uh we look at the traditional sovereignty and jurisdictional problems. The great power rivalry, but very often we Overlook the fact that no there is a host of non-traditional problems. And of course, when I say I try to use the word traditional and non-traditional, but it is purely for the sake of academic discussion because uh granted every country regards security issues in their own way and their own right. What could be traditional to you might be non-traditional and vice versa. But I think it is safe to say that there is a Nexus of security problems in the South China Sea and for asean the way I look at it is to deal with these issues look at it in two pillars. And usually when we talk about cooperation in the South China Sea, we should look at it from two perspectives one is from the standpoint of trying to promote crisis stability uh and the management of Crisis stemming from the use of appropriate confidence and security building measures or csvms. So that is one pillar and then of course the other pillar is to talk about practical security cooperation. The distinction between these two is that the the second one that relates to practical security cooperation deals with commonly perceived security threats they are functional in nature we are talking about things like say climate induced uh weather contingencies, we're talking about illegal fishing, and all these you know require countries to come together collectively deal with them. Of course, not to mention the issue way piracy and Armory against uh ships in the region.

So we can deal with these issues and try to compartmentalize them what we saw in the case of practical security cooperation could also have a confidence building element to it right. So as what I saw right now and to based on the question that part you asked, and I will use the ongoing discussions about the core of Conduct in the South China Sea right. So far you know the discussion has largely been focused on maintaining and promoting practical security cooperation because if you look at the original giraffe negotiating tax that came about in 2018 if you look at all the Clauses being put into it by China and the concerned asean countries, you'll find that predominantly the emphasis has been on practical security cooperation. They talk about such a rescue cooperation environmental pollution control and all that, but it is very short when it comes to CSVM and understandably so because this is a very Tawny issue to think about. It's going to open Newcastle worms, but the bigger problem that I see here is that right now as it is it is not asean with China. Right now, it is 10 this thing asean countries with China so it's a 10 plus one format and not a one plus one format. As it would have been originally envisaged but what I see as going forward looking at the existing state of cooperation what I feel is really Asean and it's important for interested parties to come together and to try to initiate some form of a mini lateral right.

A mini lateral, because we have to consider that it's a fact that within asean we are going to continue to have divisions and differences amongst the 10 countries regarding how they build the South China Sea. This spirit and how they prioritize it anyway for their national interests. So, we are not going to have all 10 Azan countries converging all together, this is going to be difficult if not impossible to attain. So, we can think about a more mini lateral approach to it and one way to start doing that is for bilateral intra asean disputes in the South China Sea to be resolved as soon as possible. I'm referring to the exact boundary the limitations between Indonesia and Vietnam, and also referring to the fishery issues between Malaysia and Vietnam as well. So all these has been under the table and less emphasized than the one with China but I think you know resolving addressing these intra-azam problems in the South China Sea might potentially lead us to new avenues for cooperation against security challenges in the South China Sea. Thank you.

QUESTION- ANSWER PLENARY SESSION 2

DAY 1/ 24 August 2022

Geo-maritime Political Economy: Generating Growth, Sustaining Resources, and Gaining Power.

1. Host:

Doctor Heath, you mentioned about compartmentalizations of cooperation but I but I see something missed from your presentation you didn't actually explain to us how big is u.s interest in the region if we put aside the geopolitical risk of strategic competition with china how much interest does u.s have in the region in terms of Sea Trade in terms of series of communication in terms of marine food and energy based resources. I think by enlightening us that we will be able to understand more why the U.S. is rather hesitant to extend more cooperation in the maritime economic issue.

Timothy R. Heath, Ph.D.:

Okay. Yes, so I will answer your question then the US is very interested in the indo-pacific for several reasons. First off, as i mentioned the economic potential of the region is widely recognized the future of the global economy will be based in asia and in southeast asia will play a very large role in the future of the global economy. So the US has an economic incentive. There's a strategic reason for the US to care a great deal about this region, because the US Navy and aircraft rely on key sea lanes of communication to transit from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean and that sea or sea. Sea lane passes right through the south china sea so the south china sea is very important for strategic reasons for the U.S. military and the U.S. is determined to maintain that access through the region.

In addition, there are friends and allies and partners in the region who have long-standing relations with the u.s and u.s does have invested interest in their well-being. I will note that the US interest in staying in the asia pacific is as much a function of demand from countries in the region as it is a push from the u.s side. There are many countries in the region that have asked not for less U.S. engagement but more, and the U.S. is responding to that. As well as your question asked about the limited US approach towards funding infrastructure and competing head-

to-head to the BRI. The reason why the u.s doesn't do that is first off the u.s has tried that in the past actually in the 1950s and 60s when the us was actually much more wealthy on a per capita basis. The us did a lot of infrastructure development in the around the world and what it learned is that often those projects are very difficult to financially sustain, and two the u.s learned that often the political goodwill from building that infrastructure was very short-lived and and so after a certain point the u.s scaled back its involvement in direct government support for that sort of infrastructure development. Another reason why the U.S. is not trying to repeat a bri style approach is that the U.S. political system and economic system is very different from China. It is not a state-directed economy; the US government cannot order companies to carry out strategic infrastructure development projects that have very little benefit economically and may never pay off. That's just not how the US works so what the US government has tried to do and still tries to do is offer incentives for private investors to invest in projects that could both help the host nation and prove [uh] profitable down the road.

So it's a different style different approach u.s is not china that doesn't mean the us does not care and the u.s is not interested it's very interested and it's not an accident that u.s presidents have since president obama at the least and even earlier arguably prioritise the asia pacific as the region that the us is most interested in and wants to be active involved and a good partner to countries there.

Host:

Following up that dr hid is there any particular policy made by the u.s government to to push or to incentivize the private sectors to to go into this region?

Timothy R. Heath, Ph.D.:

Yes the U.S government has passed legislation that under actually president trump and president biden. And actually, in coordination with japan and australia there is a small budget several hundred million dollars that serve as seed money to help start projects and incentivize companies the u.s has offered in the IPEF very low-cost loans and other financial incentives to companies that become partners in the indo-pacific. So, there are a variety of tax and investment incentives that the

u.s has developed, but again it's quite different than the chinese government's approach which i you know i only want to highlight the bri projects there's still a lot of debate about how many of them will actually be implemented and how many will actually be carried out.

The Chinese have promised many many projects and often failed to actually carry them out at all so um there remains doubts as to the so-called chinese model of state-directed investment.

2. Host:

Thank you, Dr. Heath, next I would like to move on to Dr Philips Vermonte, you mentioned about Asean that we should empower ASEAN and more to um create more corporations. [Um] how would however I would like also to uh remind you that uh not all of us and maritime powers have the same interest when it comes to issues for example sustainability are you fishing for example, we gotta acknowledge that Vietnam is probably the second largest perpetrators of are you fishing in indonesia. So, um what are the obstacles that we have to overcome when we want to use asean for the future?

Philips Vermonte, Ph.D.

Right I think i'm glad that you uh raised that question because this is a very important question for a number of reasons number one you are right when you are mentioning that not all not many asean countries will have same interests because there are they are landlocked for example or on the question of iu facing and and that's the how i see asean as well that is we have a maritime southeast asia and we have mainland southeast asia and that actually impact in my opinion our government views about uh great powers. For example, some countries accuse indonesia of getting closer to china not countries well some observers or some uh analysts saying that indonesia is getting closer to china and will be under the influence of china. But if you look at asean through that kind of perspective, that is maritime Southeast Asia and mainland Southeast Asia, only two or three countries right. On the maritime side of southeast asia indonesia philippines and probably singapore or Malaysia.

Now china has been very aggressively existing on the mainline of mainland southeast asia through the BRI through [uh] great mekong

river cooperation and so on. And I think Indonesia has to be in the loop has to be in this network of Chinese you know initiatives that go through ASEAN countries, otherwise Indonesia will lose its relevance in the eyes of countries in mainland Southeast Asia if more economic activities more cooperation is coordinated with China in the mainland. Then six against four, or two against eight against two then Indonesia will somehow eventually lose our relevance and then will affect our ability to influence and to shape the norms and behaviour in the region. So that's why you know uh again I would emphasise that we cannot afford to choose between us and China because we have our own strategic interests. We have to maintain a good relationship with China but at the same time of course U.S. is the balancer and then still the strongest uh you know in a way military power so that's uh one reason why that question is important. Number two ASEAN has this long experience in managing great power competition in the region. We've been successfully creating a region with all the norms that have been signed by all the dialogue partners or countries interested in working with ASEAN. We have taxes, we have ASEAN nuclear free zone and so on and so forth and and during the 80s and 90s there were a number of conflicts because some countries in Southeast Asia had become the theatre of this major power competition.

ASEAN was able to solve the problem through our own mechanism without the help of these great powers. So why now we cannot do the same thing?

That of course there is competition between us and China, but we have our regional interest and I don't see why we should not, you know, do this. Once again but the question is now whether or not there is a leader in Southeast Asia that can pull these 10 countries together and unfortunately in the past few years it seems that ASEAN you know seems to be quote unquote uh weakened or weak uh we cannot solve the problem in Myanmar. [Uh] now we have uh you know a coup in uh in Myanmar as well Rohingya issues and many other issues that ASEAN seems to lose its capacity to internally solve the problem. And that's why I think Indonesia next year will become the chairman of ASEAN so the opportunity uh is coming again to Indonesia.

You know, to come up with [uh] ideas and proposals and leadership for ASEAN to manage this difficult you know situation that we are facing right

now uh because of the geopolitical rivalry. But i think there are opportunities, because right now again our DNA is for cooperation [uh] you know transforming competition or conflict into cooperation. And now I think you know the pandemic forced us to cooperate right. And the depletion of marine resources forced us to cooperate. And there are a number of reasons why we need more cooperation and that's why that's what asean is for if you look at the asean the [uh] what is it now as in documents on the pacific [uh] it's all about cooperation and that's why i think the dna is to force countries that see in the pacific region as a theatre for competition we put forward fuse of functional cooperation. because that's where our interest lies so that's why i think again this region in my opinion should not be defined by the state of affairs between us and china. although we cannot escape. So, uh suggestion from dr heath i think is clearly the point, that when it comes to our cooperation with us in china we have to compartmentalise and what is it you know approach uh to this problem but we need to socialise with u.s and china. and socialise and make them understand that you know you cannot force us because we have our interests and that's through a dialogue like this, we can achieve that we have to socialise with china more and we have to socialise with us and our allies more as well. in order to clearly state our uh regional interests and indonesia's interests.

Host:

Thank you [uh] dr Philip Vermonte [uh] and thank you for reminding all of us that uh indonesia will be the asean uh chair next year so uh what would you think would be the quick win that asean needs to reinforce the the trust of international not international community, the trust of even asean members yeah um of the um of the of the agency of asean to do more right?

Philips Vermonte, Ph.D.:

Code of conduct in the south china sea will be one. It's been a long process of course. But i think it is in the interest of china in my opinion because of the conflict with with the climate states in south china sea. I think [uh] the world is waiting to see how China would behave and would solve international conflicts. and south china sea uh in relation to the asean countries that are the claimants provide that opportunity for china to show their current good intention or uh to show whether or whether or not china is benign or belligerent. Right. uh china has been i think china has been uh quite assertive in number of ways you know in

south china sea but if they could achieve a court of conduct with southeast asian countries uh regarding the claim over south china sea and at least show some you know some possible uh solution for south china sea. Then it can be a model for China to show to the world.

That's okay we've been doing this with with the southeast asian countries and then probably they will do it with other countries, when when it comes to conflicts. But of course, this is our expectation [uh] whether or not China thinks the same way. But i think that would be a quick win for asean as well but uh there are other quick wins, but it's not related to geopolitics it's more on the domestic problems faced by Southeast Asian countries.

3. Host:

Okay I would move to Dr Korolev uh if you mentioned about the um the role of non-state actors and um and I remember that early this year our end of last year we have incident in south china sea near to north natuna sea near to our natuna islands. In which there was a um chinese vessels uh trespassing into our uh economic zone and even if i'm not mistaken they even encroach into our territorial sea and we we were having uh the establishment of a marine energy exploration infrastructure there and the and the investment was made uh jointly by russia. So [uh] I think um that is one example how the uh the business uh community can play a role yeah uh in ensuring that the exploitation of marine-based resources can still occur even in the in the area where it is still under dispute.

My question to you Dr uh korolev with regards to the points that you mentioned earlier about the non-state actors in the agency. I'm not really sure how much you have researched into the philippine side of the cooperation with china. But when we talk about non-state actors and business-led cooperation, we require a strong business sector. How do you think is the way to strengthen the business community in southeast asia so that we could enable more cooperation yeah just like the one, that china and philippines has uh that you mentioned to be the good example of uh the way to conduct join um cooperation in the uh south china sea um can you offer us your perspective?

Alexander Korolev, Ph.D. :

Yeah sure. Thank you very much for your question. It's a kind of comprehensive question right so there are different intertwined you know links um. So, my take is that yeah I do, first of all I do agree with you definitely that um this is a very sensitive issue in terms of the maritime dimension in the south china sea. So, I'm not sure and I do believe that it's actually right now it's even if we one day imagine the law next year or maybe you know in two years the code of conduct will be signed will be and then will be implemented. I don't see that there will be a full solution of the south china sea conflict uh in this regard so it may be just as i mentioned uh will be only the mitigation of the issue right. so, the same point comes to the non-state uh holders um stakeholders in the philippines. So, um I can say that first of all they already are implementing a quite solid corporation, the Philippine non-state holder and business sector with China in different aspects.

Which are you know very intertwined the security issues, the food security um with uh between, between China and the Philippines. So, these relations are already being established uh institutionally economically uh and even politically. and right now, when there is a new as we all know the new president of the philippines uh Marcus Jr. he already stated that he would be more he will be less hawkish towards China and towards South China Sea. Which is being, you know, criticised a lot uh even in the philippines for this you know pro-chinese approach um which is not definitely a true case. but he said that yeah, we will the philippines we will [uh] try to you know build more join business business associations with china on different levels.

More non-state holders will be joined in more inclusive dialogue with China and especially in the south china sea. So, another, let's say, way how to build a more solid way a more solid cooperation is we can see from the case of uh from the experience of malaysia in china how they build a relationship in general economically and in terms of the south china sea. Especially because we all know that Malaysia is also a claimant in the South China Sea issue and is a very sensitive question for the national Malay sovereignty, but they built. I think a very comprehensive institutional dialect on different levels with china which is more comprehensive right now than uh vietnam china dialogue or the philippines down so i think one of the ways how to mitigate once again not a resultful result but how to mitigate this issues is to develop more

solid more comprehensive institutional dialogue on different levels. And especially the business associations for example trying to integrate more deeply on ethnic chinese diaspora living in in the Philippines or the philippine acting desperately in china how this is the the case for for example Indonesia and China or Malaysia and China.

4. Host:

Thank you uh Dr. Korolev. [Um] I rather agree with your points about the need for engaging more actors uh in the regional dialogue especially on south china sea issues I remember I I did try to map out the the number of um regional mechanisms that the death issue of south china sea and most of them actually occurring through the first track. Which is the government uh that track, and we are lacking the participation of the academics and the business and also at the common community level thank you again for mentioning that so ladies and gentlemen i think it's about the time for us to take questions from the audience.

I have a list here on my mobile phone. I would like to give the first opportunity to Major general Endang Khairudin and to post the first question. Please keep your comments or questions brief to one Pak.

Mr. Endang Khairudin:

Okay thank you very much for [uh] the time. I have a question for [uh] Mr. Korolev [uh] yeah in your conclusion that is uh talking about the resources sharing for example you give a good example that between China and Philippines. Do you mean that as overlapping between the operating problem between the countries uh I've seen china and filipina was sold and. This is as a win-win solution or as the China economic diplomacy victory. Okay that is my question, Thank you.

Alexander Korolev, Ph.D.:

Estimation is that from one hand it can be overlapping issues and especially since as I mentioned during my uh during my presentation. That of course we should not forget that uh with i mean the philippines and china are they are still in the process in the state of uh conflict or dispute in the south china sea so of course we cannot admit the very factor that there is a conflict the ongoing factor the ongoing conflict but at the same time we can see from the previous examples of the philippine uh china uh relationship in the south china sea. Which were especially under Benigno Aquino III, [uh] former president of the

philippines were more let's say troublesome but even under these circumstances we saw some cooperation schemes between [uh] between China and the Philippines in oil and gas exploration and shell. So [uh] right now I think that of course [uh] they're will not be on the very frequently and positive track I mean the general relationship but in terms of the [uh] since the new president come to power came to power in the Philippines he stated, and they already actually agreed on more cooperation and oil and gas [uh] in the in the south china sea.

So, I think that [uh] it's hard to say right now it's hard to estimate whether this will be a win-win corporation the win-win solution. Because it's still a few times left [uh] when these even with this memorandum was signed it's just four years it's not enough for such a burden such a comprehensive issue like south china sea but some cooperation schemes between these two countries, I do think that they will continue and under new presidency in the Philippines maybe we can see the new let's say trigger for more [uh] more trustful cooperation.

5. Mr. Sam Roggeveen

Thank you very much. My questions for [uh] for tim heath [uh] i'm curious about the political power that comes along with with economic power [uh] in australia we of course were one of the first I think the first country to ban huawei from our 5G telecommunications infrastructure rollout that was ostensibly done for concerns around espionage and surveillance since then. Of course, other countries have followed the United Kingdom and the United States, and I think several others as well have excluded Huawei from [uh] major [uh] telecoms [uh] contracts [uh]. As I said the ostensible reason was around surveillance and concerns about espionage, but I think underlying. It also was a concern that [uh] because major chinese companies are do have close connections with the chinese state, and with the chinese communist party that therefore the control of key aspects of a nation's economy by these chinese entities could create [uh] the potential for political coercion.

And I just want to ask you if you have a view about what how exactly that could manifest itself [uh] how exactly does that work given that you would expect that market forces would impose a kind of discipline here so for instance if huawei was found to be exercising you know undue political influence in in a foreign country. Then its chances of ever

winning contracts in third countries would be damaged [uh] and also the renewal of that contract for let's say 6G or 7G, would also be damaged so market forces you would think would impose a certain discipline on these concerns about [uh] political coercion so what exactly is the link here between economic control and political control thank you.

Timothy R. Heath, Ph.D.:

So, Huawei is a little a little different than maritime political economy but if people indulge me in discussing the issue it is of interest to many countries and Indonesia certainly has been involved in this controversy. Chinese companies are Chinese companies, and they are not like western companies. They have a relationship with the state and the communist party that cannot be avoided.

It is written into law that the state and intelligence services can order any chinese company to comply with with what the chinese government wants to accomplish and that could be anything from intelligence collection surveillance to sabotage. In the event of a crisis or war now when it comes to the so so that's about that's true of all chinese companies. And it is not the case that the Chinese government believes market forces [uh] must be always adhered to and followed and that that market forces represent the best way to deal with [uh]. Companies we see in the case of alibaba and some of the some of the big giant [uh] tech companies in china that the CCP, has no problem firing the chief or disciplining a company if they feel politically threatened or if they feel there's a political need to intervene and disrupt the company's operations. So for China politics and security are paramount and market forces are secondary what about huawei and and tech companies huawei actually has made similar arguments they, they reject the idea that they can be a tool of the state and they insist that they would never allow the state to to interfere with them because they are they want to protect their market share and reputation. That is the argument by Huawei, but they cannot get around the fact that they are a chinese company and by law regardless of what huawei executives may believe they have an obligation to carry out. Whatever the state directs them to do when ordered to do so, so the Huawei promise is simply not credible. However, the Chinese government is also smart enough to know that reckless and rash interference and sloppy orders of operations to, to interfere in other countries would damage a crown jewel in the Chinese economy.

Therefore, the evidence to date that the Huawei's been actively carrying out CCP orders is is [uh] controversial and debatable. There's i'm not going to say there's none but certainly it's it's controversial. I think there are two real concerns. First off the real issue isn't in peace time when there's stable trade and commerce. The real concern is what happens in a crisis or or a war if a country is indebted to China and its infrastructure is owned by Chinese companies. In the event of a crisis or conflict that country becomes extremely vulnerable to anything the Chinese state wants to do second there's a difficulty of reversing Chinese ownership of a country's infrastructure. It is extremely costly and exceedingly difficult to reverse that path once you go down it even in the United States. Huawei built a handful of networks in rural communities and the US government decided. This is too big a security risk and order those states to rip them out. In some cases, they still haven't done it because it is so expensive to rip them out and rebuild. Any country that allows china to build its digital infrastructure is going to be beholden to china for many many years. Even if they decide this was a bad idea and they regret doing that, oftentimes the expense is so large that the country will have no choice but simply to accept this is now a permanent fact and a permanent liability and vulnerability [uh] to which they they have now exposed themselves to chinese coercion pressure and and higher-level damage [uh] in the event of a crisis. Thank you.

6. Host:

Thank you for the question, Sam and also for Dr. Heath we have next question also from the audience. I would like to call for Pak Indra Sutomo. Okay go-ahead sir.

Mr. Indra Sutomo

Referring from this morning and this afternoon about this two-dragon project about the BRI and then the Indo-Pacific economic framework Indonesia is naturally and strategically located between these two giants. And then refer to the governor of LEMHANAS this morning about the global connectivity and then the rising tension of the east china sea. The question is what Indonesia can do to minimise this damage if something happened with this tension. And maybe how can we make turn it to be beneficial for Indonesia since Indonesia strategically locally located between these two giants and [uh] in the next year Indonesia will be the head of the Asian and also for the timothy [uh] especially for the these two options for a la carte corporation what is your recommendation for us. Maybe this is just the question, thank you.

Philips Vermonte, Ph.D.:

Yeah, thank you. I think [uh] if we consider ourselves well there's this quote that i keep quoting [uh] from two cities "the stronghold the the strong do what they want the weak suffer". What they must um well looking at it from the perspective of Indonesia. We are not weak right. But we are not strong so we are middle power if you will [um] and there are things that middle power can do but there are things that middle power cannot do. What middle power can do is to be [uh] participants strong proponents of norm shaping behaviour through regional organisation to multilateral platform so that's i think [uh] four middle powers. [Uh] we always need to opt for multilateralism and asean is one of course and a second [uh] we've been in the past before china rises what happened with Huawei right now is familiar to developing countries with western countries with regard to companies operating and natural resources extraction many developing countries including Indonesia its private sector but work closely with their respective government putting pressure to national government of developing countries. Now China is doing the same thing right through huawei or through these digital companies my point is either China or the United States or European union they will have their own interest for sure but now I think we can tackle through having for example transparent national law that regulates digital [uh] digital world in Indonesia.

The concern is, as Sam mentioned, surveillance, intelligence activities and so on if we have strong [uh] transparent laws that would protect our interests. That's something that we can do as middle power right but of course this is something more than that we cannot say. In my opinion Sam, you know China is probably doing this, what is it surveillance, intelligence activities and so on. But we cannot also, we cannot be so sure that other countries is not doing that. You know in Indonesia through their companies [uh] through through many ways so what i'm saying is in the end it's about our own government our own laws and then to to keep acting as middle power. With the limit of the power that we can have, Australia is a very good example. I think [uh] in the 80s and 90s Australia, you know as a middle power, proposed very strongly the idea of human securities and Australia tackling the problem of this illegal trafficking. People smuggling and all these human security activities with japan the other middle powers at the time, but they have been successfully creating norms around these areas of non-traditional securities. So now [uh] if we if we believe Indonesia is a middle power in

the making then you know non-making [uh] platform, multilateral platform indonesia should be very very active in that kind of multilateral settings.

Host:

Thank you, Phillips. [uh] perhaps if I made to follow up the question um well Asean seems to excel in, on shaping rule but in the years ahead we might see a crisis entangled open conflict on maritime sphere and I believe that Asia needs to move further for another role which is crisis management how do you think asean would would develop itself to deal with such consensus.

Philips Vermonte, Ph.D. :

There are a number of proposals for asean that has been put forward number one maybe asean needs to reconsider how decision is made within asean you know this idea of consensus i think needs to be rethought you know in the area of economic operation for example asean has agreed to have this asean minus x you know type of mechanism but not in the political security cooperation so maybe you know some sort of that kind of arrangement that we can move forward without the need for having 10 countries agreed on everything and that's [uh] that is difficult but we have to set the parameters of what kind of issues in the political and security realms that asean can move forward if there are eight countries agreeing or seven or nine or what not but the underlying points is we need to reconsider the decision making process within asean for asean to be able to move fast you know with this changing environment strategic environment that asean needs to be prepared that's probably just one example of what can be done within Asean.

Host:

Okay thank you dr Vermonte, Dr heath um previously i offer you an indonesian great dish of oxtail soup what would you offer indonesia in terms of the menu for cooperation with united states.

Timothy R. Heath, Ph.D.:

And I think this goes to our questioner's question as well about what practically can indonesia do to carry out my recommendation so several things first i think it is essential that countries like indonesia welcome

and build relations with both u.s and china and other outside powers more options on the menu is better for countries like indonesia and asean and the more countries like china and the usc that asean countries have these other options.

And partners the more countries like china and the us will realise they don't have a huge amount of leverage and [uh] and their expectations will have to be modified and i i think that's kind of the goal is to get to the point where countries like china modify their expectations about how much they can expect deference and compliance to their demands from countries throughout the region so practically speaking articulating clearly like geopolitical fulcrum started to do what are the things and principles and non-negotiables that indonesia is looking for from any partner and and then engaging all kind of partners us china japan other europeans and look for ways to secure the deal that that will meet those goals and the more diverse partners and more diverse engagements i think that tends to make a more resilient development approach and would probably serve those countries and trust best thanks.

7. Host:

Thank you [uh] Dr heath ladies and gentlemen we still have two one or two more questions allow me to check with the committee okay um i would like to call major i'm sorry [uh] rear admiral Edi Sucipto.

Rear Admiral Edi Sucipto

Regarding the second sub-theme; geomaritim political economy. Saya mencoba menangkap apa yang disampaikan oleh Pak Timothy. bahwa ekonomi tidak dapat dipisahkan dari politik. Terus kemudian yang juga disampaikan tadi bahwa kedepan ini central of gravity dari perekonomian dunia sekarang ada di Asia. Pertanyaan saya baik untuk pak Timothy baik pak Vermonte. Kalau pak Vermonte di indonesia set pandangannya seperti apa. Seperti yang kita tahu beberapa kali perdana menteri Thailand ingin membuka Kra Kanal. Ada negara yang diuntungkan dan ada yang dirugikan. Saya ingin pandangan pak Timothy apabila Kra Kanal tersebut direalisasikan.

Kemudian untuk pak Korolev, ada hal yang menarik yang bapak tawarkan tentang pilihan kerjasama atau konfrontasi. Tapi yang saya tanyakan bukan soal pilihannya, itu kan MOU ditandatangani di tahun

2018. Padahal Filipina sebagai claimant state mengajukan kepada mahkamah 47.10 dan nyatanya keputusannya relatif tidak digubris oleh China. Kira-kira apa pandangan pak Korolev tentang sikap Filipina yang akhirnya mau mengajak kerjasama.

Host:

A couple of years ago there was an idea to open crocodile in thailand with the objective to shorten the sea routes for china so china would lessen its dependence towards malika streets at the moment most of the chinese trade pass through malikian street and that is identified as one of their main vulnerabilities especially when china needs to project its maritime power in case of open conflict around south china sea

Timothy R. Heath, Ph.D.

Yes I remember now i'll say a couple things about china-thailand relationship that i think is important first my earlier point that with china economic cooperation is inseparable from political and security cooperation if you look at what is happening in thailand what you're seeing is the implementation of that ideal so for example as thailand has become more involved in belton road the chinese demands have increased on in political and security affairs thailand now buys more and more weapons and equipment from china to satisfy china than it used to do in the past when thailand had a close relationship with the u.s and in security issues or development issues when china asked to do things like build the croc canal we've seen the past as thailand becomes more dependent it becomes harder and harder to say no so i and i have to research the latest development on that i think the chinese are interested in finding a way on reducing their dependence on the malacca strait they've been worried about that for a while they are developing workarounds such as building well infrastructure in pakistan is one route one way to get around the malacca strait is [uh] through [uh] port and then access in Cambodia um in the in some of the facilities.

They're building, there's another way to try to get around that building the canal if they proceed with doing that which my understanding is engineering wise, and technically it is hugely difficult and costly. And I think there's still some debate about whether it's doable but if they do that. I think I would see that's another sign of just how dependent Thailand had become and how it has become extremely difficult for the

Thai government to refuse Chinese demands. That's kind of a paradigm of of a partnership that the Chinese hail is this is what kind of partnerships they're looking to build where countries are more more compliant and willing to do what Beijing demands in return the economic relationship grows.

Philips Vermonte, Ph.D.

Thank you. For, I just chipped. I think that's a very interesting question [uh]. CSIS has not done any study on this but I think lessons can be drawn from Singapore. Singapore there is this ice melting in the arctic that would if it continues the shipping would go through the arctic and probably will cost singapore a great deal singapore responded by number one becoming an observer in the arctic organisation and they are planning to you know to invest in ports and should that happen and second also they invest a lot in making singapore ports more efficient so they are not [uh] they are afraid of what will happen but they respond very smartly right by investing and increasing the efficiency of their ports.

And then the efficiency of the government so ships will call at singapore sport regardless of should the crack canal is being implemented. I think about Indonesia also i think in our history. [Um] i think we failed to respond to the changing environment sabang was once main ports for trades now it's losing relevance because of singapore that continuously [uh] you know building innovating and becoming major ports so sabang has long gone as a main port for trade and now singapore face you know you know a changing environment as well if if the arctic ice melt continues it will affect them and it's the crack now also happen it will affect them but they responded very smartly by investing even more and then adding more technology to their ports so it will not lose their relevance i think that's the only answer i can give right now Pak Edi Sucipto.

Host :

Thank you Dr. Vermonte. [[uh]] Dr. Korolev, did you get the question?

Alexander Korolev, Ph.D.:

Actually, there was no translation in english so I that that's why i didn't [uh] get the question okay correctly.

Host:

Allow me to remind you the question so um basically [uh] eddie asked about the cooperation agreement between China and philippines that was signed in 2018. That was after Philippines submit its case to the international arbitrage which china disregard afterwards he inquired what do you think would be the reason for Philippines to go down the path of cooperation with china actually we can see the history of philippines government they attempt to change the way they approach things with China with the change of the political regime is do you have any insights um whether the um what what would be the cost for the government of the philippines to choose cooperation over conflict with China.

Alexander Korolev, Ph.D.:

Yeah sure. Thank you so [uh] I do move, and I do a career with [uh] professor vermont that [uh] so professor said that Indonesia is the middle power and that's why it's more hedging or a balancing position between two or more great powers. So actually, the philippines is the same so the so the new president of the philippines he stated that yeah, we don't understand our limitations we do understand our possibilities that's why our country is a middle power and. That's why we just don't want to put all the acts in one basket. That's why the only option for such you know type of countries like the Philippines as being the male power is to to diversify the geopolitical economic ties. Of course, the philippines is the official security ally of the United States but at the same time [uh] the philippines is also in a huge demand economically.

[Uh] in terms of the fdi from china so that's why the contemporary the Philippines government just don't doesn't want to jeopardise its economic [uh] benefits from cooperation with China. That's why i do believe that this is one of the incentives [uh] why and the reason why [uh] the new philippine president Marcus Jr. wants to lessen and to be less hawkish towards china as [uh] it was under the bernina kino third [uh] administration and and [uh] regular duterte as well so that's why economic pragmatism of the philippines elite [uh] you know predetermined the [uh] this more balanced and hedging position in the philippines foreign policy and spa and in south china sea issue as well.

8. Host:

Thank you, Dr. Korolev, [um] we have a question from our online audience actually and this one is directed to Dr. Vermonte. It's from a policy analyst at an Indonesian local representative. What is the strategy of local government in Indonesia that lies on the border of a province which is close to the South China sea you mentioned about the national regulations the national approach and also multilateralism approach but how about the local regional approach?

Philips Vermonte, Ph.D.

Well unfortunately defence policy foreign policies are not decentralised so local government must follow what has been decided by the national government in Indonesia and in well at the central level at the national level so in this regard when it comes to relations with other countries in the bordering areas of Indonesia. It has to be directed and followed the policies by the central government so there's no kind of a leeway for for local government to have some flexibilities and having their [uh] international relations so to speak with with these countries at the at the borders.

9. Host

Thank you [uh] Phillips. I think this um question should also should probably be replaced into what role the local government can play and how the national government should accommodate that role [uh] i think in line with what Dr karl said about non-state actors we probably need to have more engagement from the local government but it is still understudied and unexplored so i think that's one of the possibilities that we need to explore in the future ladies and gentlemen if there is no more questions from the studio okay we have another one from Berlian Helmy. Committee could you provide the mic? Okay.

Drs. Berlian Helmy

Thank you so i just want to make some clarifications [uh] kind of comments [uh] not not not kind of questions but [uh] to Timothy Heath. Yes you know you know that we are part of intel region connectivity in the uncertain complex interdependence so I think we are now we are now a part in [uh] three [uh] contradictory regions. One in europe eastern, europe western europe with european union one the other one in east asia and the other one in indo-pacific so we have three concepts of interconnectivity [uh] through the [uh] what you call a global

spectrum with diverse philosophy of geopolitical interest. If you talk about east Asia so then we talk about security perspective there is one of the hot spots in southeast asia dispute. That is why chinese aggressiveness in that region cannot be avoidable so well one [uh] note taiwan straight against china will be more you know escalate the tension of geopolitical in that region so [uh] will be more that connectivity [uh] on the basis of security test one and in the pacific. iIf you talk on the pacific it will be a very provocative it is very provocative concept of japan's fight and the asean's away and the other one from india so if you talk about indo pass in the pacific we talk about submarine defense where AUKUS and the quartz is playing there so the connectivity connectivity in that region is more less more security oriented behind this. If you talk about europe now europe europe if you talk about the european union connectivity strategy connected to chinese build and grow initiative it's purely economic and trade but if you talk about eu's connectivity with western lions for example it will be talk about nato's alliance in terms of security so will be some mixture [uh] concept and diverse you know geopolitical philosophy in this in this in this in this [uh] situation well i think in my opinion so [uh] it's it's hard you know [uh] it's a challenge actually for for for for indonesia especially as regional power.

Maybe I'm touching upon governor Dr. Andi Widjajanto [uh] more preferably use the terms [uh] regional power instead of middle power. So I think um you know that's, that's the spectrum now we have to clarify um our position in Indonesia [uh] [uh] just wait and see [uh] how is you know [uh] the dynamic of geopolitics in terms of [uh] economic balance and geopolitical balance [uh] in the context of the regional architecture and secondly more on what [uh] we have been underlined as the um [uh] [uh] [uh] geopolitical stability. Into some extent in in in certain regions cannot be defined as as the as the as the fixed [uh] term so it will be a dynamic equilibrium. So, i think i think it's difficult to define which one is is is is is for um you know firmly [uh] [uh] you know stability for certain region as long as as long as you know [uh] still we have the [uh] complexities uncertainties and unprecedented events inside [uh] all the things.

I think that's my thought that it's a complex challenge for us now so very difficult to get the global stability as long as all the all the [uh] you know [uh] game player there so have a very different and diverse concept and context of the geopolitics in terms of that wide spectrum i

think that's not the questions but just want to share my my thoughts.
Thank you.



QUESTION- ANSWER PLENARY SESSION 3

DAY 2/ 25 August 2022

Advancing Maritime Technology in Geostrategic Context.

1. Timothy R. Heath, Ph.D.:

Okay. Yes, thank you. My question uh is uh actually I did want to ask gentlemen on the far-right monsieur professor um yeah. You mentioned maritime technologies will be critical to rule world leadership and I wonder if you could tell us which types of technologies you were thinking about. Thank you.

Prof. Dr. Ir. Dadan Umar Daihani, D.E.A.:

Yes, uh thank you very much I would like to answer your question in French because you speak french very well. But okay uh I think uh yes the technology is uh for the maritime technology a lot of our thing why if we uh if we can master the maritime technology it will be the leaders in the future. Why as a dimension of other speakers in the or in the maritime a lot of resources and then now we have to develop the supply chains global supply chain. It depends on the maritime as napoleon foreign said that the archbishop country is the futures the sea is the future of resources etc the technology.

The high tech nowadays for instance is more efficient and effective if we are using integrated artificial intelligence. In [uh] the maritime technology so the the trend is how we can use technology as a power and human is a driver of technology this may be uh hopefully can answer your question. Thank you very much Mr. Timothy for your question.

2. Host:

Okay thank you so before I give the second, I mean persons to raise his question. So, I think we all of us just have to give the thing yeah to say thank you to Mr. Ryan from Washington DC. For his uh presentations yeah and also, I mean what you call comments to the our speakers ryan because when you are still very tired. I think is already midnight in Washington DC so thank you very much Ryan and we will meet again in the next activities.

I actually uh would open this question to any of the panelists. [Uh] I, I just wondered if uh the events in Ukraine over the last six months had changed your minds about the role of uh technology in strategic and military affairs. In maritime southeast asia one obvious factor is the ubiquitous use of drones on both sides of the russia ukraine conflict but also the sinking of the russian cruiser moskva.

[Um] there is a debate a long debate that goes back at least to the 1980s and uh the um and the falklands war and perhaps even before then uh which is about the uh the utility of large surface ships in modern warfare given the uh uh the lethality of modern uh high-speed anti-ship missiles are our navy keeps buying in australia keeps buying big and very expensive surface ships. I think Indonesia is as well to a lesser extent and most navies around the world are still investing hundreds of billions of dollars in what look to me to be incredibly vulnerable [uh] [uh] military platforms reinforced again by uh uh by the events in ukraine.

So, I would like your comments narrowly about that but more broadly about whether the war in Ukraine has made you rethink some of your assumptions about uh the role of technology, in uh in in military the military balance in Southeast Asia?

So, Alan will you give a response and maybe other speakers also give very what you call Because this is very time limit so give the answers uh not okay so quick couple of quick responses.

Alan Dupont, Ph.D.:

First of all, you know there is always debate about uh do we have a revolution and you know military affairs or technologies after each war and of course every war focuses the minds of our of our generals and our admirals about whether the old technology is still relevant or to the same extent as it was before I think there are some obvious developments out of Ukraine.

That are applicable now and you've put your finger on one of them drone has been quite revolutionary but not quite as much as a lot of people think because there are counter drone technologies being developed as we talk.

So it's very easy to paint with a broad brush and say all those technologies big ships, tanks, they're all obsolete, we need to look at all the high-tech asymmetric weapons of the future. I think it's probably the truth is somewhere in the middle some of those old traditional platforms will be changed and transformed it's how you use the technology militarily that matters and the russians failed military science 101 or military taxis 101 by deploying their tanks without infantry to support them so it was their faulty tactics rather than the tanks itself.

That you know to argue that tanks are now obsolete because of what happened in Ukraine I don't think necessarily follows the only other point i'd make on this is the way in which the ukrainians have won the information war and this goes to some of the technology we've been talking about you know the wars are one in the in the hearts and minds of humans and information war is critical so you can be you can be deficient in military capabilities but if your information warfare technology and techniques is good as the ukrainians has been you can actually it contributes to you to winning overall in the long term and i think ukraine has done extremely well we've learned a lot a lot of lessons from how to conduct information war in the 21st century. I think we can all learn a lot from that .

Prof. Dr. Ir. Dadan Umar Daihani, D.E.A.:

Yeah, what I'm worried is not the the traditional war but the technological war. Someone said that if i can destroy the country by using computers where you have to send the military so this the technologies. I want over in the future so Ukraine for instance and Russia because the two countries have capabilities in hacking technology cyber warfare etc. Maybe it is just only give another perception thank you please well.

Prof. Tirta Nugraha Mursitama, Ph.D.:

Okay uh I have to admit that I am not an expert on maritime technology same uh but I would like to underlines once again that uh maybe in the future or even today we have to consider that that the uses of the technology like like uh AI machine learning can uh somewhat to just like to change the thing. [Uh] not gradually but maybe uh significantly because we still don't know that whether artificial intelligence in the future would really uh comply or abide by us i mean a human here there's there's still, uh you know like a you know box or something that maybe even 0.001

that may be a possibility that artificial intelligence can go against us. So I don't know here maybe it's quite more normative in answering your question but I think we have to start to think that yeah whoever exists want to be uh let's say middle power or even big power or superpower. I think I have to invest on that things right now um to change the mindset that we have to include technology uh uh in our daily life okay and and uh not to mention us or or China.

I think we even even maybe smaller countries or even even uh yeah in Indonesia we can start from from investing uh investing that that the technology and not only the heart component or hardware.

But I think we have to to start to uh you know to create the education or the not only the higher education but on in the vocational thing uh how to um use technology wisely and interact with humans okay uh I know this is a maybe maybe a scared scatter and answering your question.

But I want to uh say that uh we need to consider technology at the the moment and whoever runs the the technology I think he will rend the world in the future thank you.

R. M. Wibawanto Nugroho Widodo, Ph.D., M.A. (Brad.), M.A., War College Dip. (NDU), M.P.P. (GMU), Ph.D. (Exon.) :

Yes Doctor, a quick response to the Russia-Ukrainians conflicts give us a very good lesson learned about uh and then confirming the potencies by Iran corporations assessments. The global uh you know the future global warfare is uh predominantly influenced by the cyber warfare. Okay so we can see this for from the social aspects the control of information and also the other aspect is in other aspects of technical aspects like intrusions and also sabotaged rights and how it's connected with other domains and how it's well conducted within the joint operations context.

There's some things that we need to learn Indonesia we haven't we haven't been involved in the what the panic said we never been involved in the regular or conventional warfare so we need to learn about this you know and the social aspect and the technical aspects and How the warfare is conducted in the future is a predominantly uh depend on the usage of the cyberspace and how it's connected with other domains that's from mine.

3. Host

Okay thank you. Now I'll give the opportunity to rear Admiral Trusty. Oh yeah okay actually we also have the uh question from the outside this room. Yeah from Fatima Amir from Universitas Islam Indonesia so i mean fatima mir are you there because i'm uh civil uh i mean her questions on screen oh yes yes please just very short questions.

Fatima Amir

Okay thank you so much for the opportunity i want to ask uh how to overcome excessive dependence on technology in this modernization era what if due to increasingly moderate technology human resources i impulsively relief and always need things that smell instant how to overcome all of it that's all for me thank you

Prof. Tirta Nugraha Mursitama, Ph.D.

I mean the technology or something like that okay I don't really get it the the question quickly clearly. Boleh mungkin pakai Bahasa Indonesia?

Fatima Amir

Baik pak. Jadi saya bertanya tentang ketergantungan yang berlebihan di era [ee] teknologi yang modern ini. Dan bagaimana jika karena teknologi yang semakin modern ini, sumber daya manusia bertindak impulsif meremehkan sesuatu atau meringankan, dan selalu membutuhkan hal-hal yang berbau instan.

Prof. Tirta Nugraha Mursitama, Ph.D.

Saya jawab pakai bahasa Indonesia. Pertanyaan yang bagus sekali. Jadi kita harus menyadari bahwa teknologi itu hanyalah tools. adu kita yang mengontrol teknologi. Namun demikian ada satu teknologi ya, katakanlah kecerdasan buatan. Itu kalau algoritmanya bisa lebih canggih, manusia bisa saja ada chance kalau mereka bisa melawan kita. Tidak ada yang bisa membuat kita secure, bahwa Artificial Intelligence itu secure dalam hadapan manusia. Mungkin kalau dalam konteks kita generasi muda, sama halnya tadi. Mau itu diterapkan dalam kehidupan sehari-hari, teknologi harus di bawah kendali kita.

Bagaimana, saya setuju tadi bagaimana mindset kita sebagai huma bisa mengatur. Teknologi dalam tanda kutip sangat netral. Namun ketika dia belajar dari perilaku kita, dia bisa menemukan pola yang kemudian akan berpikir secara independen untuk kemudian memilih keputusan kepada manusia. Yang kedua tentu kita harus menggunakannya secara bijak. Sehingga kesannya tadi, sampai membuat hasil itu ingin diraih secara instan. Tetap harus menjalani suatu proses. Jadi contohnya mahasiswa, ketika ada tugas, tidak hanya ambil sumber di Internet dan copas-copas aja.

4. Host

[Uh] actually we still have uh two persons uh i mean who wants to raise uh their questions yeah and i will give the opportunity to Pak Indra Sutomo, director of the Antagraha Bank International.

Mr. Indra Sutomo

Based on your presentation technology maybe is unappointable for us and alongside to build the capability of maritime industry with advanced technology we have to in parallel to build the ai machine learning and big data as Mr. Dupont said action is required so indonesia can have a leading role to play actually fatima on the zoom is also asking about the human capital and the question is maybe how is the initiative for the human to build human capital capability uh in indonesia so how we can do the ai thing machine learning thing big data things because human capital is maybe the most uh most important thing in here.

The second question is also the initiative maybe for the infrastructure maybe the infrastructure technology actually for the internet things we talked about the iot and any things maybe the infrastructure is yeah we we will go there to complete the infrastructure the land infrastructure. But when you say about the space technology infrastructure, I don't know what is the initiative for that. Maybe we have a satellite there but maybe not much and how to to build and to add that because we have a we are the maritime uh maritime country. Yeah we have to know all about the Indonesia maritime country and then we also have to maybe the initiative or big data cross-institut institution so we know the the what the wealth of the maritime in indonesia but that yeah two questions.

Alan Dupont, Ph.D :

Thank you really enlightening question well uh just i go straight forward at the first uh response the first question initiative in building the human capital since i am from from higher education we have to invest in higher education but as i mentioned before we need also to mention in the professional school that's very important.

I just uh just quick uh observation now the data scientist the you know there's a needs of people who mastering in data science so like for example venus and i believe in other universities as well uh there are so many uh uh requirements also so many uh you know uh demand from the industry body data science.

In Binus uh computer science and information system uh you know the best graduate even not graduate yet officially that's already higher okay this is the the real things and [uh] AI machine learning big data actually is it's not just jared gordon but it's real. And I believe mr, Industry, because you're working in the bank industry so you believe how the competition is very fierce on that field as well. And even now uh let's say the the starting salary for the data science would just graduate for undergraduate uh more than two digits so if even from one industry or even one firm of our company the eager to hijack even from still the junior developer or the junior quarter. So this is a real thing so if uh we need uh we are really serious on on developing the the uh ai related technology we start from the education of course education is not merely the the the public and private one it's not only about the universities but also another. Let's let's institution uh that's why uh uh we can also learn from from the uh whatever sources that available our online uh online course and so on and so forth.

That's one thing but the second point I think the the initiative of the government is a must relate to the the question uh number two I think the AI related or technology related big data is a huge money so if if just just let's say one institution or one individual just invest to the AI courses it's a small uh thing.

But if the government is very serious in there on this issue I think they have to to uh i don't know revitalize this curriculum uh maybe from the you know high school to the to the uh graduate school related to these topics or their study program.

And they have they have to start pouring money investing the infrastructure and also creating the let's say the best uh education on that and we know the the other thing is that uh we need to invest more on the public rnd we know that the brain and so on and so forth so so many complicated uh you know arrangement on that. But actually you know, I think there's still a hope that how that we can go further on that by investing rnd a public RND in a huge manner. It gives a signal to the private sectors okay since the government invests on that now retake project as well. Let's give a signal to us. Okay I will join jointly invest on that specific project we go along together because the we know that the the logic of the government and the state at the uh the market is different we thought the signal from the government. I believe that you will not invest on all that kind of the big things we thought you know you know uh uh it is important but we don't know yet how effective and how the written of investment in the future okay this is just my my quick response thank you.

R. M. Wibawanto Nugroho Widodo, Ph.D., M.A. (Brad.), M.A., War College Dip. (NDU), M.P.P. (GMU), Ph.D. (Exon.)

Saya hanya mau tambah sedikit poin ya. Yang pertama adalah dari perspektif higher education dan professional schools tadi. Pembelajaran teknologi harus dengan interdisciplinary, dengan social science dan public policy.

Sehingga keluaran-keluaran dari didikan ini tidak hanya menjadi teknisi, tetapi menjadi strategis. Karena banyak orang Indonesia jago matematika, dan fisika tapi kenapa dari global normalnya menjadi inovator. Ada tiga aspek yang bisa dieksplor. Teologi, Alam, dan Manusia. Jadi kita harus selain mengawasi teknologi, menguasai social science dan public policy.

Saya mau address mengenai pentingnya government untuk melakukan percepatan pembangunan tiga lapisan tiga cyber. Yang pertama adalah lapisan fisik, infrastructure dan hardware yang tersebar di lingkungan geografis Indonesia. Yang kedua adalah pembangunan logical obligations, atau logical network. Untuk sementara mungkin kita harus bergandengan tangan dengan pihak luar negeri untuk hal itu. Untuk menstimulasi perkembangan produksi dari logical layer. Yang ketiga adalah manusia, sebagai layer yang ketiga. Nah ini semua tidak boleh saling kalah, tiga-tiganya harus berimbang dan diukur benar. Pembangunan lapisan cybernya

menjadi backbone. Dan interconnectivity dengan domain lain. Saya rasa itu.

Host :

Please, Alan. Will you give any comments?

Alan Dupont, Ph.D :

So I'm not sure in Indonesia if this is the case but in Australia we have this acronym called STEM, right.

Yeah okay so so there's a big drive for stem graduates because everyone is making the argument that with all this technology we need to have people who are more technologically literate and understanding that's true.

However what we're finding is that there are a whole lot of ancillary disciplines supporting disciplines that you need to develop at the same time who's looking at the legal dimension of all these technology sort of innovations who's looking at the ethical side. Who's looking at the policy side what does it all mean so you need to have people who also have skills in the social sciences working with the stem people together, you know, because it's not usually everything we look at is not just a straight question of the technology. We understand the technology the question is what does it mean how do we integrate that into our economic or military decision making what are the consequences of doing that what are the economic tradeoffs you need to have economists working on this so you need to put together a team of people who understand the whole ecosystem in which you're operating and that means the demand for non-stem people is also very great.

But the non-stem people need to have a better understanding of the stem subjects to talk about. They have to have higher levels of literacy in stem to understand the policy stuff if you don't have that then you can't understand what the consequences of the policy implications are. Okay.



QUESTIONS IN CHAT BOX

Day 1 – 24 August 2022

09:27 AM From Muhammad Sulton_DinkopJatim:

Question to Dr. Koh, in a digital point of view, what did you see the possible Cybersecurity threat years ahead especially in ASEAN region, caused by this uncertain geopolitics?

Question to Sam,

Do you think that the colonialization era still happening nowadays (in a different form and different methodology), how do you draw its spread of power in your perspective?

09:45 AM - RINI AM - KESBANGPOL PROV KALTARA:

Maybe we should add proxy war after cold war start from cold war end until now

10:10 AM - Adi Haryono

Mendalami paparan pak gubernur tentang test mdo 2025, dalam krisis ukraine dan taiwan, apakah penerapan multidomain operation sudah terjadi ?

10:14 AM - Aulia Shifa Hamida

Concerning Indonesia's need for military transformation, reform, and defense modernization, such agenda will require outer help from particular country/ies with great military posture already in hand. It's important for Indonesia to have a non-negotiable, basic, underlying values as the building block of its military transformation. What potential country partner(s) do u see Indonesia can forge a cooperation to further its agenda regarding military and defense modernization?

10:18 AM - Rudi Rusdiah Chair of ABDI (Association of Big Data & AI) and Lemhannas PPRA 2008 alumny

Very interesting that we are in the fifth geopolitical shift with the problem of semiconductor supply chain in the Taiwan Strait. Could Dr Andi Governor Lemhannas explore further on the China military exercise & military built up that souround Taiwan could choke the semiconductor supply chain and global connectivity similarly to Ukraina conflict with the food and energy supply chain? How is the role of Indonesian presidency of G20?

10:24 AM - Peni Hanggarini, Doctoral Student from Republic of Indonesia Defense University

A question to Sam Roggeveen:

How can Indonesia-Australia's bilateral maritime cooperation could contribute to the development of Indonesia's maritime capability which could support to your view that "Indonesia should lead others in Southeast Asia in anticipating the increasing dominant power of China in the future?"

10:42 AM - M Zaki

Prof., can the Policy of 'Bebas Aktif' be interpreted as the basis for Indonesia to become major power in the region and the world and not as 'limiting' factor for Indonesia to achieve this goal?

10:54 AM - Ni Made Vira Saraswati

Is it possible for asean centrality to be a balancing power in the region in the situation where the asean members opinion are disperse and sided to different external powers? How to strengthen the asean centrality when myanmar-cambodia-and vietnam seem to rely on china while singapore close to the west?

11:25 AM - RINI AM, KESBANGPOL PROV KALTARA

in my opinion, china has power and be number one of economic hegemony, but in security and technology, US still in front of china

01:40 PM - Edrida Pulungan_AnalisKebijakan

I have question for Mr Philip Vermonte. What is the startegy of local government in Indonesia for some border in province which is closed to laut chin asea in economic, social and politic? thank you.

02:25 PM - RINI AM - KESBANGPOL PROV KALTARA

excuse me, i would ask to all speakers this afternoon, in their opinions, how should indonesian government do to control and protect territorial sea and economic for balancing from hegemony of economic china and military force of USA ?, as we know indonesia have two territorial strategic sea or area, there are Ambalat and natuna, and it's be high attention for country that have some interest there, thank you

Day 2 – 25 August 2022**10:10 AM - Nasrudin Tueka, DPP IKAL Lemhannas**

Untuk Prof Dadan Umar Dahliani , menyangkut Global Suplai Change adopt technology untuk daya saing Indonesia dan bagaimana konsepsi kebijakan strategisnya di tingkat BRIN . Bahwa konektivitas kawasan itu harusnya memberi daya tarik antara Negara - Negara satu dengan yang lainnya secara global (bukan patahan, gubernur speak). Contoh kawasan Silicon valey USA di dukung oleh RD stanford University, bagaimana technology Indonesia implementasinya di IKN?

10:10 AM - Sukendar Martha

Question to Prof. Dadan Umar Daihani : On your presentation you raised question whether the future technology will help human activities or will destruct people life One of the interesting " joke " you mentioned : technology (Wifi) is now more important than wife to say that the future technology will be more destructive for human being compared to its usefulness . Could you please elaborate more . Thank you . Sukendra Martha : Profesional Fellow in Geography and Natural Resources - Lemhannas.



PROFILE OF THE SPEAKERS





DR. ANDI WIDJAJANTO

Dr. Andi Widjajanto born in Jakarta on September 3, 1971, was inaugurated as Governor of Lemhannas RI by President Joko Widodo on February 21, 2022. He served as Cabinet Secretary during the Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla administration (2014-2015) and Senior Advisor to the Presidential Chief of Staff. (2016-2021).

He has a background as an academician, was a permanent lecturer in International Relations at the University of Indonesia (1999-2014), and is now a Senior Advisor at LAB 45 with a concentration of studies in the fields of defense, international relations, and cyber security.

He studied international relations and defense studies at International Relations, FISIP, University of Indonesia, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), National Defense University in Washington D.C., and S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore.



ADMIRAL (RET) PROF. DR. MARSETIO

Prof. Dr. Marsetio is a Professor of Maritime Defence Science, Indonesia Defence University. He is currently Special Advisor to the Coordinating Minister for Maritime and Investment on Maritime Defence and Security. Beside that, he also served as Indonesia Special Envoy to IMO in London, the UK and Chairman of PT Pelabuhan Indonesia (Persero).

He has a well-known track record at both the national and international levels. He is often invited and speaks for seminars home and abroad, Permanent lecturer at Lemhannas RI (Indonesia National Resilience Institute), Lecturer at Sesko TNI, service command and staff college, Police Science University (PTIK), State Intelligence Institute (STIN) and MOFA's high level courses at Susparlu Kemlu, Lecturer at Indonesia Defence University, and Lecturer at a number of Private and State Universities.

He received a doctoral degree from Gadjah Mada University and obtained medals of honour such as Bintang Mahaputra Utama (Republic of Indonesia's most prestigious medal of honour) and 31 medals of honour from Indonesia and other countries.



SAM ROGGEVEEN

Sam Roggeveen is a Director of the Lowy Institute's International Security Program. Before joining the Lowy Institute, Sam was a senior strategic analyst in Australia's peak intelligence agency, the Office of National Assessments, where his work dealt mainly with North Asian strategic affairs, including nuclear strategy and Asian military forces. Sam also worked on arms control policy in Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs, and as an analyst in the Defence Intelligence Organisation.

Sam has a long-standing interest in politics and political philosophy, and in 2019 he wrote *Our Very Own Brexit: Australia's Hollow Politics and Where it Could Lead Us*, about the hollowing out of Western democracy and its implications for Australia.

Sam writes for newspapers and magazines in Australia and around the world, and is a regular commentator on the Lowy Institute's digital magazine, *The Interpreter*, of which he was the founding editor from 2007 to 2014. Sam is also Director of Digital at the Lowy Institute, and editor of the *Lowy Institute Papers*.

**COLLIN KOH SWEE LEAN, Ph.D.**

Collin Koh Swee Lean is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies which is a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, based in Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He has research interests on naval affairs in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on Southeast Asia. Collin has published several op-eds, policy- and academic journal articles as well as chapters for edited volumes covering his research areas. He has also taught at Singapore Armed Forces professional military education and training courses.

Besides research and teaching, Collin also contributes his perspectives to various local and international media outlets and participates in activities with geopolitical risks consultancies.



TIMOTHY R. HEATH

Timothy R. Heath is a senior international defense researcher at the RAND Corporation. Prior to joining RAND in October 2014, he served as the senior analyst for the USPACOM China Strategic Focus Group. He has over twenty years of experience researching and analyzing military and political topics related to China.

In addition to his publications with the RAND Corporation, Heath has published numerous articles and one book. Fluent in Mandarin Chinese, he has extensive experience analyzing China's national strategy, politics, ideology, and military, as well as Asian regional security developments. He has a Ph.D. in political science from George Mason University and an M.A. in Asian studies from George Washington University.



ALAN DUPONT, PH.D.

Alan Dupont, Ph.D. is the founder and CEO of the Cognoscenti Group, a geopolitical risk consultancy. He is also the Defence and National Security Advocate for Australia's Northern Territory. Dr. Dupont has an international reputation for his expertise on defence and national security and has worked extensively at the interface of security, politics, business and technology. He has held many advisory and board positions in government and the corporate sector.

In 2013/14 he established and led the Australian Government's Defence White Paper team.

Dr. Dupont has received commendations for his work from the Foreign Minister of Japan and the President of Timor-Leste and was named by the Australian Financial Review as one of Australia's leading strategists. In 2019, he was made an Officer in the Order of Australia for "distinguished service to the international community through security analysis and strategic policy development." The author of nearly 100 books, monographs and articles on defence and international security, his path breaking study of the non-military, transnational challenges to East Asia's security for Cambridge University Press (East Asia Imperilled) is generally acknowledged to be one of the authoritative academic works in the field. Dr. Dupont was the inaugural holder of the Michael Hintze Chair in International Security at the University of Sydney, Director of the Centre for International Security Studies and start-up CEO of the United States Studies Centre.

Dr. Dupont holds a PhD in international relations from the Australian National University and is a graduate of the Royal Military College Duntroon and the US Foreign Service Institute. He is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington and the Lowy Institute in Sydney and is Contributing National Security Editor for The Australian newspaper.



ALEXANDER KOROLEV

Alexander Korolev is a Ph.D. in Political Science, Associate Professor, Deputy Head of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies, Higher School of Economics. Alexander is an expert at Russian International Affairs Council and the Valdai International Discussion Club.

He is a well-known Russian specialist in international relations in Eurasia, regional integration and security in the Asia-Pacific region. He is an author of more than 40 academic works in Russian, English, Chinese, Vietnamese and more than 50 analytical materials in favour of Russian government authorities, international companies and regional development institutions. In 2018 Alexander was a Visiting Fellow at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University (USA) and Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS Malaysia).



PHILIPS J. VERMONTE, Ph.D.

Philips J. Vermonte joined CSIS in 2001. He received his Master of Arts degree in international studies from Department of Politics, the University of Adelaide, Australia, in 2001, funded by the AusAID scholarship. He obtained his Ph.D in Political Science at Northern Illinois University, Dekalb, USA in 2012. He is one of the founding members of the policy research network (ProREP).

He is one of the expert respondents (narasumber ahli) of Metro TV and actively contributes to the Jakarta Post and Tempo Magazine.



RYAN HASS

Ryan Hass is a senior fellow and the Michael H. Armacost Chair in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, where he holds a joint appointment to the John L. Thornton China Center and the Center for East Asia Policy Studies. He is also the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies. He was part of the inaugural class of David M. Rubenstein fellows at Brookings and is a nonresident affiliated fellow in the Paul Tsai China Center at Yale Law School. Hass focuses his research and analysis on enhancing policy development on the pressing political, economic, and security challenges facing the United States in East Asia.

Prior to joining NSC, Hass served as a Foreign Service Officer in U.S. Embassy Beijing, where he earned the State Department Director General's award for impact and originality in reporting, an award given annually to the officer whose reporting had the greatest impact on the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. Hass also served in Embassy Seoul and Embassy Ulaanbaatar, and domestically in the State Department Offices of Taiwan Coordination and Korean Affairs. Hass received multiple Superior Honor and Meritorious Honor commendations during his 15-year tenure in the Foreign Service.

Hass is the author of "Stronger: Adapting America's China Strategy in an Age of Competitive Interdependence" (Yale University Press, 2021), a coeditor of "Global China: Assessing China's Growing Role in the World" (Brookings Press, 2021), and of the monograph, "The future of US policy toward China: Recommendations for the Biden administration" (Brookings, 2020). He also leads the Democracy in Asia project at the Brookings Institution.

Hass was born and raised in Washington state. He graduated from the University of Washington and attended the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies prior to joining the State Department.



TIRTA NUGRAHA MURSITAMA

Tirta Nugraha Mursitama, or Tirta as his nickname, is currently a professor in International Business Management. He is currently the head of the Centre for Business and Diplomatic Studies (CBDS), Bina Nusantara University.

He received his bachelor's degree from the Department of International Relations, University of Indonesia, in 1999. He then received his master's degree in 2004 and doctorate in 2007, both in management, from the Graduate School of Management, Gakushuin University, Tokyo, Japan. His master's degree and doctorate were funded by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). He received professorship from Bina Nusantara University in 2015. He also received his second doctorate from Padjadjaran University in 2016.

Prior to joining Bina Nusantara University in late November 2011, he was a faculty member in the Department of International Relations, University of Indonesia. There, he taught courses on international trade regimes, international finance regimes, and international political economic thoughts.

He was a visiting fellow at the School of Marketing, Management and International Business, Australian National University in September-November 2011. Partnering with Associate Professor Pierre van der Eng, he conducted research on the internationalization of corporate Indonesia and its impact on the economic relationship between Australia and Indonesia. He writes his thought in his weblog mursitama.com.



DADAN UMAR DAIHANI

Dadan Umar Daihani is a Senior Expert of the National Resilience Institute of Republic Indonesia (Lemhannas RI) and a Professor at Trisakti University.

He is currently the Senior Analyst at National Resilience Laboratory and also former Head of Trisakti International Business School. Lemhannas National Resilience Laboratory measuring the national resilience index periodically. Dadan was fully involved in creating and building this system and carried out analysis and formulated recommendations to increase Indonesia's national resilience.

He has a well-known track record at both the national and international levels. He is often invited and speaks at scientific forums such as the JGF, GIS User Conference in San Diego, KNDU (Korea National Defense University) International Seminar on Non- Conventional Security Threats, The Seventh International Conference on Computing, Engineering, and Design (ICCED 2021) and others.

He received a bachelor's degree in industrial engineering from Bandung Institute of Technology (1979) and obtained his Masters (1990) and PhD (1993) from D'Aix Marseille III University France, in the field of Automatic Production Management System.

Dadan is a founding member of the Institute for Industrial Engineering and Management Association, whose mission is to build expertise in industrial technology and industrial management in Indonesia. He is also member of several professional association such as the Indonesian Lecturer Association (ADI), Association of Indonesian Engineers and others.



R. M. WIBAWANTO NUGROHO WIDODO, PH.D., M.A. (BRAD.), M.A., WAR COLLEGE DIP. (NDU), M.P.P. (GMU), PH.D. (EXON.)

R.M. Wibawanto Nugroho Widodo is a Deputy Head of National Defense and Security Affairs at RI National Resilience Institute Alumni Association Strategic Center (IKAL Strategic Center). He is currently Assistant Professor of International Politics at Universitas Pelita Harapan, Director for International Programs at Democracy and Integrity for Peace (DIP) Institute, and President Commissioner at PT Indopara Sista Semesta.

He is received a bachelor's degree in economics at Universitas Trisakti (2001), master's degree in International Business and Management at University of Bradford (2003), master's degree in Strategic Security Studies and War College Diploma in Combating Terrorism, Irregular Warfare, and International Security Strategy at U.S. National Defense University (2007), master's degree at at the Schar School of Government and Policy, George Mason University (2013), and Ph.D. from University of Exeter UK, in the field of Arab and Islamic Studies.

**CURIE MAHARANI, Ph.D.**

Curie Maharani is a lecturer for the streaming of Security Studies at Binus University. She received her PhD in Defence Management and Leadership from Cranfield University in 2016. Previously, she received cum laude in her master's study at Institut Teknologi Bandung, majoring in Defence Management, in 2017, and her bachelor's degree at Universitas Indonesia, majoring in International Relations, in 2002.

Prior to joining Binus, Curie has been actively working on issues of defence management with the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia, National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), and S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. She is an observer on defence procurement and industrial policy, offset, arms proliferation, and technology indigenisation. She was part of the Southeast Asian Young Leaders' Program at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2017 and 2018.



**AMBASSADOR PROF.(RIS) IKRAR NUSA
BHAKTI, PH.D.**

Ambassador Prof.(Ris) Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, Ph.D.

Executive Course on Security pada Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), 2002-1 (Angkatan Pertama 2002), United States Pacific Command, Honolulu, March-May 2002.

Mendapatkan gelar Profesor Riset dalam bidang Intermestic Affairs dari Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIPI) pada 29 Desember 2006 dengan Pidato Pengukuhan berjudul Merajut Jaring-Jaring Kerjasama Keamanan Indonesia-Australia (Agreement on Maintaining Security/AMS era PM Paul Keating dan Presiden Soeharto).

The Jakarta Geopolitical Forum VI 2022 hosted by Lemhannas RI (The National Resilience Institute of the Republic of Indonesia) on 24-25 August 2022 specified to focus on geopolitical matters as the implementation of critical thinking and the development of new ideas and strategic thinking which are the annual routine of The National Resilience Institute of the Republic of Indonesia based on its main tasks and functions as The School of Geopolitics.

The Security game power and global economic powerhouse in on-going hegemonic transition will have an impact on possible changes in the international order. Maritime will be the dominant competition arena, with dynamics that are challenging to take into account. The challenge of maintaining the status-quo and revival of revisionist will arise when the use of force in maritime power will include the struggle for the sake of resources and technology for power. Defeating the multipolar forces is inevitable which causes hegemony to be unable to build global stability. Furthermore, the recasting of global order in the era of strategic reality has implications far beyond the power-shift by the rise of China and the fall of the United States (The US)' supremacy. Based on that, the theme of JGF VI/2022 is "Geo Maritime: Chasing the Future of Global Stability."

The purposes of the theme are to understand the contemporary geo-maritime context that emerge power to upcoming geopolitical issues, to explore the maritime-based geopolitics and its global impact. Whereas the objectives is to structure a design of relations among geopolitical actors in achieving a balancing that comes to the global stability.

This Proceeding compiles the papers of all speakers of JGF VI/2022:

- Collin Koh Swee Lean, Ph.D.
- Admiral TNI (rtd) Prof. Dr. Marsetio, S.IP., M.M.
- Mr. Sam Roggeveen
- Dr. Andi Widjajanto
- Timothy R. Heath, Ph.D.
- Philips Vermonte, Ph.D.,
- Alan Dupont, Ph.D.
- Alexander Korolev, Ph.D.
- Mr. Ryan Hass
- Prof. Tirta Nugraha Mursitama, Ph.D.
- Prof. Dadan Umar Daihani, D.E.A.
- R.M. Wibawanto Nugroho Widodo, S.E., M.A., War College Dip., M.P.P., Ph.D.

The moderator :

- Ms. Curie Maharani Savitri, Ph.D.
- Ambassador Prof. Dr. H. Ikrar Nusa Bhakti



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